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hello um thank you thank you everyone

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for being here at 10 o'clock I know when

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I got the the timeslot announced when I

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was worried no one would come but

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delighted to see you all here so welcome

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to making sense of the ether connecting

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radio frequencies with public data so

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I'm mark de Costa I kind of a both a a

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radio and a data nerd of different

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stripes I do a lot of work working with

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public records in public data and kind

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of combining them cleaning them and

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trying to make them useful as a way to

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understand the world in which we live

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I'll just go back quickly as some of the

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notes and references and slides and

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stuff are available on a github repo

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which you can find there if you're

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interested so I'm going to be talking a

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lot about public data in this talk and I

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thought is a good way to kind of kick

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things off and start I wanted to kind of

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set a little bit of parameters and give

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you guys a little bit of a look and feel

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of what I mean when I talk about public

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data so so kind of run through some

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examples public data is is kind of

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amazing because it's you can kind of

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think of it as like the exhaust that

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comes off of government regulation in a

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way so this is an example is an FEC

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Federal Election Commission filing from

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the Trump campaign years ago and you can

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see it's a hundred and forty dollar

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Hoover disbursement and what's really

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cool about this data set is you can see

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you know all of the line items of those

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sorts of things this is of course a

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McDonald's drive-through and you might

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say what does this have to do with

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public data but what's really cool and

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what I'll be talking about a little bit

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later is every or most of the McDonald's

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drive-throughs in the countries are

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connected to the restaurants through

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commercial radios which means that you

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can find records of them in public data

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and use them to understand what's going

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on you know also this is just a slide

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from a 990 kind of not-for-profit tax

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filing you can see some curators at the

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Museum of Modern Art in the city here

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make a tremendous amount of money what's

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really cool any time you walk into an

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elevator you probably see a placard like

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this

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and every state has you know a record of

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every elevator in in the state and who

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runs it and how fast it is and things

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like that this is a copy of the deed for

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the hotel that we're standing in

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aircrafts of course are all registered

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and you I think there's a hundred

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thousand or so of them registered in the

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country which you can all go fine and

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this is actually one of my favorite

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examples of public data it's an import

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Bill of Lading record from the return of

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the Apollo 11 moon mission because they

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were importing space rocks into the air

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moon rocks into the earth they had to

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fill out a form and you know I think it

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it goes a long way to kind of

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understanding like all of the kind of

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weird stuff that is reflected in public

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data so you know I'm sure a lot of you

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guys have been to you hope before and of

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course club monta is a part of the

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experience and the culture and I was

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really excited to see like what could I

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find out about club mottai in public

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data as an example and you might be

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surprised to know but the 2600

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enterprises incorporated imported almost

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2700 kilograms of club mate' for the

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event here and what's really cool is you

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know I was able to go search through

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through the public records and find that

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you know they all came from this brewery

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in Germany which has really cool

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machines that are used to manufacture

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and to brew the club mottai it you know

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went to Bremen Haven port on the 30th of

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April this year went into a very

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specific shipping container sailed on a

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very specific ship the vecchio bridge

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and then arrived in the port of Newark

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you know just two months before the

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event and so we can of course thankthank

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that wonderful supply chain for being

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able to be at a clock at 10 o'clock

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tonight in any event you know to sort of

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just grant that is a little bit of

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ground work and get down to really the

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meat of the talk I want us to kind of

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think about how we can use you know the

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RF spectrum in public data to help

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really understand that the world around

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us

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and I'm sure as many of you know the

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electromagnetic spectrum is really big

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you know we of course usually live in

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this like tiny little slice of the

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visual spectrum but we sort of see but

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you know across all of this there is a

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very big band of things that we usually

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think about is radio radio is of course

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one of the people that's really given

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credit for its invention is Marconi and

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in the early 20th century when it was

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being commercialized it was happening

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you know under a context without

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regulation and it was really kind of a

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free-for-all and interestingly the

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sinking of the Titanic is is kind of

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considered to be one of the origin

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moments of the current regime of a sort

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of electromagnetic spectrum regulation

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we have right now you know the Titanic

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was kind of a state-of-the-art ship at

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the time it had an onboard you know

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radio transmission station and when the

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ship ran into trouble they were

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broadcasting SOS signals but what sort

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of came out later was that because of

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all of the radio frequency interference

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on the land base stations and cities and

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things like this those SS SOS signals

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didn't really come through and so this

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sort of by extension wound up leading to

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the radioactive 19:12 which set the

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groundwork for the current FCC and the

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sort of regulatory regimes that we have

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at the moment and what's really

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interesting about that and this image

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will be a little bit of a touchstone

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throughout the talk is that you know

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given all of this kind of government

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regulatory systems that are in place we

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have you know a really clearly

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demarcated and a really you know hyper

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specific set of rules about how and for

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what the radio spectrum can be used so

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this map is really interesting it I

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think it goes something from three

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kilohertz all the way up basically to 30

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gigahertz and along the way it allocates

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those bands for different uses so just

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to zoom in a little bit here to kind of

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put this into a bit of context that

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maybe will be more familiar you know we

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can see sort of it in the top

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Center there we've got a band basically

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from 88 megahertz to 108 megahertz that

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of course is carved out for FM broadcast

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radio like we listen to you in our car

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or whatever but also you know one thing

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that I think is really interesting to

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kind of recognize is that you know along

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this spectrum there are so many

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different sort of zones that are cut out

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for different uses so you can see a

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little bit further down the spectrum in

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the kind of 150

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megahertz zone is where a maritime ship

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position data is is broadcast on the

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radio spectrum and I'll be talking a

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little bit more about that later and you

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know even kind of continuing down we can

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see that there's a big chunk reserved

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for things like aircraft navigation and

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each one of these little slots has all

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sorts of you know very specific with

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people that are allowed to use it and

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applications and protocols for which it

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is used and you know of course the the

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radio spectrum is like a highly you know

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politicized and economically important

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thing you know just recently with the

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kind of retirement of analog television

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broadcasting big swaths of the spectrum

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were opened up and you know last year

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there was a large auction and you had

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twenty billion dollars changing hand

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hands basically for that spectrum you

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know as you can see the people that are

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buying it are like t-mobile and AT&T and

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Dish Network and folks like that but

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this is you know sort of certainly a

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very octave an important space and you

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know the kind of upside of the

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regulatory regime in which all this

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stuff sits is that there's a tremendous

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amount of kind of data exhaust and

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information about how the spectrum is

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being used that's produced not what's

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really very easy to work with but it is

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kind of out there and in the United

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States the two main sort of databases

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that exist are both run by the FCC the

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first one at the top as you can see you

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know looks like something from the 90s

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and it's it

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is it's the universal licensing system

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and it's it's certainly the place where

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you can get the richest degree of data

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about how the spectrum is being used so

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each different class has its own sort of

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forums and things that get filled out

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and they all sort of flow they're a

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project that came out of the FCC under

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the Obama administration that reboot FCC

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gov is this license view database and

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what's really nice about that is it

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drops out a lot of the ancillary fields

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and the really high resolution that you

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get from the universal licensing system

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but the upside of that is you can go and

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get sort of one file that describes more

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or less all of the licenses that exist

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and the the great thing about that is

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you know in the US there's about 30

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million licenses that have been given

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out and these things run the spectrum

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from you know from a McDonald's

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drive-thru to a Verizon base station and

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so it's really quite a rich thing this

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data itself is a little tricky to work

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with this is a link to a github repo of

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a repository I made that sort of helps

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you bootstrap working with this data so

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we'll sort of download it load it into a

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post Grise database that you presumably

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have running locally geocoded and and

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sort of do some basic cleaning and the

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thing that's interesting about this data

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set and having it sort of prepared in

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that form is you can really start asking

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questions of it straight out of the gate

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so this which I hope you guys can see is

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just a you know really simple sort of

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you know geo query that I did of this

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data set to basically ask the question

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you know who are the people within a

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kilometer of this hotel that have radio

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licenses and by doing this you know in

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this of course varies by location but

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you can start to understand you know who

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are you know who are the actors who are

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the people that are are kind of out

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there you know living in the broader

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spectrum around us you know not not

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surprisingly where we are now but the

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city of New York and the NYPD really

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have the lion's share of the spectrum

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around us but you also start to learn

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you know other things about the kook

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environment that we are so there's a lot

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of TV studios so we can see you know Fox

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and NBC and CBS and other folks this was

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what sort of one a little bit further

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down that jumped out at me that was

273
00:11:11,210 --> 00:11:14,870
really surprising kind of in my broader

274
00:11:12,890 --> 00:11:17,180
investigations in New York was to

275
00:11:14,870 --> 00:11:19,870
realize that Northrop Grumman has a

276
00:11:17,180 --> 00:11:23,359
massive wireless network in the city

277
00:11:19,870 --> 00:11:25,430
they have thousands and thousands of of

278
00:11:23,360 --> 00:11:26,930
transmitters right across and you know

279
00:11:25,430 --> 00:11:28,609
at first blush seeing a defense

280
00:11:26,930 --> 00:11:30,859
contractor was such a big network in the

281
00:11:28,610 --> 00:11:34,880
city was quite surprising

282
00:11:30,860 --> 00:11:37,370
apparently it's part of a we what wound

283
00:11:34,880 --> 00:11:39,860
up being a very underutilized sort of

284
00:11:37,370 --> 00:11:41,690
you know city level wireless network

285
00:11:39,860 --> 00:11:43,280
that was deployed but certainly

286
00:11:41,690 --> 00:11:45,110
interesting to see and at the at the

287
00:11:43,280 --> 00:11:48,410
bottom we can see with McDonald's and a

288
00:11:45,110 --> 00:11:50,660
Swiss bank are well represented here and

289
00:11:48,410 --> 00:11:53,780
so you know I don't know how familiar

290
00:11:50,660 --> 00:11:56,540
you all are with using software-defined

291
00:11:53,780 --> 00:11:58,939
radios and sort of how that technology

292
00:11:56,540 --> 00:12:01,010
has evolved over the last maybe ten

293
00:11:58,940 --> 00:12:03,020
years at this point but it's really

294
00:12:01,010 --> 00:12:06,560
great there's you know because of the

295
00:12:03,020 --> 00:12:09,650
influx of low-cost digital TV tuners

296
00:12:06,560 --> 00:12:11,349
there were some very clever hackers that

297
00:12:09,650 --> 00:12:14,689
realize that you could basically

298
00:12:11,350 --> 00:12:16,820
repurpose the chipsets in those tuners

299
00:12:14,690 --> 00:12:19,010
in order to not just tune into a

300
00:12:16,820 --> 00:12:20,420
broadcast television but you know really

301
00:12:19,010 --> 00:12:22,850
take a pretty broad range I think

302
00:12:20,420 --> 00:12:24,709
somewhere from maybe thirty megahertz to

303
00:12:22,850 --> 00:12:27,110
to just over a Giga hurt and they're

304
00:12:24,710 --> 00:12:29,390
like twenty bucks or less and really

305
00:12:27,110 --> 00:12:31,970
great tools for getting started with

306
00:12:29,390 --> 00:12:35,180
exploring the all of the transmissions

307
00:12:31,970 --> 00:12:37,280
that are in the air around us there's

308
00:12:35,180 --> 00:12:39,380
really great you know sort of software

309
00:12:37,280 --> 00:12:42,199
around there this is sort of a really

310
00:12:39,380 --> 00:12:45,590
easy standard one called GQ rx which is

311
00:12:42,200 --> 00:12:48,080
a tuner built on new radio that you know

312
00:12:45,590 --> 00:12:50,990
right now 93.9 megahertz is what it's

313
00:12:48,080 --> 00:12:53,000
tuned to which is the local National

314
00:12:50,990 --> 00:12:54,560
Public Radio affiliate but you could

315
00:12:53,000 --> 00:12:57,140
just as easily tune into any sort of

316
00:12:54,560 --> 00:12:59,959
simplex transmissions that are happening

317
00:12:57,140 --> 00:13:02,630
on any any bit of that band that the

318
00:12:59,960 --> 00:13:04,340
tuner can go into so of course today

319
00:13:02,630 --> 00:13:06,890
we're we're gathered in the hotel

320
00:13:04,340 --> 00:13:09,020
Pennsylvania which I don't know if

321
00:13:06,890 --> 00:13:11,260
anyone here has seen this Netflix

322
00:13:09,020 --> 00:13:12,970
documentary called wormwood

323
00:13:11,260 --> 00:13:14,950
a bit of an aside but very interesting

324
00:13:12,970 --> 00:13:17,560
documentary by Errol Morris about a

325
00:13:14,950 --> 00:13:20,640
government scientist in the 50s that was

326
00:13:17,560 --> 00:13:23,380
thrown out of a window of a hotel for

327
00:13:20,640 --> 00:13:25,960
objecting to biological weapons research

328
00:13:23,380 --> 00:13:27,370
that the government was doing and it

329
00:13:25,960 --> 00:13:28,960
just so turns out that actually was this

330
00:13:27,370 --> 00:13:30,900
hotel which is something I discovered

331
00:13:28,960 --> 00:13:33,970
recently it had a different name then

332
00:13:30,900 --> 00:13:37,840
but you know the great thing is we can

333
00:13:33,970 --> 00:13:38,980
start to dig into this FCC data and and

334
00:13:37,840 --> 00:13:41,800
even start to ask questions of you know

335
00:13:38,980 --> 00:13:44,020
what's going on in this very hotel so I

336
00:13:41,800 --> 00:13:46,209
looked up the hotel Pennsylvania and

337
00:13:44,020 --> 00:13:48,340
found you know some sort of interesting

338
00:13:46,210 --> 00:13:50,350
ancillary information we can find okay

339
00:13:48,340 --> 00:13:52,510
here is the actual license filing they

340
00:13:50,350 --> 00:13:54,310
have we can see there's a call sign in

341
00:13:52,510 --> 00:13:56,380
there that could be interesting this

342
00:13:54,310 --> 00:13:57,969
stuff is also really great you know

343
00:13:56,380 --> 00:14:00,280
there were some social engineering talks

344
00:13:57,970 --> 00:14:02,680
lately but in terms of you know starting

345
00:14:00,280 --> 00:14:04,990
to understand some of the management

346
00:14:02,680 --> 00:14:06,839
structure of organizations so this was

347
00:14:04,990 --> 00:14:09,790
really interesting they're able to find

348
00:14:06,840 --> 00:14:11,290
this fellow Eugene rudder Minh who's

349
00:14:09,790 --> 00:14:12,670
actually the director of engineering of

350
00:14:11,290 --> 00:14:16,319
the hotel and is in charge of all the

351
00:14:12,670 --> 00:14:19,089
licenses and this hotel like many other

352
00:14:16,320 --> 00:14:21,490
businesses uses sort of a third party to

353
00:14:19,090 --> 00:14:23,530
actually file and manage these kind of

354
00:14:21,490 --> 00:14:25,720
regulatory licenses and here at the

355
00:14:23,530 --> 00:14:27,699
bottom we can see that's a micro magic 2

356
00:14:25,720 --> 00:14:29,740
way which can all be useful bits of

357
00:14:27,700 --> 00:14:32,830
information you know but what's great

358
00:14:29,740 --> 00:14:34,900
about this is by finding this license we

359
00:14:32,830 --> 00:14:36,460
can then kind of back into what are the

360
00:14:34,900 --> 00:14:39,610
you know the particular broadcast

361
00:14:36,460 --> 00:14:42,250
frequencies that the hotel is using and

362
00:14:39,610 --> 00:14:44,470
it's you know super interesting they

363
00:14:42,250 --> 00:14:46,720
have it looks like over 100 you know

364
00:14:44,470 --> 00:14:48,010
radio units that they're permitted to

365
00:14:46,720 --> 00:14:50,860
use and these are sort of the

366
00:14:48,010 --> 00:14:54,460
frequencies on which they transmit so if

367
00:14:50,860 --> 00:14:56,110
you were to use energy qrx assuming

368
00:14:54,460 --> 00:14:57,550
these are simplex transmissions it's a

369
00:14:56,110 --> 00:14:59,740
little more complicated if it's like a

370
00:14:57,550 --> 00:15:02,319
trunk radio system but this is

371
00:14:59,740 --> 00:15:03,760
presumably where you know the bellhops

372
00:15:02,320 --> 00:15:05,050
will be called in the maintenance and

373
00:15:03,760 --> 00:15:07,300
all these sorts of things which can be

374
00:15:05,050 --> 00:15:08,500
interesting for a bunch of reasons and

375
00:15:07,300 --> 00:15:10,660
to kind of come back and kind of put

376
00:15:08,500 --> 00:15:14,860
this stuff back in context this is again

377
00:15:10,660 --> 00:15:16,689
kind of a zoom in on that kind of 450 to

378
00:15:14,860 --> 00:15:19,150
500 megahertz bit of that broader

379
00:15:16,690 --> 00:15:21,130
spectrum map and we can see that you

380
00:15:19,150 --> 00:15:23,530
know all of these different uses of the

381
00:15:21,130 --> 00:15:24,970
wireless spectrum are you know they they

382
00:15:23,530 --> 00:15:25,150
kind of live next door to each other so

383
00:15:24,970 --> 00:15:26,740
you

384
00:15:25,150 --> 00:15:28,870
we can see you know the hotel

385
00:15:26,740 --> 00:15:30,760
Pennsylvania coming in in the 460 range

386
00:15:28,870 --> 00:15:33,250
and just a bit further down is the

387
00:15:30,760 --> 00:15:37,210
reserved section for law enforcement and

388
00:15:33,250 --> 00:15:39,760
things like that but you know this the

389
00:15:37,210 --> 00:15:41,470
usage of kind of public data and of

390
00:15:39,760 --> 00:15:43,839
software-defined radio certainly goes

391
00:15:41,470 --> 00:15:46,360
beyond just picking up voice

392
00:15:43,839 --> 00:15:48,400
transmissions so this is the NOAA 19

393
00:15:46,360 --> 00:15:50,470
satellite it's very cool it's an earth

394
00:15:48,400 --> 00:15:52,510
imaging satellite I think it revisits

395
00:15:50,470 --> 00:15:55,240
the surface of the earth you know once

396
00:15:52,510 --> 00:15:55,779
every maybe 10 or 14 days or something

397
00:15:55,240 --> 00:15:57,040
like that

398
00:15:55,779 --> 00:15:58,360
and what's really interesting is you

399
00:15:57,040 --> 00:15:59,949
know it's up there in space it's taking

400
00:15:58,360 --> 00:16:01,810
these photos and the way it gets the

401
00:15:59,950 --> 00:16:03,520
photos back down to earth is it it just

402
00:16:01,810 --> 00:16:07,750
kind of beams them down in an

403
00:16:03,520 --> 00:16:09,579
unencrypted way so these satellites you

404
00:16:07,750 --> 00:16:12,520
know the downlink happens at 137

405
00:16:09,580 --> 00:16:13,990
megahertz and as you can see it's kind

406
00:16:12,520 --> 00:16:15,699
of cool you know that there are these

407
00:16:13,990 --> 00:16:18,300
kind of dedicated bits of the spectrum

408
00:16:15,700 --> 00:16:20,950
that are for space downlink

409
00:16:18,300 --> 00:16:23,439
transmissions and a friend of mine

410
00:16:20,950 --> 00:16:26,500
actually built a an antenna that was

411
00:16:23,440 --> 00:16:28,570
sort of optimized for picking up those

412
00:16:26,500 --> 00:16:30,400
sorts of transmissions and from his

413
00:16:28,570 --> 00:16:32,529
rooftop in Brooklyn was actually able to

414
00:16:30,400 --> 00:16:33,970
download directly from the satellite the

415
00:16:32,529 --> 00:16:36,220
image is that it's blasting down the

416
00:16:33,970 --> 00:16:37,870
caveat there is you need to know when

417
00:16:36,220 --> 00:16:39,850
the satellite will be overhead but

418
00:16:37,870 --> 00:16:42,190
because they follow very predictable

419
00:16:39,850 --> 00:16:45,820
paths he actually set up something that

420
00:16:42,190 --> 00:16:47,080
put Google Calendar reminders in his in

421
00:16:45,820 --> 00:16:50,950
his calendar so that he knew when to go

422
00:16:47,080 --> 00:16:52,360
outside but you know there's there's

423
00:16:50,950 --> 00:16:54,400
more that we can do than just sort of

424
00:16:52,360 --> 00:16:55,990
being in a relationship with the radio

425
00:16:54,400 --> 00:16:59,250
sort of spectrum where we're just kind

426
00:16:55,990 --> 00:17:01,120
of you know passively downloading a

427
00:16:59,250 --> 00:17:03,100
project that I worked on a little while

428
00:17:01,120 --> 00:17:05,890
ago is kind of asking the question of

429
00:17:03,100 --> 00:17:07,929
you know could we use public data and

430
00:17:05,890 --> 00:17:10,630
radios to effectively look inside of

431
00:17:07,929 --> 00:17:13,780
cargo ships so what's really interesting

432
00:17:10,630 --> 00:17:15,370
here is you know kind of a shot of you

433
00:17:13,780 --> 00:17:17,920
know maybe like our fishing like a small

434
00:17:15,369 --> 00:17:20,319
sort of private boat or whatever it is

435
00:17:17,920 --> 00:17:23,439
you can see not surprisingly these boats

436
00:17:20,319 --> 00:17:26,139
are just loaded with loaded with radios

437
00:17:23,439 --> 00:17:27,910
of all different kinds you know here

438
00:17:26,140 --> 00:17:30,640
we've got you know there's a cell

439
00:17:27,910 --> 00:17:33,220
repeater for for use onboard Wi-Fi of

440
00:17:30,640 --> 00:17:35,260
course GPS and up here on the left you

441
00:17:33,220 --> 00:17:36,720
can see a really important thing called

442
00:17:35,260 --> 00:17:40,250
the AIS Class B

443
00:17:36,720 --> 00:17:42,750
tenna so a is stands for automated

444
00:17:40,250 --> 00:17:44,610
identification system and it's basically

445
00:17:42,750 --> 00:17:47,309
like a safety protocol so every time a

446
00:17:44,610 --> 00:17:49,229
ship is underway it sends out regular

447
00:17:47,309 --> 00:17:51,000
transmissions that basically announce

448
00:17:49,230 --> 00:17:53,909
you know who the ship is and its heading

449
00:17:51,000 --> 00:17:57,150
and speed and things like that those

450
00:17:53,909 --> 00:17:58,799
radios have a fairly limited range when

451
00:17:57,150 --> 00:18:01,820
you're on the surface so you have to be

452
00:17:58,799 --> 00:18:05,400
more or less line of sight which is fine

453
00:18:01,820 --> 00:18:06,480
when you're out at sea but picking them

454
00:18:05,400 --> 00:18:08,460
up in the city can become difficult

455
00:18:06,480 --> 00:18:10,980
however on the flip side there are

456
00:18:08,460 --> 00:18:14,130
companies like marine traffic and others

457
00:18:10,980 --> 00:18:16,500
that actually lease satellite kind of

458
00:18:14,130 --> 00:18:18,840
reception capacity and they produce

459
00:18:16,500 --> 00:18:20,700
these really amazing real-time ship

460
00:18:18,840 --> 00:18:25,470
position maps by listening to these

461
00:18:20,700 --> 00:18:27,480
transmissions what's cool though is if

462
00:18:25,470 --> 00:18:30,600
you are in sort of you know eyesight of

463
00:18:27,480 --> 00:18:32,760
of a port or of waterway these things

464
00:18:30,600 --> 00:18:36,719
are fairly simple to pick up so using

465
00:18:32,760 --> 00:18:39,299
one of these $20 SDR dongles and there's

466
00:18:36,720 --> 00:18:44,429
a you know really nice program called

467
00:18:39,299 --> 00:18:46,679
RTL AIS which is you know works on Mac

468
00:18:44,429 --> 00:18:50,340
or Linux and it's built off of good new

469
00:18:46,679 --> 00:18:54,299
radio and it sets up a really simple

470
00:18:50,340 --> 00:18:56,370
server that basically decodes in a first

471
00:18:54,299 --> 00:18:58,620
step what's coming across the frequency

472
00:18:56,370 --> 00:19:00,989
into the the kind of underlying packets

473
00:18:58,620 --> 00:19:02,729
of data that are there so this is just

474
00:19:00,990 --> 00:19:05,100
kind of a screen shot example of what

475
00:19:02,730 --> 00:19:07,799
each of these individual messages look

476
00:19:05,100 --> 00:19:10,439
like not super useful in that format but

477
00:19:07,799 --> 00:19:12,450
the they do come across in in kind of

478
00:19:10,440 --> 00:19:15,720
clear text like that once you decode

479
00:19:12,450 --> 00:19:17,880
them and so in this project I was like

480
00:19:15,720 --> 00:19:19,470
okay I set up a receiver on Governors

481
00:19:17,880 --> 00:19:23,250
Island which is sort of right at the

482
00:19:19,470 --> 00:19:24,360
mouth of New York Harbor and start

483
00:19:23,250 --> 00:19:26,640
whisking I'm starting to pull these

484
00:19:24,360 --> 00:19:28,229
messages down but you know certainly

485
00:19:26,640 --> 00:19:30,150
wanted to get to the point where I could

486
00:19:28,230 --> 00:19:31,530
move from just these kind of encoded

487
00:19:30,150 --> 00:19:33,870
messages into stuff that I could start

488
00:19:31,530 --> 00:19:36,418
to work with so there's you know just a

489
00:19:33,870 --> 00:19:38,959
great that there's a you know pretty

490
00:19:36,419 --> 00:19:41,220
clear spec on how this encoding happens

491
00:19:38,960 --> 00:19:43,440
someone made a really nice Python

492
00:19:41,220 --> 00:19:45,780
library called Lib AIS which lets you go

493
00:19:43,440 --> 00:19:47,159
from those payload those message

494
00:19:45,780 --> 00:19:49,649
payloads which is basically what's just

495
00:19:47,159 --> 00:19:52,110
being put in line 4 into that func

496
00:19:49,650 --> 00:19:54,990
and from that pullout the structured

497
00:19:52,110 --> 00:19:56,250
data that it contains and as you can see

498
00:19:54,990 --> 00:19:59,040
here there's things like you know rate

499
00:19:56,250 --> 00:20:01,740
of turn and you know XY coordinates

500
00:19:59,040 --> 00:20:04,860
where the ship is but importantly you

501
00:20:01,740 --> 00:20:07,620
also get in this transmission something

502
00:20:04,860 --> 00:20:10,320
called an MMS I number and MMS I stands

503
00:20:07,620 --> 00:20:13,110
for a mobile maritime subscriber

504
00:20:10,320 --> 00:20:14,280
identifier and it's basically like you

505
00:20:13,110 --> 00:20:15,990
could think of it as like the cell phone

506
00:20:14,280 --> 00:20:17,910
number of the ship or whatever it's how

507
00:20:15,990 --> 00:20:20,430
you would address a radio transmission

508
00:20:17,910 --> 00:20:23,420
directly to the ship and what's nice is

509
00:20:20,430 --> 00:20:26,820
the the UN through the international

510
00:20:23,420 --> 00:20:28,350
telecommunication union maintains they

511
00:20:26,820 --> 00:20:30,330
have a you know as you can see kind of a

512
00:20:28,350 --> 00:20:31,559
pretty primitive search form but one

513
00:20:30,330 --> 00:20:34,260
that's easy enough to kind of put a

514
00:20:31,559 --> 00:20:36,870
scraper around and it lets you turn that

515
00:20:34,260 --> 00:20:39,330
MMS I number into information about the

516
00:20:36,870 --> 00:20:41,070
ship's registry so here I don't know if

517
00:20:39,330 --> 00:20:44,189
you guys can read but you know I had

518
00:20:41,070 --> 00:20:47,460
seen a cargo ship that had a Liberian

519
00:20:44,190 --> 00:20:49,650
flag the ER Sweden and so that's great

520
00:20:47,460 --> 00:20:50,820
once you know the name of the ship and

521
00:20:49,650 --> 00:20:52,770
you know the kind of time of the

522
00:20:50,820 --> 00:20:55,080
observation and where it happened you

523
00:20:52,770 --> 00:20:58,830
can then take the step of starting to

524
00:20:55,080 --> 00:21:00,899
look inside of it so in the United

525
00:20:58,830 --> 00:21:03,629
States as an example the Customs and

526
00:21:00,900 --> 00:21:05,880
Border Protection office is the agency

527
00:21:03,630 --> 00:21:08,010
that deals with all of these bills of

528
00:21:05,880 --> 00:21:10,440
lading which are the kind of customs tax

529
00:21:08,010 --> 00:21:13,200
filings that have to come in it in

530
00:21:10,440 --> 00:21:16,050
advance of cargo being offloaded from a

531
00:21:13,200 --> 00:21:17,910
ship and they all have of course the

532
00:21:16,050 --> 00:21:20,428
vessel name as sort of a somewhat unique

533
00:21:17,910 --> 00:21:22,920
identifier what's kind of crazy about

534
00:21:20,429 --> 00:21:25,020
this data is the Customs and Border

535
00:21:22,920 --> 00:21:27,780
Protection office is the only they're

536
00:21:25,020 --> 00:21:29,179
the only folks that have that data in

537
00:21:27,780 --> 00:21:31,620
the US or at least they're the primary

538
00:21:29,179 --> 00:21:33,720
generator of it and the only way they

539
00:21:31,620 --> 00:21:37,889
make it available to anyone is on cd-rom

540
00:21:33,720 --> 00:21:39,420
so it's $100 per day and if you pay that

541
00:21:37,890 --> 00:21:42,929
you can go to the office and pick up a

542
00:21:39,420 --> 00:21:44,850
cd-rom and therein lies lots of kind of

543
00:21:42,929 --> 00:21:46,860
fixed-width files that describe all the

544
00:21:44,850 --> 00:21:49,980
shipping containers that are sort of do

545
00:21:46,860 --> 00:21:52,530
in that day a company that I started

546
00:21:49,980 --> 00:21:55,320
years ago called enigma has a whole sort

547
00:21:52,530 --> 00:21:56,610
of search engine of these sort of public

548
00:21:55,320 --> 00:22:00,889
records and one of the things that we

549
00:21:56,610 --> 00:22:03,149
aggregate is these bills of lading so by

550
00:22:00,890 --> 00:22:04,679
effectively being able to

551
00:22:03,149 --> 00:22:07,349
you know sit on Governors Island with a

552
00:22:04,679 --> 00:22:09,029
radio listen and sort of set up a series

553
00:22:07,349 --> 00:22:11,820
of scripts to listen to the ships going

554
00:22:09,029 --> 00:22:13,169
by and join them with this underlying

555
00:22:11,820 --> 00:22:15,389
information from the Bill of Lading

556
00:22:13,169 --> 00:22:17,399
registry you're actually able to kind of

557
00:22:15,389 --> 00:22:21,059
see what's what's going on inside the

558
00:22:17,399 --> 00:22:22,649
ship be it pallets of club Mattei or you

559
00:22:21,059 --> 00:22:26,158
know buckets of widgets or whatever it

560
00:22:22,649 --> 00:22:28,830
might be so that's kind of like you know

561
00:22:26,159 --> 00:22:30,299
one example that hopefully will kind of

562
00:22:28,830 --> 00:22:32,849
get you guys thinking a little bit about

563
00:22:30,299 --> 00:22:35,820
sort of how we can use you know sort of

564
00:22:32,849 --> 00:22:37,259
real-time data gathering through you

565
00:22:35,820 --> 00:22:40,019
know things like software-defined radios

566
00:22:37,259 --> 00:22:41,549
and then this kind of contextual outside

567
00:22:40,019 --> 00:22:43,859
information that can kind of help us

568
00:22:41,549 --> 00:22:46,950
make some sort of sense of what it is

569
00:22:43,859 --> 00:22:50,369
that's going on I don't know how many of

570
00:22:46,950 --> 00:22:52,559
you guys have seen this story but at

571
00:22:50,369 --> 00:22:53,820
BuzzFeed over the last couple of years

572
00:22:52,559 --> 00:22:56,460
they've come out with a series of

573
00:22:53,820 --> 00:23:01,289
stories effectively tracking law

574
00:22:56,460 --> 00:23:03,749
enforcement usage of stingrays and you

575
00:23:01,289 --> 00:23:05,549
know a common way in which sting way

576
00:23:03,749 --> 00:23:07,320
stingrays are used or by basically

577
00:23:05,549 --> 00:23:09,779
putting them in helicopters are small

578
00:23:07,320 --> 00:23:13,408
aircraft and flying them in circles

579
00:23:09,779 --> 00:23:15,719
above you know a target so that it sort

580
00:23:13,409 --> 00:23:17,879
of becomes a persistent fake cell phone

581
00:23:15,719 --> 00:23:21,570
tower that those phones are getting

582
00:23:17,879 --> 00:23:24,799
caught up in so similar to the AIS

583
00:23:21,570 --> 00:23:28,979
transmissions that ships have planes

584
00:23:24,799 --> 00:23:34,349
broadcast a sort of positioning

585
00:23:28,979 --> 00:23:35,369
information data called a DSB and as we

586
00:23:34,349 --> 00:23:37,499
can see there's actually a pretty big

587
00:23:35,369 --> 00:23:42,539
chunk of the spectrum it's that's carved

588
00:23:37,499 --> 00:23:44,129
out for that and it is one of these

589
00:23:42,539 --> 00:23:46,469
things that if you do get an STR it's

590
00:23:44,129 --> 00:23:48,330
like a great kind of hello world because

591
00:23:46,469 --> 00:23:50,070
you know pretty much wherever you are

592
00:23:48,330 --> 00:23:51,570
there's gonna be some sort of air

593
00:23:50,070 --> 00:23:54,269
traffic going on overhead and there's

594
00:23:51,570 --> 00:23:55,619
lots of really easy tools that you can

595
00:23:54,269 --> 00:23:57,869
download to just kind of jump in

596
00:23:55,619 --> 00:23:59,820
immediately this is one if you're

597
00:23:57,869 --> 00:24:03,718
interested that's good for for Mac OS

598
00:23:59,820 --> 00:24:05,729
called cocoa 1090 called 1090 cuz that's

599
00:24:03,719 --> 00:24:08,639
the 1090 megahertz is usually where

600
00:24:05,729 --> 00:24:10,259
these things are broadcast and so you

601
00:24:08,639 --> 00:24:12,570
can see this is from that BuzzFeed

602
00:24:10,259 --> 00:24:14,309
article on by Peter old house and some

603
00:24:12,570 --> 00:24:16,289
other folks where they were looking

604
00:24:14,309 --> 00:24:16,889
around New York City had just sort of

605
00:24:16,289 --> 00:24:18,780
set up

606
00:24:16,890 --> 00:24:20,850
one of these receivers we're pulling at

607
00:24:18,780 --> 00:24:24,600
all this information and then started to

608
00:24:20,850 --> 00:24:26,490
analyze it for for flight paths that

609
00:24:24,600 --> 00:24:28,260
were kind of going in these repeated

610
00:24:26,490 --> 00:24:30,390
circles because you know it's certainly

611
00:24:28,260 --> 00:24:33,360
like a kind of anomalous and unusual way

612
00:24:30,390 --> 00:24:36,330
to fly a plane unless you're doing

613
00:24:33,360 --> 00:24:39,600
something like like this and likewise

614
00:24:36,330 --> 00:24:41,490
the if you go to the FAA there's

615
00:24:39,600 --> 00:24:43,919
something called the FAA aircraft

616
00:24:41,490 --> 00:24:46,320
registry which is really cool because it

617
00:24:43,920 --> 00:24:47,580
has all of the information about you

618
00:24:46,320 --> 00:24:50,010
know every plane that's registered to

619
00:24:47,580 --> 00:24:52,500
fly in the US it's tail number owner and

620
00:24:50,010 --> 00:24:53,550
so on and so forth and so one of the

621
00:24:52,500 --> 00:24:56,670
things they were able to do in this

622
00:24:53,550 --> 00:24:58,620
story is working with a third-party

623
00:24:56,670 --> 00:25:01,100
vendor that actually collects this kind

624
00:24:58,620 --> 00:25:03,899
of a DSP data for the whole country

625
00:25:01,100 --> 00:25:06,600
they were able to basically go to the

626
00:25:03,900 --> 00:25:08,760
FAA registry search for airplanes that

627
00:25:06,600 --> 00:25:11,310
you know are actually registered to like

628
00:25:08,760 --> 00:25:13,140
Homeland Security or other potentially

629
00:25:11,310 --> 00:25:16,500
interesting government agencies find

630
00:25:13,140 --> 00:25:18,620
those tail numbers and then query this

631
00:25:16,500 --> 00:25:23,460
broader data set of all the flight paths

632
00:25:18,620 --> 00:25:25,800
to see which ones exhibited that sort of

633
00:25:23,460 --> 00:25:27,750
you know anomalous flying in a circle

634
00:25:25,800 --> 00:25:33,030
behavior that indicates the likelihood

635
00:25:27,750 --> 00:25:34,290
of of a stingray being used they

636
00:25:33,030 --> 00:25:36,120
actually took it also a step further

637
00:25:34,290 --> 00:25:38,940
which was I think really interesting is

638
00:25:36,120 --> 00:25:41,820
they were able to using sort of some

639
00:25:38,940 --> 00:25:45,480
somewhat simple machine learning

640
00:25:41,820 --> 00:25:48,629
techniques to basically observe planes

641
00:25:45,480 --> 00:25:52,650
that they knew to be used by law

642
00:25:48,630 --> 00:25:54,180
enforcement in order to you know to

643
00:25:52,650 --> 00:25:57,120
basically go out with with stingrays for

644
00:25:54,180 --> 00:26:00,390
surveillance and use that basically as

645
00:25:57,120 --> 00:26:01,620
training data into a classifier to kind

646
00:26:00,390 --> 00:26:03,330
of figure out like what are the maybe

647
00:26:01,620 --> 00:26:06,090
underlying patterns of that kind of

648
00:26:03,330 --> 00:26:08,550
flying of a plane and then use that to

649
00:26:06,090 --> 00:26:10,889
apply to all of the flight records they

650
00:26:08,550 --> 00:26:13,649
had and by doing that they were able to

651
00:26:10,890 --> 00:26:15,900
identify a bunch of additional airplanes

652
00:26:13,650 --> 00:26:18,570
that were registered to shell companies

653
00:26:15,900 --> 00:26:22,680
that wouldn't obviously be operated by

654
00:26:18,570 --> 00:26:24,720
DHS or someone like that but who you

655
00:26:22,680 --> 00:26:26,580
know certainly had suspicious kind of

656
00:26:24,720 --> 00:26:28,530
flight pattern activity and then who

657
00:26:26,580 --> 00:26:29,850
upon further investigation they were

658
00:26:28,530 --> 00:26:30,168
able to find that their shell companies

659
00:26:29,850 --> 00:26:32,389
do

660
00:26:30,169 --> 00:26:36,039
have what seemed to be kind of clear

661
00:26:32,389 --> 00:26:39,979
links to you to law-enforcement agencies

662
00:26:36,039 --> 00:26:42,830
you know in these sorts of of techniques

663
00:26:39,980 --> 00:26:44,960
instead of thinking about how radios and

664
00:26:42,830 --> 00:26:46,759
the sort of ancillary data can be used

665
00:26:44,960 --> 00:26:48,470
to understand the world can become

666
00:26:46,759 --> 00:26:50,539
important for you know all sorts of

667
00:26:48,470 --> 00:26:52,460
reasons and so you know I was speaking

668
00:26:50,539 --> 00:26:55,489
with someone who was an activist that

669
00:26:52,460 --> 00:26:57,409
was at the Standing Rock protests a few

670
00:26:55,489 --> 00:26:59,869
years ago and they were actually

671
00:26:57,409 --> 00:27:02,629
collecting a DSV data while they were

672
00:26:59,869 --> 00:27:05,359
there specifically trying to identify

673
00:27:02,629 --> 00:27:08,209
and become aware of when stingrays were

674
00:27:05,359 --> 00:27:09,918
sort of being used in the vicinity and

675
00:27:08,210 --> 00:27:11,570
so I think it's certainly that was a

676
00:27:09,919 --> 00:27:14,090
very interesting example to me because

677
00:27:11,570 --> 00:27:17,059
it sort of speaks to I think some of the

678
00:27:14,090 --> 00:27:19,129
the creative and and sort of expanded

679
00:27:17,059 --> 00:27:21,980
applications of this kind of technology

680
00:27:19,129 --> 00:27:24,649
and of course I think like importantly

681
00:27:21,980 --> 00:27:26,950
you know we live in in a world that's

682
00:27:24,649 --> 00:27:29,209
you know uh turley saturated with

683
00:27:26,950 --> 00:27:31,730
wireless infrastructure of all different

684
00:27:29,210 --> 00:27:33,409
kinds and you know all of these things

685
00:27:31,730 --> 00:27:36,379
are existing on different parts of the

686
00:27:33,409 --> 00:27:38,450
spectrum and you know using either you

687
00:27:36,379 --> 00:27:39,889
know cheap or slightly more expensive SD

688
00:27:38,450 --> 00:27:42,289
ours there are things that we can

689
00:27:39,889 --> 00:27:45,469
interrogate and try to understand and I

690
00:27:42,289 --> 00:27:47,570
you know often times actually you know

691
00:27:45,470 --> 00:27:50,090
discover really important things there

692
00:27:47,570 --> 00:27:51,980
was a workshop given earlier today by a

693
00:27:50,090 --> 00:27:54,379
Brandon Dorsey who's a really

694
00:27:51,980 --> 00:27:57,799
interesting kind of artist researcher

695
00:27:54,379 --> 00:27:59,658
who did a project on the pedra networks

696
00:27:57,799 --> 00:28:02,090
so it's kind of crazy as an example

697
00:27:59,659 --> 00:28:04,639
about pagers is there still actually

698
00:28:02,090 --> 00:28:07,070
used quite a bit in this country but

699
00:28:04,639 --> 00:28:10,908
largely by in hospitals and by doctors

700
00:28:07,070 --> 00:28:12,559
and the crazy thing about pagers is that

701
00:28:10,909 --> 00:28:15,230
you know all of the traffic is not only

702
00:28:12,559 --> 00:28:17,690
unencrypted but it's it's broadcast to

703
00:28:15,230 --> 00:28:20,330
the entire city it's the pager itself

704
00:28:17,690 --> 00:28:23,419
that sort of self selects which messages

705
00:28:20,330 --> 00:28:25,609
to pull out of the air and display but

706
00:28:23,419 --> 00:28:28,070
using an SDR it's relatively trivial to

707
00:28:25,609 --> 00:28:29,960
make sort of like a super pager that

708
00:28:28,070 --> 00:28:32,210
will just receive and decode all of the

709
00:28:29,960 --> 00:28:34,279
messages going through a city and this

710
00:28:32,210 --> 00:28:36,019
of course is like massive implications

711
00:28:34,279 --> 00:28:38,629
when you think about the fact that you

712
00:28:36,019 --> 00:28:40,700
know today pagers are basically just

713
00:28:38,629 --> 00:28:43,238
part of hospital infrastructure and

714
00:28:40,700 --> 00:28:43,239
consequently

715
00:28:43,240 --> 00:28:46,960
you know have a tremendous amount of

716
00:28:44,710 --> 00:28:51,730
sometimes very personal and potentially

717
00:28:46,960 --> 00:28:54,760
compromising information about people so

718
00:28:51,730 --> 00:28:55,900
you know one of the things that I think

719
00:28:54,760 --> 00:28:57,220
is really interesting is you know not

720
00:28:55,900 --> 00:28:59,260
only this question of how can we engage

721
00:28:57,220 --> 00:29:01,690
the spectrum around us but how can we

722
00:28:59,260 --> 00:29:06,670
use these sort of more general residue

723
00:29:01,690 --> 00:29:10,240
about how how the radio spectrum is

724
00:29:06,670 --> 00:29:13,809
being used to to kind of dig into other

725
00:29:10,240 --> 00:29:16,780
I guess issues of concern when I was

726
00:29:13,809 --> 00:29:19,750
working with this FCC license spectrum

727
00:29:16,780 --> 00:29:21,190
database one of the things that I became

728
00:29:19,750 --> 00:29:24,070
really curious about is you know what

729
00:29:21,190 --> 00:29:26,740
does the radio activity look like along

730
00:29:24,070 --> 00:29:28,330
the us-mexico border so this is just a

731
00:29:26,740 --> 00:29:31,150
really kind of simple somewhat

732
00:29:28,330 --> 00:29:34,030
interpolated map of you know all of the

733
00:29:31,150 --> 00:29:35,860
radio licenses that are that have been

734
00:29:34,030 --> 00:29:38,710
issued within 10 kilometers of the

735
00:29:35,860 --> 00:29:40,059
border and so when I was looking at that

736
00:29:38,710 --> 00:29:42,280
you know I started to kind of explore

737
00:29:40,059 --> 00:29:44,170
and zoom in and you know these are some

738
00:29:42,280 --> 00:29:45,670
examples of you know what these kind of

739
00:29:44,170 --> 00:29:48,309
licenses look like when they're mapped

740
00:29:45,670 --> 00:29:51,010
on to you know pretty big metropolitan

741
00:29:48,309 --> 00:29:52,149
centers so you can see as you'd expect

742
00:29:51,010 --> 00:29:54,520
like kind of pretty broadly distributed

743
00:29:52,150 --> 00:29:57,580
these things are going all over the

744
00:29:54,520 --> 00:29:59,170
place but as I was kind of digging it a

745
00:29:57,580 --> 00:30:01,980
little bit more and kind of following

746
00:29:59,170 --> 00:30:05,650
the border along I just kind of observed

747
00:30:01,980 --> 00:30:08,620
these sort of patterns of kind of you

748
00:30:05,650 --> 00:30:10,240
know evenly spaced antennas being

749
00:30:08,620 --> 00:30:12,239
installed in places that you know there

750
00:30:10,240 --> 00:30:15,700
really wasn't much other radio activity

751
00:30:12,240 --> 00:30:17,710
happening and so I became really curious

752
00:30:15,700 --> 00:30:18,880
about like what you know who are

753
00:30:17,710 --> 00:30:20,740
installing these things what are they

754
00:30:18,880 --> 00:30:25,000
being used for like what what's going on

755
00:30:20,740 --> 00:30:27,580
here this this one here you can see it

756
00:30:25,000 --> 00:30:29,800
was put on or sort of filed by this

757
00:30:27,580 --> 00:30:32,020
company M SAR so I started looking said

758
00:30:29,800 --> 00:30:33,490
ok what is M SAR do well I found out

759
00:30:32,020 --> 00:30:36,429
that you know M SAR is basically a

760
00:30:33,490 --> 00:30:39,010
company that makes kind of the ground

761
00:30:36,429 --> 00:30:40,990
radar modules for Predator drones and

762
00:30:39,010 --> 00:30:43,860
other things like that so I thought well

763
00:30:40,990 --> 00:30:45,940
that's interesting you know presumably

764
00:30:43,860 --> 00:30:47,709
therap sort of trying to set up some

765
00:30:45,940 --> 00:30:49,330
sort of like radar networks along the

766
00:30:47,710 --> 00:30:50,860
border this is kind of interesting so I

767
00:30:49,330 --> 00:30:53,260
sort of wanted to dig in a little bit

768
00:30:50,860 --> 00:30:55,209
more deeply and I said ok you know for

769
00:30:53,260 --> 00:30:55,879
all of these radio licenses along this

770
00:30:55,210 --> 00:30:58,759
kind

771
00:30:55,879 --> 00:31:00,619
this kind of 10 kilometer band along the

772
00:30:58,759 --> 00:31:01,999
border you know what's going on who

773
00:31:00,619 --> 00:31:05,478
what's the activity been like who are

774
00:31:01,999 --> 00:31:06,559
filing these things so one of the things

775
00:31:05,479 --> 00:31:08,299
that I think is actually really

776
00:31:06,559 --> 00:31:11,269
interesting to note about this dataset

777
00:31:08,299 --> 00:31:13,609
is as you might expect there's like of

778
00:31:11,269 --> 00:31:16,849
course many different classes of FCC

779
00:31:13,609 --> 00:31:18,678
licenses you can file you know there are

780
00:31:16,849 --> 00:31:21,379
ones that are really specific to like

781
00:31:18,679 --> 00:31:23,059
commercial radio like you might use at a

782
00:31:21,379 --> 00:31:25,339
McDonald's or in a hotel there are

783
00:31:23,059 --> 00:31:27,019
others that are really specific for you

784
00:31:25,339 --> 00:31:31,239
know putting out you know 100 mega watt

785
00:31:27,019 --> 00:31:33,469
or 100 whatever sort of like FM

786
00:31:31,239 --> 00:31:34,819
broadcast stations or whatever and then

787
00:31:33,469 --> 00:31:37,609
there's also a really interesting class

788
00:31:34,819 --> 00:31:39,379
of experimental licenses and these are

789
00:31:37,609 --> 00:31:41,359
things that you know usually hardware

790
00:31:39,379 --> 00:31:43,968
manufacturers or others will file for

791
00:31:41,359 --> 00:31:47,119
and they only kind of generally lost for

792
00:31:43,969 --> 00:31:49,489
a window of time and they you know

793
00:31:47,119 --> 00:31:51,379
basically the FCC gives people

794
00:31:49,489 --> 00:31:53,029
permission to sort of do stuff that you

795
00:31:51,379 --> 00:31:55,849
know maybe hasn't been fully vetted in

796
00:31:53,029 --> 00:31:57,289
terms of how it's going to impact you

797
00:31:55,849 --> 00:31:59,389
know the broader spectrum but in order

798
00:31:57,289 --> 00:32:01,940
to run an experiment to approve stuff so

799
00:31:59,389 --> 00:32:03,978
this is just a count and sort of view

800
00:32:01,940 --> 00:32:06,019
into all of these experimental licenses

801
00:32:03,979 --> 00:32:08,779
that were being filed along the border

802
00:32:06,019 --> 00:32:10,940
and so I started to kind of dig in and

803
00:32:08,779 --> 00:32:13,999
say well who are these companies I'm

804
00:32:10,940 --> 00:32:15,889
sorry sort of researching them and all

805
00:32:13,999 --> 00:32:19,249
the ones with red arrows next to them

806
00:32:15,889 --> 00:32:21,649
are effectively defense contractors so

807
00:32:19,249 --> 00:32:24,109
it was really interesting for me to

808
00:32:21,649 --> 00:32:26,359
learn that and I guess not so surprising

809
00:32:24,109 --> 00:32:27,948
and in hindsight but that you know

810
00:32:26,359 --> 00:32:30,349
there's actually kind of a you know

811
00:32:27,949 --> 00:32:31,759
hundreds of individual experiments that

812
00:32:30,349 --> 00:32:34,458
are sort of starting to be launched by

813
00:32:31,759 --> 00:32:37,669
defense contractors presumably in

814
00:32:34,459 --> 00:32:40,579
advance of sort of competing for

815
00:32:37,669 --> 00:32:42,829
business and things like that to start

816
00:32:40,579 --> 00:32:45,259
to install them sort of some sort of

817
00:32:42,829 --> 00:32:46,369
surveillance network there and as I

818
00:32:45,259 --> 00:32:49,129
actually started digging into these

819
00:32:46,369 --> 00:32:50,928
companies and sort of seeing asking who

820
00:32:49,129 --> 00:32:53,359
is it that was that is sort of actively

821
00:32:50,929 --> 00:32:56,479
experimenting along the border I wound

822
00:32:53,359 --> 00:32:58,759
up on a lot of kind of very very strange

823
00:32:56,479 --> 00:33:00,199
websites I would say so you know one of

824
00:32:58,759 --> 00:33:02,449
the big companies there was called Chi

825
00:33:00,199 --> 00:33:05,019
column they make these inflatable I

826
00:33:02,449 --> 00:33:07,699
think they're called aerostatic

827
00:33:05,019 --> 00:33:09,500
sort of basically like drones that they

828
00:33:07,699 --> 00:33:10,970
can stick in place and

829
00:33:09,500 --> 00:33:13,280
can stay aloft for a long time and

830
00:33:10,970 --> 00:33:16,640
they're sort of stable as sort of

831
00:33:13,280 --> 00:33:19,070
surveillance platforms you know there's

832
00:33:16,640 --> 00:33:20,870
the company called Leonardo DRS which is

833
00:33:19,070 --> 00:33:23,240
an Italian defense contractor that does

834
00:33:20,870 --> 00:33:25,879
a lot of work with the US government and

835
00:33:23,240 --> 00:33:27,860
they sort of have lots of materials like

836
00:33:25,880 --> 00:33:30,010
that another one telephonic that also

837
00:33:27,860 --> 00:33:32,479
suit ourselves these ground radars

838
00:33:30,010 --> 00:33:37,160
another one which is this is an Israeli

839
00:33:32,480 --> 00:33:39,230
defense contractor ELT a that makes a

840
00:33:37,160 --> 00:33:43,250
lot of in one of the things that they do

841
00:33:39,230 --> 00:33:46,580
a lot of is you know sort of sort of

842
00:33:43,250 --> 00:33:49,160
border surveillance stuff for sort of

843
00:33:46,580 --> 00:33:51,470
the israeli-palestinian border as well

844
00:33:49,160 --> 00:33:55,010
as sort of anti-ballistic missile radar

845
00:33:51,470 --> 00:33:58,910
systems and things like that another one

846
00:33:55,010 --> 00:34:00,560
elbit systems which has an you know a

847
00:33:58,910 --> 00:34:02,270
lot of these sort of both optical and

848
00:34:00,560 --> 00:34:04,190
radio surveillance platforms that are

849
00:34:02,270 --> 00:34:07,340
used and it's interesting a lot of this

850
00:34:04,190 --> 00:34:10,100
technology wound up getting kind of

851
00:34:07,340 --> 00:34:12,649
developed and refined as a result of

852
00:34:10,100 --> 00:34:14,389
sort of United States's military

853
00:34:12,649 --> 00:34:16,819
activity and places like Iraq and

854
00:34:14,389 --> 00:34:20,570
Afghanistan where there was sort of a

855
00:34:16,820 --> 00:34:24,889
need to be able to stand up these these

856
00:34:20,570 --> 00:34:26,750
sort of surveillance systems and so

857
00:34:24,889 --> 00:34:28,790
certainly like now that you know I sort

858
00:34:26,750 --> 00:34:29,690
of had found hundreds of these kind of

859
00:34:28,790 --> 00:34:31,879
radio experiments

860
00:34:29,690 --> 00:34:33,830
I was curious to see you know what what

861
00:34:31,879 --> 00:34:36,469
where can we go from there can we dig in

862
00:34:33,830 --> 00:34:37,940
a little bit more deeply so this is just

863
00:34:36,469 --> 00:34:40,759
kind of a screenshot of you know one

864
00:34:37,940 --> 00:34:42,530
specific license that I had found and

865
00:34:40,760 --> 00:34:43,700
you know it's kind of interesting like

866
00:34:42,530 --> 00:34:45,770
to the extent to which you want to dig

867
00:34:43,699 --> 00:34:48,560
into this you can get some sense of what

868
00:34:45,770 --> 00:34:50,449
the equipment is because you can see the

869
00:34:48,560 --> 00:34:52,370
you know the sort of band widths that

870
00:34:50,449 --> 00:34:54,770
are the frequencies that are being used

871
00:34:52,370 --> 00:34:56,509
and the kind of power output and really

872
00:34:54,770 --> 00:34:58,640
interestingly you know kind of the time

873
00:34:56,510 --> 00:35:02,360
in place of where these transmissions

874
00:34:58,640 --> 00:35:03,890
were happening and so kind of from there

875
00:35:02,360 --> 00:35:06,350
you can of course pivot over to like

876
00:35:03,890 --> 00:35:07,879
Google Earth or Google Maps and start to

877
00:35:06,350 --> 00:35:09,920
just kind of take a look like what's

878
00:35:07,880 --> 00:35:10,880
what's going on here this I don't know

879
00:35:09,920 --> 00:35:13,370
how well you can see here but there's

880
00:35:10,880 --> 00:35:15,200
sort of a pickup truck with a antenna on

881
00:35:13,370 --> 00:35:16,640
the back of it which was kind of

882
00:35:15,200 --> 00:35:18,589
interesting to see especially when you

883
00:35:16,640 --> 00:35:20,230
sort of see the broader or landscapes

884
00:35:18,590 --> 00:35:22,730
here I mean there's absolutely nothing

885
00:35:20,230 --> 00:35:24,230
there so kind of finding these ox

886
00:35:22,730 --> 00:35:27,410
Rhodes and these install sites are

887
00:35:24,230 --> 00:35:29,900
really interesting here's another one

888
00:35:27,410 --> 00:35:33,020
certainly a bit more of a fully built

889
00:35:29,900 --> 00:35:34,520
structure and I think it looks like it

890
00:35:33,020 --> 00:35:38,240
has a combination both of kind of

891
00:35:34,520 --> 00:35:40,900
networking sort of technology to connect

892
00:35:38,240 --> 00:35:44,629
these towers together in addition to

893
00:35:40,900 --> 00:35:46,640
some sort of surveillance radar system

894
00:35:44,630 --> 00:35:48,770
these sites sometimes get actually much

895
00:35:46,640 --> 00:35:50,240
more even you know sort of

896
00:35:48,770 --> 00:35:52,250
well-established of course

897
00:35:50,240 --> 00:35:54,140
infrastructure is really difficult to

898
00:35:52,250 --> 00:35:58,190
run out to these places so a lot of them

899
00:35:54,140 --> 00:36:00,049
have a degree of you know sort of self

900
00:35:58,190 --> 00:36:03,619
generation in terms of power and things

901
00:36:00,050 --> 00:36:05,570
of like sort of going through this one

902
00:36:03,619 --> 00:36:07,940
of the things that kind of came to the

903
00:36:05,570 --> 00:36:10,910
surface for me was that it's actually

904
00:36:07,940 --> 00:36:14,359
extremely hard to from a technical

905
00:36:10,910 --> 00:36:16,819
perspective to build this sort of border

906
00:36:14,359 --> 00:36:21,440
surveillance technology there was a

907
00:36:16,820 --> 00:36:24,080
really famous as I found out sort of

908
00:36:21,440 --> 00:36:25,430
like disaster that happened in terms of

909
00:36:24,080 --> 00:36:28,310
you know government as far as government

910
00:36:25,430 --> 00:36:31,399
contracting goes where Boeing I think

911
00:36:28,310 --> 00:36:34,369
under President George W Bush had gotten

912
00:36:31,400 --> 00:36:36,830
a really big contract they basically

913
00:36:34,369 --> 00:36:38,359
said you know hey for I think you know

914
00:36:36,830 --> 00:36:40,160
three or four billion dollars we'll be

915
00:36:38,359 --> 00:36:42,290
able to take care of the whole border

916
00:36:40,160 --> 00:36:45,319
with like a super high-tech surveillance

917
00:36:42,290 --> 00:36:48,290
system but I mean what actually wound up

918
00:36:45,320 --> 00:36:50,420
happening I think is it wound up costing

919
00:36:48,290 --> 00:36:53,270
them a billion dollars to just do 53

920
00:36:50,420 --> 00:36:54,710
miles of the border and you know a lot

921
00:36:53,270 --> 00:36:57,640
of the challenges that they apparently

922
00:36:54,710 --> 00:37:00,220
were running into or I mean in terms of

923
00:36:57,640 --> 00:37:03,170
actually being able to you know identify

924
00:37:00,220 --> 00:37:04,669
people versus grass moving or animals

925
00:37:03,170 --> 00:37:06,560
and things like that and being able to

926
00:37:04,670 --> 00:37:09,740
work in these very kind of remote

927
00:37:06,560 --> 00:37:11,779
inhospitable places but you know I think

928
00:37:09,740 --> 00:37:13,399
one of the things that is quite

929
00:37:11,780 --> 00:37:14,780
interesting to me about this is you know

930
00:37:13,400 --> 00:37:18,590
this is a project that wound up getting

931
00:37:14,780 --> 00:37:20,990
shut down I think back in 2011 and of

932
00:37:18,590 --> 00:37:28,010
course now that there's so much kind of

933
00:37:20,990 --> 00:37:30,229
increased you know attention and sort of

934
00:37:28,010 --> 00:37:33,859
effort being put towards things like

935
00:37:30,230 --> 00:37:35,900
border security this data I think can

936
00:37:33,859 --> 00:37:37,640
provide a very interesting

937
00:37:35,900 --> 00:37:39,769
and to you know what is the government

938
00:37:37,640 --> 00:37:41,868
actually doing what you know sort of

939
00:37:39,769 --> 00:37:43,249
what sorts of surveillance technologies

940
00:37:41,869 --> 00:37:47,299
are we purchasing and maybe what are the

941
00:37:43,249 --> 00:37:48,740
broader kind of implications of that you

942
00:37:47,299 --> 00:37:50,269
know I think one of the things that for

943
00:37:48,740 --> 00:37:53,569
me is a big take away around all of this

944
00:37:50,269 --> 00:37:55,819
is that there's a tremendous amount of

945
00:37:53,569 --> 00:37:57,859
kind of public information out there and

946
00:37:55,819 --> 00:38:00,038
one of the really I think fun and

947
00:37:57,859 --> 00:38:03,288
interesting challenges as a researcher

948
00:38:00,039 --> 00:38:05,359
you know in whatever capacity you might

949
00:38:03,289 --> 00:38:07,130
work is to sort of think about how can

950
00:38:05,359 --> 00:38:08,900
we find these sort of lateral

951
00:38:07,130 --> 00:38:12,410
connections and other sources of

952
00:38:08,900 --> 00:38:14,990
information because of course as we know

953
00:38:12,410 --> 00:38:18,710
the truth is out there we just have to

954
00:38:14,990 --> 00:38:20,180
find it hopefully and yeah so that's

955
00:38:18,710 --> 00:38:22,910
that's all I have for you guys today

956
00:38:20,180 --> 00:38:24,558
this is again the the kind of repo if

957
00:38:22,910 --> 00:38:26,299
you're interested in I think we still

958
00:38:24,559 --> 00:38:29,980
have some time so I'd be happy to take

959
00:38:26,299 --> 00:38:29,980
any questions if there are any

960
00:38:30,530 --> 00:38:34,719
[Applause]

961
00:38:31,650 --> 00:38:34,719
[Music]

962
00:38:45,460 --> 00:38:52,270
is this data getting used as economic

963
00:38:48,850 --> 00:38:53,950
signals by sort of people following

964
00:38:52,270 --> 00:38:55,900
markets people finding out things about

965
00:38:53,950 --> 00:38:58,029
companies you would you one would

966
00:38:55,900 --> 00:39:01,270
imagine that this would be a significant

967
00:38:58,030 --> 00:39:02,830
economic sort of activity indicator is

968
00:39:01,270 --> 00:39:05,350
that something if people figured out

969
00:39:02,830 --> 00:39:07,240
that that the various pieces of data

970
00:39:05,350 --> 00:39:09,190
that you are talking about here can be

971
00:39:07,240 --> 00:39:10,629
used for that purpose I think you're

972
00:39:09,190 --> 00:39:13,240
absolutely I think you're absolutely

973
00:39:10,630 --> 00:39:14,910
right to call out the fact that there

974
00:39:13,240 --> 00:39:17,410
probably is a lot of really interesting

975
00:39:14,910 --> 00:39:19,270
signal in you know in these sort of

976
00:39:17,410 --> 00:39:21,040
obscure data sets that could be used for

977
00:39:19,270 --> 00:39:22,300
those sorts of purposes I think we're

978
00:39:21,040 --> 00:39:25,000
still in a world where a lot of this

979
00:39:22,300 --> 00:39:26,200
data is still kind of quite clumped like

980
00:39:25,000 --> 00:39:29,230
really difficult to work with really

981
00:39:26,200 --> 00:39:31,089
obscure and you know I don't personally

982
00:39:29,230 --> 00:39:32,830
know of any examples of this being used

983
00:39:31,090 --> 00:39:35,830
for like trading algorithms or things

984
00:39:32,830 --> 00:39:39,310
like that but one could certainly

985
00:39:35,830 --> 00:39:41,590
imagine it I'd say this was great thank

986
00:39:39,310 --> 00:39:45,220
you I had a question about the flight

987
00:39:41,590 --> 00:39:46,780
path data hmm is that available before

988
00:39:45,220 --> 00:39:48,250
the flights happen or is it something

989
00:39:46,780 --> 00:39:51,040
that's posted afterwards like what's the

990
00:39:48,250 --> 00:39:52,750
lead time yeah there so I think there's

991
00:39:51,040 --> 00:39:55,420
two there's two pieces of it one is

992
00:39:52,750 --> 00:39:56,890
using the this kind of a BSB receiver

993
00:39:55,420 --> 00:39:59,530
that's actually kind of getting

994
00:39:56,890 --> 00:40:01,299
real-time position data of where the

995
00:39:59,530 --> 00:40:02,650
flights are so that of course they've

996
00:40:01,300 --> 00:40:04,330
got to be in the air and move in that's

997
00:40:02,650 --> 00:40:06,700
where that data comes from separately

998
00:40:04,330 --> 00:40:09,240
from that and this is not something I'm

999
00:40:06,700 --> 00:40:13,180
a full expert on but I do know that

1000
00:40:09,240 --> 00:40:16,089
planes do file flight paths or flight

1001
00:40:13,180 --> 00:40:19,450
plan data with the FAA ahead of time and

1002
00:40:16,090 --> 00:40:21,880
it is I think it is obtainable if it's

1003
00:40:19,450 --> 00:40:24,520
something you're interested in I would

1004
00:40:21,880 --> 00:40:27,660
suggest looking up a woman named Margot

1005
00:40:24,520 --> 00:40:30,040
Williams who is the research editor at

1006
00:40:27,660 --> 00:40:31,870
the intercept and she's done a

1007
00:40:30,040 --> 00:40:35,020
tremendous amount of work on this but it

1008
00:40:31,870 --> 00:40:36,819
does exist I don't think it's like a you

1009
00:40:35,020 --> 00:40:38,560
know certainly not at the extent there's

1010
00:40:36,820 --> 00:40:40,390
an API and you can query it but I there

1011
00:40:38,560 --> 00:40:42,910
are ways of doing it

1012
00:40:40,390 --> 00:40:46,540
but just as a final caveat not all I

1013
00:40:42,910 --> 00:40:48,720
think that not all planes I I don't know

1014
00:40:46,540 --> 00:40:51,009
I think there's some complexity about

1015
00:40:48,720 --> 00:40:53,169
not all planes maybe needing to file it

1016
00:40:51,010 --> 00:40:56,500
and just as a last point some planes can

1017
00:40:53,170 --> 00:40:58,300
kind of opt out of a view of a security

1018
00:40:56,500 --> 00:40:58,940
or privacy concern you can opt out of

1019
00:40:58,300 --> 00:41:01,069
some of these

1020
00:40:58,940 --> 00:41:02,720
flight tracking systems I just wondering

1021
00:41:01,069 --> 00:41:04,220
about predictive ability around like

1022
00:41:02,720 --> 00:41:05,328
sensitive areas like protests or

1023
00:41:04,220 --> 00:41:06,680
something if you could figure that in

1024
00:41:05,329 --> 00:41:11,420
advance but that's really cool thank you

1025
00:41:06,680 --> 00:41:14,629
absolutely yeah hello

1026
00:41:11,420 --> 00:41:16,460
so do you foresee or do you suspect

1027
00:41:14,630 --> 00:41:18,619
there might be any risks to supply

1028
00:41:16,460 --> 00:41:21,740
chains based on the fact that you can

1029
00:41:18,619 --> 00:41:23,809
track ships and figure out and that it's

1030
00:41:21,740 --> 00:41:25,910
public to see what's on the ships what's

1031
00:41:23,809 --> 00:41:28,690
in the containers what sort of attacks

1032
00:41:25,910 --> 00:41:31,339
do you think might actually be

1033
00:41:28,690 --> 00:41:32,569
facilitated by this information yeah

1034
00:41:31,339 --> 00:41:35,509
it's an interesting question I mean I

1035
00:41:32,569 --> 00:41:37,940
know certainly you know piracy has been

1036
00:41:35,510 --> 00:41:40,309
a big issue for ever you know in places

1037
00:41:37,940 --> 00:41:45,319
like I think the Malacca Straits and and

1038
00:41:40,309 --> 00:41:47,000
elsewhere you know and I presumably I

1039
00:41:45,319 --> 00:41:49,849
don't actually know enough about how

1040
00:41:47,000 --> 00:41:52,549
like sort of the the sort of functioning

1041
00:41:49,849 --> 00:41:54,619
of piracy crime and sort of what the

1042
00:41:52,549 --> 00:41:55,940
motivations it was sort of like I don't

1043
00:41:54,619 --> 00:42:00,770
know that to the extent which they're

1044
00:41:55,940 --> 00:42:02,299
offloading material versus you know what

1045
00:42:00,770 --> 00:42:03,740
the kind of financial endgame winds up

1046
00:42:02,299 --> 00:42:06,470
being but I think certainly I mean you

1047
00:42:03,740 --> 00:42:13,038
know people are enterprising in in there

1048
00:42:06,470 --> 00:42:15,140
sort of a crime planning it could be it

1049
00:42:13,039 --> 00:42:17,930
one could imagine it being used and

1050
00:42:15,140 --> 00:42:21,288
final aside what's the lead time on

1051
00:42:17,930 --> 00:42:22,460
getting that data from the I forgot

1052
00:42:21,289 --> 00:42:23,630
exactly who provides it

1053
00:42:22,460 --> 00:42:25,640
yeah the Customs and Border Protection

1054
00:42:23,630 --> 00:42:28,670
yeah yeah it's a great question I think

1055
00:42:25,640 --> 00:42:31,520
I know that it's it's only published on

1056
00:42:28,670 --> 00:42:34,160
a daily basis but there is a combination

1057
00:42:31,520 --> 00:42:38,410
of both kind of trailing and lagging

1058
00:42:34,160 --> 00:42:40,670
shipments so some people advance file

1059
00:42:38,410 --> 00:42:42,859
bill of ladings so you can kind of see

1060
00:42:40,670 --> 00:42:44,270
things ahead of time others you're just

1061
00:42:42,859 --> 00:42:48,410
kind of getting a rearview mirror look

1062
00:42:44,270 --> 00:42:51,890
at it I am so you mentioned of course

1063
00:42:48,410 --> 00:42:53,359
the the BuzzFeed planes story and

1064
00:42:51,890 --> 00:42:55,700
intercept has done some things and

1065
00:42:53,359 --> 00:42:58,578
there's a court story and a few things I

1066
00:42:55,700 --> 00:43:01,098
think around Davos so so there's there's

1067
00:42:58,579 --> 00:43:04,099
a burgeoning like SDR investigative

1068
00:43:01,099 --> 00:43:05,960
journalism scene is it your is it your

1069
00:43:04,099 --> 00:43:10,609
sense that this is still something that

1070
00:43:05,960 --> 00:43:12,650
is is like technically difficult enough

1071
00:43:10,609 --> 00:43:15,380
that there's there's a lot of pasture

1072
00:43:12,650 --> 00:43:17,869
there or is this something that you

1073
00:43:15,380 --> 00:43:19,579
think there's where is there some an

1074
00:43:17,869 --> 00:43:21,020
area where you think see that expanding

1075
00:43:19,579 --> 00:43:23,000
or or where journalists can be doing

1076
00:43:21,020 --> 00:43:24,500
more work in that area definitely I mean

1077
00:43:23,000 --> 00:43:25,819
I think the thing that's really kind of

1078
00:43:24,500 --> 00:43:28,369
cool and interesting is that the

1079
00:43:25,819 --> 00:43:30,349
technical difficulty has sort of you

1080
00:43:28,369 --> 00:43:31,789
know is just like reducing daily

1081
00:43:30,349 --> 00:43:33,170
especially is more and more great kind

1082
00:43:31,789 --> 00:43:35,150
of like guides and things like that are

1083
00:43:33,170 --> 00:43:37,609
written and so I think that opens up the

1084
00:43:35,150 --> 00:43:39,260
field for a lot of creativity I'll give

1085
00:43:37,609 --> 00:43:41,750
you an example there was someone did a

1086
00:43:39,260 --> 00:43:45,109
project where they set up one of these

1087
00:43:41,750 --> 00:43:46,910
receivers in somewhere in Switzerland

1088
00:43:45,109 --> 00:43:50,180
either Zurich or wherever and basically

1089
00:43:46,910 --> 00:43:51,980
like what they were trying to do is see

1090
00:43:50,180 --> 00:43:54,980
when like dictator planes were going to

1091
00:43:51,980 --> 00:43:56,299
visit their Swiss banks or whatever what

1092
00:43:54,980 --> 00:43:59,029
was interesting is like they you know

1093
00:43:56,299 --> 00:44:01,520
manually had identified like some

1094
00:43:59,029 --> 00:44:02,990
handful dozens or whatever of tail

1095
00:44:01,520 --> 00:44:05,240
numbers that they said okay these are

1096
00:44:02,990 --> 00:44:06,950
you know dictator airplanes or whatever

1097
00:44:05,240 --> 00:44:08,509
but I think the kind of interesting

1098
00:44:06,950 --> 00:44:10,640
investigative work in a context like

1099
00:44:08,510 --> 00:44:12,140
that is I think you know there's a lot

1100
00:44:10,640 --> 00:44:13,848
of work to be done I'm sure there's you

1101
00:44:12,140 --> 00:44:16,069
know thousands of planes that could be

1102
00:44:13,849 --> 00:44:18,260
of interest in this regard on thinking

1103
00:44:16,069 --> 00:44:20,029
about you know how would you expand a

1104
00:44:18,260 --> 00:44:22,220
corpus like that and then what do you do

1105
00:44:20,029 --> 00:44:23,930
once you actually find oh you know that

1106
00:44:22,220 --> 00:44:25,640
you know this particular head of state

1107
00:44:23,930 --> 00:44:29,288
is traveling here at this time you know

1108
00:44:25,640 --> 00:44:29,288
how can we kind of dig further with that

1109
00:44:29,500 --> 00:44:34,430
the technical issues aside you know

1110
00:44:32,240 --> 00:44:36,558
obviously these a lot of these you know

1111
00:44:34,430 --> 00:44:38,450
this stuff is capable with $20 sticks

1112
00:44:36,559 --> 00:44:41,029
you could buy on Amazon are there

1113
00:44:38,450 --> 00:44:44,808
regulatory issues that prohibit the

1114
00:44:41,029 --> 00:44:48,200
reception of license spectrum for you

1115
00:44:44,809 --> 00:44:50,359
know swathes of these frequencies so you

1116
00:44:48,200 --> 00:44:51,710
know I I'm certainly not a full expert

1117
00:44:50,359 --> 00:44:53,450
on it and wouldn't want to be you know

1118
00:44:51,710 --> 00:44:54,619
giving kind of guidance to anyone in

1119
00:44:53,450 --> 00:44:56,270
that regard

1120
00:44:54,619 --> 00:44:58,400
my understanding is for the most part

1121
00:44:56,270 --> 00:44:59,869
you know the the regulation really kicks

1122
00:44:58,400 --> 00:45:03,520
in when you're starting to transmit

1123
00:44:59,869 --> 00:45:07,760
stuff I do know that some states have

1124
00:45:03,520 --> 00:45:09,288
regulations around like receiving police

1125
00:45:07,760 --> 00:45:11,089
scanner data when you're in like a

1126
00:45:09,289 --> 00:45:13,520
vehicle that's in motion and there's

1127
00:45:11,089 --> 00:45:16,788
certainly local regulation about those

1128
00:45:13,520 --> 00:45:18,980
things but my general understanding and

1129
00:45:16,789 --> 00:45:21,319
I would encourage you to find someone

1130
00:45:18,980 --> 00:45:23,029
who actually knows the answer is that

1131
00:45:21,319 --> 00:45:24,900
when you're receiving things it's it's

1132
00:45:23,029 --> 00:45:28,030
generally fine

1133
00:45:24,900 --> 00:45:30,250
all right the can you come up with a

1134
00:45:28,030 --> 00:45:32,320
better title for this talk than making

1135
00:45:30,250 --> 00:45:35,829
sense of the ether I'd be open to

1136
00:45:32,320 --> 00:45:38,320
suggestions do you have one well I have

1137
00:45:35,829 --> 00:45:41,130
to write one down please do and bring it

1138
00:45:38,320 --> 00:45:44,190
up after the talk I'd love to see it

1139
00:45:41,130 --> 00:45:44,190
thank you

1140
00:45:44,820 --> 00:45:49,329
hey great talk so you talked a lot about

1141
00:45:47,290 --> 00:45:51,550
um unencrypted radio protocols and I was

1142
00:45:49,329 --> 00:45:53,829
wondering do you see encrypted ones much

1143
00:45:51,550 --> 00:45:55,060
and do you know have any interesting

1144
00:45:53,829 --> 00:45:58,630
ones that you could talk about a little

1145
00:45:55,060 --> 00:46:01,540
bit yeah it's there's definitely a of

1146
00:45:58,630 --> 00:46:02,680
course a bunch of that going on there's

1147
00:46:01,540 --> 00:46:07,000
been actually I mean I think you know I

1148
00:46:02,680 --> 00:46:08,529
think some of the interesting like sort

1149
00:46:07,000 --> 00:46:09,880
of at least attacks that I've seen in

1150
00:46:08,530 --> 00:46:13,900
that regard are around sort of like

1151
00:46:09,880 --> 00:46:16,060
replay attacks ooh there's been a lot a

1152
00:46:13,900 --> 00:46:19,119
lot of sort of work and research done

1153
00:46:16,060 --> 00:46:22,328
around inert like sort of intervening

1154
00:46:19,119 --> 00:46:24,579
with sort of remote car starts and

1155
00:46:22,329 --> 00:46:25,690
remote car kind of door unlocks and

1156
00:46:24,579 --> 00:46:27,940
things like that where people have been

1157
00:46:25,690 --> 00:46:29,530
able to not necessarily get so far is

1158
00:46:27,940 --> 00:46:31,359
actually decrypting and understanding

1159
00:46:29,530 --> 00:46:33,940
what the signals were but being close

1160
00:46:31,359 --> 00:46:35,380
enough to just actually record them and

1161
00:46:33,940 --> 00:46:37,720
then be able to replay them at a later

1162
00:46:35,380 --> 00:46:39,910
time to gain access to it but it's

1163
00:46:37,720 --> 00:46:41,500
certainly there's also is an interesting

1164
00:46:39,910 --> 00:46:44,618
project that's some Eastern European

1165
00:46:41,500 --> 00:46:47,470
artists did or perhaps Brazilian around

1166
00:46:44,619 --> 00:46:48,970
sort of identifying this sort of

1167
00:46:47,470 --> 00:46:52,000
transmission frequencies that like

1168
00:46:48,970 --> 00:46:53,709
military planes use and sort of created

1169
00:46:52,000 --> 00:46:57,670
an artwork that just sort of indicated

1170
00:46:53,710 --> 00:47:00,040
when there was there were sort of you

1171
00:46:57,670 --> 00:47:02,020
know transmissions on those frequencies

1172
00:47:00,040 --> 00:47:03,700
even if they didn't know what they were

1173
00:47:02,020 --> 00:47:05,230
actually saying the kind of presence of

1174
00:47:03,700 --> 00:47:07,770
them was was interesting and something

1175
00:47:05,230 --> 00:47:10,630
that they created like an interface for

1176
00:47:07,770 --> 00:47:13,060
high excellent talk thank you very much

1177
00:47:10,630 --> 00:47:13,750
I'm so amazed that is I live in the

1178
00:47:13,060 --> 00:47:16,450
Northeast

1179
00:47:13,750 --> 00:47:18,880
I hear transatlantic flights still on HF

1180
00:47:16,450 --> 00:47:19,839
like three point four megahertz and

1181
00:47:18,880 --> 00:47:21,640
they'll go ahead and announce themselves

1182
00:47:19,839 --> 00:47:23,319
to Gander that hey I'm going to do

1183
00:47:21,640 --> 00:47:25,299
transatlantic but I was always trying to

1184
00:47:23,319 --> 00:47:26,680
figure out is Gander in does roll

1185
00:47:25,300 --> 00:47:28,270
acknowledge the airplane and then like

1186
00:47:26,680 --> 00:47:29,770
stand by for your tone and you hear

1187
00:47:28,270 --> 00:47:31,990
something sounds like almost touch-tone

1188
00:47:29,770 --> 00:47:32,930
just sending out in the HF frequency do

1189
00:47:31,990 --> 00:47:34,729
you know

1190
00:47:32,930 --> 00:47:36,859
have an idea that is I'm sure it's a

1191
00:47:34,730 --> 00:47:38,540
very old system because I want to go

1192
00:47:36,860 --> 00:47:40,850
look up the system and like there's

1193
00:47:38,540 --> 00:47:42,410
documented files of protocol they

1194
00:47:40,850 --> 00:47:44,089
actually have to use HF for

1195
00:47:42,410 --> 00:47:45,620
transatlantic as I got back up I was

1196
00:47:44,090 --> 00:47:46,790
just amazed that with all the satellites

1197
00:47:45,620 --> 00:47:48,710
and everything else that was still

1198
00:47:46,790 --> 00:47:50,330
something to be done yeah that's super

1199
00:47:48,710 --> 00:47:52,670
interesting and unfortunately I don't I

1200
00:47:50,330 --> 00:47:54,860
don't know much about it but I'd love to

1201
00:47:52,670 --> 00:47:58,870
learn more yeah an hour rtl-sdr

1202
00:47:54,860 --> 00:48:01,850
and if you tuned in around between 3.5

1203
00:47:58,870 --> 00:48:04,549
and-and-and 3.3 megahertz you'll hear

1204
00:48:01,850 --> 00:48:06,589
stuff and it's just interesting and then

1205
00:48:04,550 --> 00:48:07,880
you just take the they'll say the tail

1206
00:48:06,590 --> 00:48:09,860
number to play and just go ahead and a

1207
00:48:07,880 --> 00:48:11,900
flight or comm like okay who is that so

1208
00:48:09,860 --> 00:48:14,480
thank you cool thanks and I think if

1209
00:48:11,900 --> 00:48:19,010
there's a time for one more question if

1210
00:48:14,480 --> 00:48:21,440
there is any okay otherwise well thank

1211
00:48:19,010 --> 00:48:25,809
you guys very much this is a lot of fun

1212
00:48:21,440 --> 00:48:25,809
[Applause]