1
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Everybody grab their seats.

2
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Everybody what?

3
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Oh yeah, no, I'll wait.

4
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Okay, I'll now tell you lots of secrets.

5
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But you have to tell me which secrets.

6
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See, I can't tell you the secret until you tell me which secret you need to know.

7
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What I'm doing here, there's this...

8
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There's this Californian, Paul Hoffman, lives in his car.

9
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Lives in his car.

10
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Paul Hoffman killed Kennedy, right.

11
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But this is the whole earth, no advertising.

12
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No advertising, this is the whole earth.

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And if you send him a contribution, he'll send you a roll of these.

14
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And it's just the neatest sticker I've ever seen.

15
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And so I've got a bunch up here that anybody can come up and grab some later.

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Okay, I'm going to tell you a little bit about myself.

17
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So that you have a basis for judging whether I know anything about spying.

18
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I'll do that in just two or three minutes.

19
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And then I really, I have things that I know I want to communicate, but I'd much rather kind of get a feel from you guys of what you really want to know.

20
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I spent my whole life overseas as the son of an oil man.

21
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Ten years in Asia, including four years in Vietnam at the height of the combat period.

22
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Where as a twelve year old I was trading cigarettes for bullets and bloody shit.

23
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Which my mother made me put disinfectant on.

24
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Ten years in Latin America, got a graduate degree in international relations with a thesis on predicting revolution.

25
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Get the fuck off now.

26
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I will not fucking chill.

27
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That is a screen not to play computer games on.

28
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Not to project the speaker.

29
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So get the fuck out now.

30
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No hacking.

31
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Yes, I would like you to switch it back to the mode it was in.

32
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Okay, so thesis on predicting revolution, but I really decided I'd become much, much too intellectual.

33
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So I joined the United States Marine Corps.

34
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And this had the desired effect of re-stabilizing my balance.

35
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I was an infantry officer, but I found infantry duty very boring.

36
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So I joined the Central Intelligence Agency.

37
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I did three back-to-back tours as a clandestine case officer.

38
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Which is recruiting traitors.

39
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Don't ever call a CIA officer an agent.

40
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Agents are traitors.

41
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Case officers are the guys that work for their country and recruit traitors.

42
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And I did very well.

43
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Five times the regional recruiting average.

44
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But I had some problems with what I perceived to be the false and deceptive nature of what we were doing.

45
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Don't get me wrong, I think recruiting traitors when you need them is cool.

46
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But recruiting traitors in a very incompetent way and pretending that the local service doesn't know you've recruited them, this is not cool.

47
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Because it basically means you're living a lie to your own government.

48
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So I then went over and helped program satellites.

49
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These 30 billion dollar monsters that collect all kinds of shit.

50
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And yes, we can talk about Echelon.

51
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And I helped steal signals code books from other countries.

52
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I'm pretty familiar with what we can do in signals imagery.

53
00:04:03,570 --> 00:04:08,590
There's another discipline called Measurements and Signatures Intelligence.

54
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Which is really cool.

55
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It's like smelling shit in the air from a long way away.

56
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And I've done all the belt buckle stuff and hidden cameras and all that jazz, walking through walls.

57
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And I kind of got bored with all that and the Marine Corps asked me to come stand up a new intelligence center.

58
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So I spent 20 million dollars of your money to figure out that 99% of what I needed to produce intelligence, which is useful actionable information, was not secret.

59
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Not available from the Central Intelligence Agency.

60
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Not in English and not in this country.

61
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This really fucked me up.

62
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And so I spent the next 10 years coming to grips with this.

63
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I've spent the last 10 years as CEO of what's called a lifestyle company.

64
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Meaning it can afford to keep me in visiting conferences like this, but not much else.

65
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And I've spent the last 10 years trying to teach governments how to use private sector knowledge that they've cut themselves off from, literally.

66
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Our spies are in a cement bunker and they think that the only shit that matters is stuff they steal.

67
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Well, we're spending 30 billion dollars a year stealing 10% of what we need to know.

68
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And we've completely cut ourselves off from the 90% of the information that's actually useful.

69
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And so I've just published a book.

70
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It's called On Intelligence, Spies and Secrecy in an Open World.

71
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And if you really, really want to toy with the Amazon ranks, everybody buy it tomorrow.

72
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I went to rank 902 on Amazon.com based on 88 people buying it on the same day.

73
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This was great.

74
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I managed to catch it and I've printed it out and of course I'll never see that rank again unless you all buy my book tomorrow.

75
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In which case I could compete with Harry Potter.

76
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That would be a good hack.

77
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Thank you very much.

78
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I get no money for the book.

79
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This was a labor of love.

80
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I sold my soul to the small publisher.

81
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Actually, I didn't.

82
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I did a book from nothing to published and ranked 902 on Amazon.com in four months.

83
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It took me two months to write it and two months to get it published and that's pretty fast.

84
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But all the money goes to the publisher but I'd like to see it out there and that kind of leads me to what I thought I might do here when Emanuel and I talked about me doing something up here.

85
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We have a dumb nation.

86
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I was very, very moved by the keynote speaker.

87
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In fact, he really depressed me a lot.

88
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I'm familiar with Norm Chomsky's Manufacturing Consent and the literature.

89
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That's wonderful, wonderful work.

90
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But I had forgotten how bad it is.

91
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And in fact, the keynote speaker today changed what my next book will be about.

92
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Because what we really need to talk about is how do you create a smart nation?

93
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How do you create a nation that harnesses the distributed intelligence of the whole earth?

94
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How do you create a nation that makes informed decisions at local, state, national and global levels?

95
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The only really decent idea I've had in the last year is I suddenly realized that global intelligence, global coverage of all things that are happening that matters is unaffordable and unachievable by any single nation.

96
00:08:06,920 --> 00:08:14,860
You actually need to go back to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the NUOSphere, H.G.

97
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Wells, World Brain, my own implementation of these ideas, which is a virtual intelligence community.

98
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Where guess what?

99
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Intelligence is not secret.

100
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I distinguish between data, information and intelligence.

101
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Data is the print, the image, the signal, whatever.

102
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Information is data that has been collated and is of generic interest and is broadcast.

103
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New York Times is information.

104
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So is all of the so-called intelligence that we publish.

105
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Intelligence, rather than information, is information that has been discovered, discriminated, distilled and delivered to answer a really serious question.

106
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And it's actionable.

107
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Alright, so we have someone who's buying land in a foreign country soon.

108
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They have an intelligence question, which is who in this country can fuck me up?

109
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That's a really important question.

110
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So we need to know who's the power structure, not just the power structure in country, but the power structure that would be elected if there was a changeover, the church power structure, the mestizo Indian power structure, the drug runner power structure.

111
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It would be real helpful to know that there's a cocaine lab right on the border of the land you're about to buy.

112
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Because it may be bombed and they may miss.

113
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So this is other cool shit.

114
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Anyway, let me stop at that point and just say I've done all of this stuff.

115
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And I would be happy, speaking spontaneously, to answer any questions you may have.

116
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And I can't see all of you.

117
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Is anyone still there?

118
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So let's just have a little chaos.

119
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Somebody shout out a question and I'll see how it goes with three or four questions.

120
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And then I may or may not go back into some prepared remarks and whatever.

121
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Yeah, all right.

122
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Echelon.

123
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You know, you must be French.

124
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They're really...

125
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Europe is really into this.

126
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A little while ago, Australia and New Zealand were a little concerned because the New Zealand prime minister discovered that the New Zealand intelligence service, A, did not tell him when they agreed to sell their soul to the Americans.

127
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And B, the New Zealanders had no idea what the Americans were doing with all the computers that New Zealand had paid for.

128
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Echelon is not a program I have been directly involved with, but I can tell you as someone who knows the bureaucracy very well and knows where we've been, Echelon is 1970s technology.

129
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Okay?

130
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That's number one.

131
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Number two, I can tell you for absolute sure that we process less than 6% of the signals we collect on the Soviet Union and probably less than 1% of the signals that we collect on everybody else.

132
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All right?

133
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We have over-invested in old collection technology.

134
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We haven't invested anything in processing.

135
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We still don't understand heterogeneous database search and retrieval.

136
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We still don't do clustering, weighting, data visualization, and geospatial correlation of data at the CIA.

137
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All right?

138
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It is really, really ugly.

139
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Believe me on this.

140
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Graduate students get to CIA and although it's getting a little bit better now, you need to understand that in 1988 CIA made a fundamentally stupid decision.

141
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They decided to go with the secretly neurotic architecture and the PS2.

142
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In 1988.

143
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Can you believe this?

144
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Fuck.

145
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So, Echelon is, you know, typical of the American bureaucracy.

146
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We are in trouble in part because we have built ourselves a bureaucracy based on old technology.

147
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And we have cut ourselves off from all you smart people.

148
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So, DARPA, to take one unrelated example, spent $70 million on data visualization stuff that Hollywood had abandoned five years previously.

149
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We literally have no clue what's going on in critical technologies around the world with some isolated examples.

150
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Yes, we have the national labs.

151
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Yes, CIA.

152
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I worked, by the way, in the office.

153
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I was a founding member of the Advanced Information Processing and Analysis Steering Group for the U.S.

154
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intelligence community.

155
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My chief technical officer, Dr.

156
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Michael Levitt, was the agency architect and senior information scientist for CIA until two years ago.

157
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So, I think we know where off we speak.

158
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In your darkest nightmares about American intelligence, I am sure none of you ever conceived of the possibility that rather than being intrusive, they are stupid.

159
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This is scary.

160
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Okay.

161
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Does that answer the Echelon question?

162
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Okay.

163
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Yes, sir.

164
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And then here.

165
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Okay.

166
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Let me go with CIA first.

167
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Thank you.

168
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The question is, does this thing work?

169
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I guess it's not.

170
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I'll repeat the question.

171
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The question was, how much domestic CIA spying takes place?

172
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And also NSA.

173
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A couple of quick thoughts on this.

174
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Number one, CIA has an entire division called the National Collection Division.

175
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These are CIA officers with CIA credentials who approach corporations, generally for two reasons.

176
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First, to find non-official cover positions that can be used overseas.

177
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And second, to obtain information from these corporations that's helpful to American interest.

178
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Sometimes proprietary information.

179
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Let me give you an example.

180
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During the Gulf War, we creamed Saddam Hussein's C3I system because we were able to get from some of the people who created the telecommunications stuff, information about what was actually there and how to hit it and stuff like that.

181
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That was a real success story.

182
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A lot of it came from CIA people overseas that got it from West German companies that do a lot of work in Iraq.

183
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So my answer to you is that CIA does not, to the best of my knowledge, spy on anyone in the United States.

184
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Now we go to NSA.

185
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Now you've got to understand, remember, if in doubt between conspiracy and ignorance, always go with ignorance.

186
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NSA listens, obviously, when you're doing digital, when you're doing eavesdropping, you can't distinguish where the signal originated from and so on.

187
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So NSA will indeed pick up a lot of stuff from the United States that's going in and out.

188
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But there is an executive order, 12333, which lays down the rules.

189
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They do violate these rules, they violated it in my case.

190
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I was interviewed by a tabloid newspaper, which is given out free at supermarkets in Israel, and I was talking about how it could take down the country in 48 hours with 10 good people.

191
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Israel.

192
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It doesn't matter which country, actually.

193
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But these assholes sent, the CIA, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, sent a report over to the White House that had my name in it.

194
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That's illegal.

195
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U.S.

196
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citizens, unless they are known to be an agent of a foreign power, or suspected strongly to be an agent of a foreign power, are absolutely not supposed to appear by name in any message, nor are they supposed to store information about U.S.

197
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citizens.

198
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in their files.

199
00:16:17,230 --> 00:16:22,570
In my case, obviously, they violated the rules, and at the time I was too dumb to sue their ass, because it would have been a quick million.

200
00:16:22,970 --> 00:16:26,330
Maybe not, but the point is they violated their own regulations.

201
00:16:26,850 --> 00:16:32,610
Now, everyone working overseas is assumed to be a non-U.S.

202
00:16:32,610 --> 00:16:37,270
citizen, or any transmissions that are intercepted from overseas are assumed to be non-U.S.

203
00:16:37,270 --> 00:16:42,590
in nature, unless there is context and text in the message that makes it clear it's a U.S.

204
00:16:42,590 --> 00:16:44,630
citizen, then the executive order applies.

205
00:16:44,630 --> 00:16:47,190
In the United States, the reverse is true.

206
00:16:47,610 --> 00:16:54,310
Every signal intercepted that appears to originate or have someone involved in the United States is assumed to be a U.S.

207
00:16:54,310 --> 00:16:57,270
citizen, until the contrary is known.

208
00:16:57,730 --> 00:17:02,290
So, I would give them high marks for following this.

209
00:17:02,370 --> 00:17:04,590
I think, by and large, the U.S.

210
00:17:04,590 --> 00:17:10,510
intelligence community is a bureaucracy rather than an intrusive conspiracy, if you will.

211
00:17:10,510 --> 00:17:14,990
And they have a real problem because their technology is worse than yours.

212
00:17:14,990 --> 00:17:18,670
In fact, their technology is worse than the druggies.

213
00:17:18,970 --> 00:17:28,350
I mean, the Colombian drug lords have better computers, better airplanes, more real estate, more people working as informers.

214
00:17:28,350 --> 00:17:33,150
I mean, every Coast Guard platform that moves in air, land, and sea is being followed.

215
00:17:33,390 --> 00:17:35,570
I mean, they know where all our shit is.

216
00:17:35,610 --> 00:17:39,810
And they let us have 1% of the take every year, and they get all the rest in here.

217
00:17:40,550 --> 00:17:46,550
We are absolutely clueless on how to fight the drug war, and I've heard reasonable comments about how to make this go away.

218
00:17:47,810 --> 00:17:50,130
Yes, there was a question over here.

219
00:17:55,700 --> 00:18:02,180
Los Alamos, you know, a lot of people don't realize that the national labs are actually run by private sector companies.

220
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And they are bureaucracies once removed.

221
00:18:09,600 --> 00:18:12,440
And I do have an important comment about security.

222
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Which is, when your best employees violate the rules, it's time to change the rules.

223
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Our security bureaucracy has become so incredibly pedestrian and intrusive and annoying that people are refusing to work for the intelligence community because the background investigations and the polygraphs and so on take 18 months or just a real royal pain in the ass.

224
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And then they pay you like shit and give you bad working conditions and don't give you the tools you really need to do the job.

225
00:18:50,040 --> 00:18:54,960
So the security things at Los Alamos are the tip of the iceberg.

226
00:18:55,620 --> 00:19:05,060
In fact, when State Department lost its laptop computer, there was a frantic effort over at all the other national intelligence agencies to account for theirs, and they couldn't.

227
00:19:06,420 --> 00:19:09,580
There's a shitload of laptops missing at CIA.

228
00:19:09,580 --> 00:19:11,060
They don't know where they are.

229
00:19:11,060 --> 00:19:14,800
Now the good news is there's nothing on them because most people over there don't get laptops.

230
00:19:15,020 --> 00:19:18,180
But it's really not pretty.

231
00:19:18,180 --> 00:19:19,200
Another question.

232
00:19:20,180 --> 00:19:21,960
There and then here and then there.

233
00:19:21,960 --> 00:19:23,040
Over there first.

234
00:19:26,020 --> 00:19:26,740
Sure.

235
00:19:29,060 --> 00:19:30,140
It's classified.

236
00:19:32,820 --> 00:19:34,520
How do you walk through a wall?

237
00:19:35,340 --> 00:19:45,480
Well, basically you walk through a wall by pretending you have a key to the door and getting through all the alarm systems and being on the other side.

238
00:19:46,060 --> 00:19:48,420
So you're talking about several technologies.

239
00:19:48,420 --> 00:19:52,940
You're talking about lockpicking technology, and we have a master lockpicker here.

240
00:19:53,380 --> 00:19:55,620
You're talking about alarm technology.

241
00:19:55,620 --> 00:19:58,220
Now digital alarms are making it a lot harder.

242
00:19:59,340 --> 00:20:01,300
It's really getting serious.

243
00:20:02,200 --> 00:20:06,700
You also have technology to open safes.

244
00:20:07,690 --> 00:20:15,660
And you should literally be able to tell what the combination is without knowing it in advance.

245
00:20:16,100 --> 00:20:18,080
And there are some really, really good things.

246
00:20:18,080 --> 00:20:19,820
They are, however, dangerous.

247
00:20:20,100 --> 00:20:25,420
You might radiate for a while when you use this stuff.

248
00:20:27,140 --> 00:20:38,520
Anything that doesn't have at least two live human beings, one of them ideally remote from the site itself, is vulnerable to penetration.

249
00:20:39,300 --> 00:20:41,320
I'll tell you two funny stories.

250
00:20:41,320 --> 00:20:47,300
One is we did something really, really complicated, got all the way in, and there was nothing in there.

251
00:20:48,280 --> 00:20:53,660
And as we're going out the door, someone thought to look under the code clerk's pillow, and there it was.

252
00:20:54,040 --> 00:20:55,460
It was great.

253
00:20:56,400 --> 00:21:01,200
Another time, and this wasn't me, this was someone else, but they darted a dog.

254
00:21:01,200 --> 00:21:07,100
They put a dart into a dog to put him to sleep, and they went in and they did some really, really sophisticated stuff.

255
00:21:07,100 --> 00:21:08,560
They backed all the way out.

256
00:21:09,180 --> 00:21:15,360
They're listening to the audio the next morning, and the woman is screaming, someone's killed the dog.

257
00:21:15,980 --> 00:21:17,580
Well, the dart was missing.

258
00:21:17,580 --> 00:21:19,540
The dart was still in the dead dog.

259
00:21:19,740 --> 00:21:22,760
The dog had crawled under the Volkswagen and died.

260
00:21:23,900 --> 00:21:29,600
And so they're having a panic attack, because we're talking about 18 months' worth of work, millions of dollars going down the drain.

261
00:21:29,600 --> 00:21:32,380
If they find the dart, they realize they've been compromised.

262
00:21:33,100 --> 00:21:35,700
She wanted autopsies, but those were expensive.

263
00:21:37,080 --> 00:21:40,700
So finally, they just buried the dog, and everybody breathed a sigh of relief.

264
00:21:40,700 --> 00:21:48,040
But ever since then, this major friendly country, the United States, has told all of its people, whatever you do, don't kill the fucking dog.

265
00:21:52,640 --> 00:21:55,140
There's a similar story on the Soviet side.

266
00:21:55,380 --> 00:21:59,080
It's told by Oleg Kalugin, who's now a green card resident in the United States.

267
00:21:59,880 --> 00:22:05,220
The wife of the senior military intelligence officer in New Delhi fell in love with her German shepherd.

268
00:22:06,840 --> 00:22:09,820
And this posed a security problem for them.

269
00:22:10,280 --> 00:22:15,740
So they go all the way back to the Soviet Union, and finally gets up to Andropov.

270
00:22:15,840 --> 00:22:18,940
And he's nodding his head, and finally says, kill the dog.

271
00:22:20,660 --> 00:22:23,460
So, this is a good Soviet solution.

272
00:22:25,020 --> 00:22:27,620
You don't want her sleeping with the dog, kill the dog.

273
00:22:28,280 --> 00:22:34,900
So they go, and they order up another batch of this poison that they used in London with the umbrella to kill this guy.

274
00:22:35,280 --> 00:22:38,300
And so they go out, and they umbrella the dog.

275
00:22:40,220 --> 00:22:43,180
But, they made a mistake.

276
00:22:43,340 --> 00:22:47,160
They didn't kill the dog, but he was paralyzed from the waist down.

277
00:22:51,720 --> 00:22:52,760
Awesome!

278
00:22:54,300 --> 00:23:01,030
I had 20 Australian officers in tears on the floor over this one.

279
00:23:02,900 --> 00:23:04,740
Over here, sir.

280
00:23:11,430 --> 00:23:13,190
Yes, it is.

281
00:23:13,330 --> 00:23:25,670
Bill Colby, a former director of Central Intelligence, speaking at one of my conferences, said in 1996, I think it was, that the NRO could see a grapefruit.

282
00:23:25,670 --> 00:23:28,950
Okay, it's four inches wide.

283
00:23:29,510 --> 00:23:32,550
Problem is, you have to tell them where to look for it.

284
00:23:32,970 --> 00:23:36,710
They can't find the goddamn grapefruit in the first place.

285
00:23:37,270 --> 00:23:52,050
And so, we have a real problem with overhead technology, because in the 70s and 80s, when we were transitioning from the U-2s to overhead satellites, we had two satellite constellations planned.

286
00:23:52,050 --> 00:24:00,690
One was for wide area surveillance, to be able to look at large swaths of ground and then hone in on things and kind of figure out where stuff was.

287
00:24:00,690 --> 00:24:02,790
And then the other one was the precision thing.

288
00:24:03,270 --> 00:24:12,190
There's a wonderful Washington Post article, by the way, on spy satellite technology and how Hollywood differs from the reality.

289
00:24:12,410 --> 00:24:16,170
There's a book out on spy satellites that's very, very good.

290
00:24:16,170 --> 00:24:23,070
I just do a search on Amazon.com for spy satellites and you'll find what I think is probably a very decent book.

291
00:24:24,010 --> 00:24:25,550
What's the issue here?

292
00:24:25,550 --> 00:24:28,550
During the Gulf War, we could not find Scud missiles.

293
00:24:29,630 --> 00:24:34,670
I mean, we're spending $30 billion on all this shit and we can't find an 18-wheeler?

294
00:24:35,690 --> 00:24:37,430
You know, in a desert?

295
00:24:39,030 --> 00:24:42,090
There's something wrong with our system.

296
00:24:42,890 --> 00:24:57,810
So, I will tell you, and Locke Johnson, who was on both the Church and the Aspen Brown Commissions, will tell you, we have spent way too much money on narrowly focused overhead collection systems.

297
00:24:57,810 --> 00:25:07,010
We've spent no money on processing multimedia, multilingual information in a way that makes it useful to a human being.

298
00:25:07,010 --> 00:25:11,750
And we've spent almost no money on smart people that know something.

299
00:25:11,750 --> 00:25:17,470
I mean, your average analyst is right out of college, paid dirt.

300
00:25:18,410 --> 00:25:24,010
Okay, we're talking GS-7, 8, and 9, which is like second lieutenant's pay.

301
00:25:24,710 --> 00:25:33,410
They will, over time, over a 20-year career, rise, if they're lucky, to GS-14, which is like a lieutenant colonel, $65,000, $75,000.

302
00:25:33,430 --> 00:25:37,030
You guys can earn that tomorrow, if you're not already.

303
00:25:38,550 --> 00:25:40,150
Very bad pay.

304
00:25:40,150 --> 00:25:47,670
We haven't figured out that in the age of information, you've got to pay a lot of money for a few really smart people, and you don't need the clerks.

305
00:25:47,930 --> 00:25:49,490
Here's another true story.

306
00:25:50,070 --> 00:25:54,990
I was responsible for offensive counterintelligence, and so I asked for a list.

307
00:25:54,990 --> 00:25:59,430
Offensive counterintelligence means penetrate the other guy so you can find out if they've penetrated you.

308
00:25:59,770 --> 00:26:04,930
And so I asked for a list of everyone that we knew who worked for this denied area country.

309
00:26:05,130 --> 00:26:07,190
And they came back with a list of 200 names.

310
00:26:07,190 --> 00:26:08,270
I said, this is bullshit.

311
00:26:08,270 --> 00:26:12,030
I reported more names than this from prisoner interrogations in Central America.

312
00:26:12,870 --> 00:26:24,030
And so, after many, many efforts of trying to get the data out of the CIA computers, I finally hired a retired CIA person, and she spent three months going through all of the files.

313
00:26:24,470 --> 00:26:27,410
And at the end of that period, we had 3,000 names.

314
00:26:28,170 --> 00:26:31,130
So then I said, alright, why?

315
00:26:31,570 --> 00:26:40,350
Because when you do a message and you have a lot of names in it, at the end you say index all names, which means every single name in this old-fashioned system is supposed to be indexed.

316
00:26:40,350 --> 00:26:49,510
Turns out, the people who do the index are GS2 clerks in the basement with no education.

317
00:26:50,950 --> 00:26:58,370
And so when a message comes in with a prisoner or defector debriefing that has 300 names, shit!

318
00:26:59,470 --> 00:27:01,450
And it moves on.

319
00:27:02,370 --> 00:27:04,150
No indexing.

320
00:27:04,790 --> 00:27:08,550
When in doubt, it's not a conspiracy.

321
00:27:09,370 --> 00:27:11,490
FBI has the same problem.

322
00:27:12,650 --> 00:27:13,910
Over here.

323
00:27:15,850 --> 00:27:17,210
Am I distracting you?

324
00:27:17,210 --> 00:27:19,350
Is this obsessive-compulsive behavior?

325
00:27:23,070 --> 00:27:24,730
I'll tell you, I love this.

326
00:27:24,730 --> 00:27:33,370
Paul Hoffman is just a wonderful human being, and I think he did more good for the Earth with this sticker than anyone I know.

327
00:27:34,190 --> 00:27:36,330
I hope you guys... what?

328
00:27:37,750 --> 00:27:44,850
It's an Apollo 17 shot, and on the back, and I ask you all to just take one of these, on the back are the EarthSeals PO box.

329
00:27:44,850 --> 00:27:48,770
And if you just send them like $10, they'll send you a roll of $1,000.

330
00:27:48,890 --> 00:27:53,390
It's absolutely the best bargain that I know of for this kind of thing.

331
00:27:53,390 --> 00:27:54,690
You had a question.

332
00:27:55,250 --> 00:27:57,730
I will now manipulate my bottle here.

333
00:28:04,850 --> 00:28:07,130
Radar mapping of the surface, okay.

334
00:28:10,850 --> 00:28:12,950
Get me started on NEMA.

335
00:28:13,510 --> 00:28:17,290
You guys haven't seen a rave until I start talking about NEMA.

336
00:28:19,790 --> 00:28:22,390
I love General King, he's a fine man.

337
00:28:24,770 --> 00:28:26,690
And it's not his fault.

338
00:28:28,250 --> 00:28:35,290
NEMA is so fucked up, because they don't have any satellites.

339
00:28:36,430 --> 00:28:53,810
Alright, when we decided, this goes back to your question sir, when we decided to build satellites, we knew that we needed a wide area surveillance satellite that could do two shots, and we could get to contour lines and all this other cool shit, and then we needed something really narrow so we could read license plates.

340
00:28:54,430 --> 00:28:57,370
Well, we cancelled the wide area surveillance one, right?

341
00:28:57,370 --> 00:28:59,270
So, think about this.

342
00:28:59,630 --> 00:29:04,310
You have satellites that can take postage stamp sized pictures of the whole earth.

343
00:29:04,650 --> 00:29:06,290
One at a time.

344
00:29:06,850 --> 00:29:10,110
Taking maybe a thousand years to do the whole earth.

345
00:29:10,410 --> 00:29:28,750
And then, let's say you get most of those postage stamps, you're now trying to create a map image out of a mosaic of postage stamps taken over the course of many years, at different times of day, during different seasons, from different angles of looks,

346
00:29:28,750 --> 00:29:31,130
with different kinds of cloud cover.

347
00:29:31,290 --> 00:29:32,330
You're fucked.

348
00:29:33,430 --> 00:29:36,230
This is where NEMA is today.

349
00:29:36,250 --> 00:29:39,730
Now, the good news is, radar has come a long way.

350
00:29:39,910 --> 00:29:42,230
Canadian Radarsat is excellent.

351
00:29:42,370 --> 00:29:44,970
They advertise 8 meter, that's the best they can do.

352
00:29:44,970 --> 00:29:47,870
Their average is actually 25 meters resolution.

353
00:29:47,870 --> 00:29:51,250
The best today is space imaging, but no one can afford it.

354
00:29:51,330 --> 00:30:00,110
The best in the world in terms of an industrial system, thank you sir, with 17 ground stations and very fine 10 meter resolution is the French.

355
00:30:00,670 --> 00:30:05,530
But, the Department of Defense has this real hard on about buying stuff from the French.

356
00:30:05,530 --> 00:30:06,890
So, they won't do it.

357
00:30:06,910 --> 00:30:08,450
They'd rather be ignorant.

358
00:30:09,050 --> 00:30:13,370
So, when we go to Burundi or Somalia, we don't have maps.

359
00:30:13,990 --> 00:30:15,770
So, we end up having to do things.

360
00:30:15,770 --> 00:30:18,830
They finally figured out they could buy maps from the Russian military.

361
00:30:19,030 --> 00:30:21,670
The Russian military does have maps of the third world.

362
00:30:21,670 --> 00:30:22,390
Very good maps.

363
00:30:22,390 --> 00:30:25,250
They had the Italian cable car on their map.

364
00:30:32,570 --> 00:30:36,650
Sorry, they probably also had the Chinese embassy on their map.

365
00:30:42,650 --> 00:30:45,010
I've heard two stories on the Chinese embassy.

366
00:30:45,010 --> 00:30:51,670
The first is that we just fucked up and missed because the embassy had moved and we didn't talk to anybody who was there.

367
00:30:51,670 --> 00:30:57,190
The second story I've heard is that China was running all of the Chinese intel ops in the region out of that embassy.

368
00:30:57,390 --> 00:30:58,550
And it was deliberate.

369
00:30:58,750 --> 00:31:04,710
My understanding of bureaucracy is such that I'm inclined to believe the former rather than the latter explanation.

370
00:31:04,810 --> 00:31:05,690
I'll tell you something.

371
00:31:05,690 --> 00:31:08,270
I'm alive today because we don't kill each other.

372
00:31:08,730 --> 00:31:13,350
There are lots of times I could have been killed by the KGB or extreme leftists or extreme rightists.

373
00:31:13,350 --> 00:31:15,310
I mean, there are a lot of people that like to kill.

374
00:31:15,990 --> 00:31:20,690
But we have an unwritten code that we don't kill each other.

375
00:31:20,790 --> 00:31:22,230
We don't kidnap each other.

376
00:31:22,230 --> 00:31:25,110
Except in very, very rare occasions.

377
00:31:25,110 --> 00:31:27,830
And the guy that got kidnapped in Beirut was one of those.

378
00:31:28,110 --> 00:31:32,870
But by and large, we leave each other alone and we pretend that we're doing serious intelligence.

379
00:31:33,270 --> 00:31:34,030
Andy.

380
00:31:46,150 --> 00:31:47,030
The NATO...

381
00:31:47,030 --> 00:31:48,650
That's not one I'm familiar with, Andy.

382
00:31:48,650 --> 00:31:51,350
This is Andy Mullermagen from Germany, Chaos Club.

383
00:31:51,350 --> 00:31:52,330
You know him.

384
00:31:58,130 --> 00:32:04,990
We became rock

385
00:32:08,470 --> 00:32:09,470
stars.

386
00:32:12,690 --> 00:32:14,170
Did it close down?

387
00:32:22,450 --> 00:32:23,350
Okay.

388
00:32:23,810 --> 00:32:28,930
I'll talk about recruiting, spotting, assessing, recruiting, handling, and terminating agents.

389
00:32:28,930 --> 00:32:37,670
But first, I do want to mention that we have a shuttle mission, which may or may not have happened, which was supposed to do the whole earth at radar resolutions down below one meter.

390
00:32:37,670 --> 00:32:38,470
And that's great.

391
00:32:38,470 --> 00:32:44,330
If and when it does happen, that's a treasure trove of data, which of course they're going to lock up in Washington rather than releasing to the public.

392
00:32:44,330 --> 00:32:45,470
This is very stupid.

393
00:32:46,170 --> 00:32:48,270
But what they don't have are the imageries.

394
00:32:48,550 --> 00:32:57,710
And I have in my book and other places said that we need no less than $500 million a year in commercial imagery procurement to marry up.

395
00:32:57,710 --> 00:32:59,430
This is how you build a map.

396
00:32:59,570 --> 00:33:02,370
First, you do your wide area surveillance.

397
00:33:02,850 --> 00:33:06,150
Then you add the precision points to orthorectify the map.

398
00:33:06,150 --> 00:33:14,470
Then you go get the Russian military maps because they have decades worth of data extraction, which is different from looking at an image.

399
00:33:14,470 --> 00:33:18,610
You overlay the Russian data on the map, verify it to the extent that you need to.

400
00:33:18,990 --> 00:33:21,350
Then you go buy the tourist map.

401
00:33:21,350 --> 00:33:24,650
Nima's budget is being increased this year by $2.98.

402
00:33:24,890 --> 00:33:25,850
Okay.

403
00:33:26,610 --> 00:33:28,250
Cheap shot, I'm sorry.

404
00:33:28,350 --> 00:33:30,330
I have more of those.

405
00:33:31,250 --> 00:33:33,590
And then, oh yes, same thing, Grenada.

406
00:33:33,590 --> 00:33:34,710
See, we were stupid.

407
00:33:35,650 --> 00:33:36,690
Grenada.

408
00:33:37,950 --> 00:33:44,650
Then after you've bought the $2.98 tourist map and just look for some basic stuff, then you ask somebody who's actually been there.

409
00:33:44,950 --> 00:33:48,970
We had defense attachés that had visited the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

410
00:33:49,030 --> 00:33:55,030
The Russians had just done in 1997 a 1 to 10 upgrade of the map.

411
00:33:55,850 --> 00:33:58,350
Their official military map, 1 to 10,000.

412
00:33:58,350 --> 00:34:00,590
That's a very, very good map.

413
00:34:01,350 --> 00:34:04,210
Okay, now going back to Andy's thought.

414
00:34:07,990 --> 00:34:09,750
We go through the motions.

415
00:34:10,730 --> 00:34:19,250
First off, the classic CIA station consists of a bunch of puppies that throw money around like it's going out of style.

416
00:34:19,730 --> 00:34:21,690
So they're really easy to spot.

417
00:34:22,390 --> 00:34:25,330
And they recruit people they meet at cocktail parties.

418
00:34:25,850 --> 00:34:31,830
They don't recruit people that operate cranes and do other useful things in the infrastructure.

419
00:34:32,250 --> 00:34:33,470
That's down in the gutter.

420
00:34:33,470 --> 00:34:35,550
That's beneath real case officers.

421
00:34:37,250 --> 00:34:46,830
So, Andy, when we talk about a sleeper network, we probably had 100 or 250 people, many of whom may have died without us noticing.

422
00:34:48,670 --> 00:34:52,190
There's someone doing wild and lascivious things back there.

423
00:34:52,930 --> 00:34:53,650
Okay.

424
00:34:55,190 --> 00:34:56,590
I don't care.

425
00:34:58,570 --> 00:35:04,890
So you go out to someone, you recruit them, maybe you give them a retainer, let's say in the order of $5,000 a year.

426
00:35:05,030 --> 00:35:08,290
And then you have legal work, you've done background checks on them.

427
00:35:08,290 --> 00:35:10,170
Okay, so they're kind of all out there.

428
00:35:10,430 --> 00:35:14,790
When you deactivate them, you can do it right or you can do it wrong.

429
00:35:15,210 --> 00:35:22,270
If you do it right, you go to them and say we're deactivating you, but here's a year's annual salary for your trouble and tell no one.

430
00:35:22,270 --> 00:35:26,410
Or you can fuck them and just forget them.

431
00:35:26,430 --> 00:35:31,490
We did that with a Soviet defector that just sued the CIA and won a bunch of money.

432
00:35:31,790 --> 00:35:33,990
Let me tell you what's going to happen.

433
00:35:34,330 --> 00:35:41,310
The Washington Post article on CIA fucking that defector is going to be in every Soviet lunchroom.

434
00:35:41,770 --> 00:35:49,310
Okay, by the end of next week, we've just kissed away our chance to do serious Soviet recruitments for a while.

435
00:35:49,310 --> 00:35:50,990
Because they're not going to trust us.

436
00:35:51,010 --> 00:35:52,850
Because we didn't treat this guy right.

437
00:35:52,850 --> 00:35:53,850
And why didn't we treat this right?

438
00:35:53,850 --> 00:35:55,910
It comes back to security blockheads.

439
00:35:56,430 --> 00:35:58,870
Real case officers don't do babysitting.

440
00:35:59,310 --> 00:36:00,610
So what happens?

441
00:36:00,990 --> 00:36:07,750
We bring them back into Washington, we turn them over to the lowest common denominator in the intelligence community, the security thug.

442
00:36:07,910 --> 00:36:18,670
Okay, who probably doesn't have a college degree, may have a college degree, but by and large is someone who walks around and checks to see if safes are open or closed.

443
00:36:19,310 --> 00:36:27,390
Okay, and this guy is handling a highly volatile defector who has got emotional angst like you can't imagine.

444
00:36:28,510 --> 00:36:32,730
And then we're saying we're not going to give you money, we're not going to live up to all of our promises.

445
00:36:34,170 --> 00:36:38,570
There's a book in my, by the way, the annotated bibliography in my book is the best part of the book.

446
00:36:38,930 --> 00:36:41,470
And there's one book in there called Traitor.

447
00:36:41,750 --> 00:36:46,270
It's about a Soviet case officer that was basically brought back to the United States and thrown out on the street.

448
00:36:46,770 --> 00:36:50,310
He ended up being a wild ass drunk, which Soviets are to begin with.

449
00:36:50,310 --> 00:36:54,550
I mean, he went California on the Soviet side.

450
00:36:55,190 --> 00:37:01,890
And he ends up taking a little motel school course, you know, one of these hundred dollar courses that will make you a millionaire.

451
00:37:02,430 --> 00:37:05,810
And finally he climbed out of it, but you can't treat people like that.

452
00:37:06,210 --> 00:37:08,810
We had a good talk here earlier about ethics.

453
00:37:09,090 --> 00:37:13,530
The ethics of the intelligence community has lost sight of the value of human beings.

454
00:37:13,530 --> 00:37:22,430
It has lost sight of the importance of treating people with enormous respect and giving them the tools that they deserve and giving them all of these things.

455
00:37:22,430 --> 00:37:28,730
So my bottom line answer to you, Andy, is that a third of those people died and we don't know that yet.

456
00:37:28,850 --> 00:37:32,730
A third of them were probably terminated in some way, shape, or form.

457
00:37:32,730 --> 00:37:38,170
And a third of them are still there waiting for the call and will never hear from us.

458
00:37:38,490 --> 00:37:40,310
Now, do you want to say anything?

459
00:37:43,640 --> 00:37:44,980
What do you think happened?

460
00:38:05,620 --> 00:38:07,300
That could be.

461
00:38:07,320 --> 00:38:14,200
I have to tell you, I mean, there are outfits like executive outcomes and there are people who like to do mercenary shit.

462
00:38:15,100 --> 00:38:20,880
My experience is that we're really crummy at setting up stay-behind networks.

463
00:38:20,880 --> 00:38:22,620
And I'll give you some specific examples.

464
00:38:22,620 --> 00:38:29,840
The reason the U-2 was invented was not because CIA was really smart and thought about doing a cool technology hack.

465
00:38:29,840 --> 00:38:33,680
It's because everybody they sent into the Soviet Union was being shot on arrival.

466
00:38:34,540 --> 00:38:37,760
Okay, now why were they being shot on arrival?

467
00:38:38,400 --> 00:38:44,960
They were being shot on arrival because CIA was doing all of its recruiting out of the Soviet emigre groups in London.

468
00:38:45,540 --> 00:38:46,980
Well, guess what?

469
00:38:46,980 --> 00:38:50,880
The KGB and the GRU were all over those groups.

470
00:38:51,100 --> 00:38:55,060
They knew within 24 hours when we had approached or pitched somebody.

471
00:38:55,300 --> 00:38:58,660
And we'd go through a year of training and really do it right.

472
00:38:58,660 --> 00:39:07,720
I mean, one of the few places in the world where we really do decent, proper, sophisticated clandestine intelligence is Russia, China, and New Delhi.

473
00:39:09,140 --> 00:39:11,740
And we're good at it when we do it right.

474
00:39:11,740 --> 00:39:15,740
So we spend a year training these guys up not realizing they already know who they are.

475
00:39:16,260 --> 00:39:20,720
We train all of our CIA case officers at Camp Perry in Williamsburg.

476
00:39:21,100 --> 00:39:28,600
And we're clueless to the fact that the Soviets are taking pictures of all of their license plates as they're driving to and from camp.

477
00:39:28,660 --> 00:39:38,900
I mean, you want to be a real spy, you should go to randomly selected military bases all over the country and be flown into training into the so-called clandestine airfield.

478
00:39:38,980 --> 00:39:41,940
And flown back out, you should do your training in alias.

479
00:39:42,260 --> 00:39:44,820
I had all the names of all my classmates.

480
00:39:46,800 --> 00:39:48,120
We're a bureaucracy.

481
00:39:48,640 --> 00:39:50,760
We're not a spy service anymore.

482
00:39:51,080 --> 00:39:56,200
And I have to tell you, when I'm done with open source, I want to go build a clandestine service the French can't find.

483
00:39:56,480 --> 00:39:58,240
One, two, and then three.

484
00:39:58,820 --> 00:40:00,080
Yes, sir?

485
00:40:16,980 --> 00:40:21,460
Well, let's deconstruct that in several ways.

486
00:40:22,100 --> 00:40:24,200
First off, you're right.

487
00:40:24,340 --> 00:40:34,360
But, when you come into the intelligence community, you do this long enormous background check and then you're cleared for SITK code word by and large.

488
00:40:34,360 --> 00:40:38,280
Now, there are a few code word compartments that you then have to go through further loops.

489
00:40:38,680 --> 00:40:46,520
But the prevailing assumption is that once you're in, you're cleared for everything and everything is classified SITK code word.

490
00:40:46,520 --> 00:40:50,760
It's not different classifications for different sections and things like that.

491
00:40:51,000 --> 00:40:57,880
Now, in this digital age, we've gotten to the point where you can, in fact, make sure that people are only reading what they're supposed to be reading.

492
00:40:57,880 --> 00:41:01,360
And you should be able to see patterns in reading that is not appropriate.

493
00:41:01,360 --> 00:41:02,300
We still don't do that.

494
00:41:02,300 --> 00:41:04,460
We still publish a lot of stuff in hard copy.

495
00:41:04,620 --> 00:41:06,280
Now, the black compartments.

496
00:41:09,330 --> 00:41:13,990
There are clearly certain capabilities we have that I couldn't talk about here.

497
00:41:13,990 --> 00:41:18,550
And, by the way, don't confuse me with some renegade or somebody who's going to give you secrets that you shouldn't have.

498
00:41:18,550 --> 00:41:20,070
That's not going to happen tonight.

499
00:41:20,610 --> 00:41:22,330
I'll tell you about dead dogs.

500
00:41:23,210 --> 00:41:26,050
But, I love the government.

501
00:41:26,050 --> 00:41:31,090
I think the government has an important role to play in what we do, but I want it to be smart about the way it does it.

502
00:41:31,150 --> 00:41:34,950
So, what I'm about is fixing the government so that it does a better job for you.

503
00:41:34,950 --> 00:41:41,110
I'm not about overturning or exposing, like Phil Agee did, valid operations.

504
00:41:41,730 --> 00:41:43,050
So, well, thank you.

505
00:41:43,050 --> 00:41:44,390
I like being here.

506
00:41:44,390 --> 00:41:45,870
You guys make me think.

507
00:41:47,670 --> 00:41:49,710
So, black compartments.

508
00:41:50,230 --> 00:41:58,670
Yes, you get down to a point where you've actually got a list of 10,000 people who are authorized to see something.

509
00:41:58,670 --> 00:42:00,950
And you have an extremely odious bureaucracy.

510
00:42:00,950 --> 00:42:05,510
One of the problems with black compartments is that each compartment gets to set up its own security.

511
00:42:05,870 --> 00:42:19,990
So, the corporations that are executing those things get down to the ludicrous point of having to have different sensitive compartmented facilities, and different safes, and different offices, and different desks for the same people working on three different compartments.

512
00:42:22,090 --> 00:42:25,050
Three offices, one person, three compartments.

513
00:42:25,050 --> 00:42:26,510
What's wrong with this picture?

514
00:42:26,570 --> 00:42:28,810
Okay, it's really expensive.

515
00:42:28,810 --> 00:42:32,830
So, there are some real handicaps to the compartmented thing.

516
00:42:32,830 --> 00:42:42,130
The other problem is, if you think about it, what does secrecy really do in the defense and intelligence contracting business?

517
00:42:42,630 --> 00:42:50,610
It gives a lifetime monopoly to the person who built the system in the first place.

518
00:42:51,370 --> 00:42:52,870
What does that mean?

519
00:42:52,870 --> 00:43:05,130
That means that all these smart people out in Sunnyvale, who have vastly better ways to do some of this stuff that we're doing in old technology and through compartments and stuff, don't know about our problems because our problems are classified.

520
00:43:05,770 --> 00:43:09,210
When there is a deficiency in the system, that's classified.

521
00:43:09,210 --> 00:43:12,630
If anything, it's even more classified than the system itself.

522
00:43:13,250 --> 00:43:27,830
Okay, so what we've just done is we've just cut ourselves off from fixes, because the people who built it in the first place have their specific paradigm or bias or whatever, and they're not going to go do out-of-the-box solutions, and so it's a problem.

523
00:43:27,830 --> 00:43:40,730
Yes, we can keep a secret, but in the larger scheme of things, the value of information expands based on its utility to others and its sharing and stuff.

524
00:43:40,730 --> 00:43:44,290
But for a spy, a secret shared is a secret lost forever.

525
00:43:44,870 --> 00:43:54,550
And so they have this very anal approach to information, and they don't focus on the fact also that that compartmented information is operating in a vacuum.

526
00:43:55,230 --> 00:44:02,790
Because we don't have... I spent 20 million of your dollars to learn that most of what I needed wasn't available from the system.

527
00:44:02,790 --> 00:44:04,130
That's still true today.

528
00:44:04,130 --> 00:44:21,590
The Aspen Brown Commission, to which I testified, and I'll tell you about the Brundy exercise if no one asks at the end of the day, said, intelligence community access to open source is severely deficient, should be a top priority for funding, should be a top priority for DCI attention,

529
00:44:21,590 --> 00:44:22,750
and it's not.

530
00:44:23,710 --> 00:44:32,270
I mean, George Tenet, the DCI, I know him, and I sent him a copy of my book because I wanted to make sure that he had it, and I signed it, from your evil twin Skippy.

531
00:44:32,990 --> 00:44:35,670
You know, or so one would think.

532
00:44:35,750 --> 00:44:40,550
Because George and I are at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of intelligence.

533
00:44:40,850 --> 00:44:43,250
And that's not a slam on George, he's a good guy.

534
00:44:43,250 --> 00:44:47,330
But he thinks he's in the business of collecting secrets.

535
00:44:47,390 --> 00:44:50,610
I think he's in the business of informing the fucking president.

536
00:44:51,470 --> 00:44:54,130
And most of the time, that's not going to be secret.

537
00:44:54,130 --> 00:45:01,410
It's going to be stuff like historical and contextual understanding, so that you know that neither the Albanians nor the Serbs are good guys.

538
00:45:02,270 --> 00:45:03,770
They're both bad.

539
00:45:04,330 --> 00:45:07,710
And they're going to continue to kill each other for the next hundred years.

540
00:45:07,770 --> 00:45:10,890
And the Croatians, you know, and Montenegro.

541
00:45:10,890 --> 00:45:14,030
I've got two guys that follow genocide worldwide every day.

542
00:45:14,030 --> 00:45:17,790
Do you know that there are 18 genocidal campaigns going on today?

543
00:45:18,010 --> 00:45:32,250
There are 18 distinct minority groups being holocausted out of existence, and I'm not talking hundreds, I'm talking tens of thousands in some cases, hundreds of thousands in some cases, and millions in about four cases.

544
00:45:32,270 --> 00:45:39,550
And there are another 16 countries that are contemplating genocidal campaigns on their minorities.

545
00:45:40,230 --> 00:45:42,090
This is serious shit.

546
00:45:42,350 --> 00:46:00,410
And the reason that the keynote speaker today really resonated with me was because I was thinking about genocide as he was speaking, and I was thinking to myself, you know, goddammit, this is what should be on the front page of the New York Times, not Monica Lewinsky's DNA sample.

547
00:46:09,380 --> 00:46:15,120
The New York Times is not here, so I'm speaking to no result.

548
00:46:15,120 --> 00:46:20,860
Probably because John Markoff knows that he'd be peed on if he came here, and they don't have anybody else.

549
00:46:22,360 --> 00:46:28,610
Why isn't the New York Times here, but why aren't those stories?

550
00:46:28,610 --> 00:46:45,290
You know, I came here, I suppose I'm conservative, I thought I was a Republican who voted Democratic on many occasions, and I discovered that I'm actually a Libertarian.

551
00:46:46,230 --> 00:46:48,230
I love that!

552
00:46:48,410 --> 00:46:53,670
That little thing that was said out there was really cool, that was worth my time.

553
00:46:54,690 --> 00:46:58,190
And I realized that we really don't understand ourselves.

554
00:46:58,610 --> 00:47:16,950
We don't know what we are, because we're not thinking about these things, we're not making informed choices, we're not asking hard questions, we're not voting with our consumer dollars, we don't know about sweatshops and all these other things, we don't know the actual cost of doing business,

555
00:47:16,950 --> 00:47:19,810
and this goes back to the external diseconomies thing.

556
00:47:19,810 --> 00:47:28,010
We need to have a smart nation, where everybody that is spending a dollar knows what that dollar is buying.

557
00:47:28,610 --> 00:47:34,870
And they know what were the ingredients that went in and made up that thing, and so on.

558
00:47:34,870 --> 00:47:36,370
Question over here?

559
00:47:36,650 --> 00:47:37,630
Yes, sir?

560
00:47:45,850 --> 00:47:49,570
I can see the tattoo under your shirt.

561
00:47:54,470 --> 00:47:58,990
I believe that there is extraterrestrial intelligence, and it's not at CIA.

562
00:48:02,990 --> 00:48:16,290
I believe that remote viewing may be possible under some circumstances, particularly if extraterrestrial intelligence is involved.

563
00:48:17,550 --> 00:48:26,810
I have heard from very credible army colonels, that there is enough there so that it should not be mocked.

564
00:48:26,810 --> 00:48:34,290
I'm somewhat skeptical that it actually did work, and that we actually got anywhere with it.

565
00:48:35,170 --> 00:48:41,510
I do believe, I mean hell, maybe I'll become Buddhist and do reincarnations.

566
00:48:41,510 --> 00:48:46,730
I know my wife's parents came back as butterflies in our garden.

567
00:48:46,730 --> 00:48:48,650
But I don't know.

568
00:48:48,650 --> 00:48:55,530
But I have to believe that there is some kind of cosmic connectivity, MEMS and all of this stuff.

569
00:48:55,530 --> 00:48:58,330
And so I'm not going to mock that stuff.

570
00:48:58,530 --> 00:49:04,710
And I'm going to hope that the day comes when our children see some kind of noosphere and cosmic learning.

571
00:49:04,790 --> 00:49:08,830
I mean one of the biggest problems we have in the intelligence community is we don't remember anything.

572
00:49:09,410 --> 00:49:11,230
Think about this for a minute.

573
00:49:11,410 --> 00:49:13,910
You have people on two year tours.

574
00:49:14,530 --> 00:49:17,910
You have files that are on low, what we call low burn time.

575
00:49:17,970 --> 00:49:24,530
Which means if the embassy has taken over because we haven't done our job, then we don't want them to find anything.

576
00:49:25,530 --> 00:49:33,950
So what you have is puppies coming in and out of town, handling agents who sold the same shit three years ago to the predecessor case officer.

577
00:49:34,890 --> 00:49:38,550
And I've never met an agent who will admit that they don't know something.

578
00:49:38,550 --> 00:49:42,090
So they'll say, oh yeah, I got a third cousin that works in the foreign ministry.

579
00:49:42,090 --> 00:49:43,870
I'll get that information for you.

580
00:49:43,970 --> 00:49:47,870
And then they'll go read their newspaper, which our case officer generally is not reading.

581
00:49:48,770 --> 00:49:51,330
And they'll concoct something up and back, up it goes.

582
00:49:51,330 --> 00:49:54,810
W and Intel, Orcon, no foreign, no contract, top secret code word.

583
00:49:56,110 --> 00:49:58,210
And nobody's checking this shit.

584
00:49:58,790 --> 00:50:01,710
I mean, by and large, there's a real quality control issue.

585
00:50:01,710 --> 00:50:03,510
There's a real issue with...

586
00:50:03,510 --> 00:50:08,870
I did my second graduate thesis on strategic and tactical information management for national security.

587
00:50:08,890 --> 00:50:11,210
And what I did was I looked at three embassies.

588
00:50:12,010 --> 00:50:16,370
This is kind of far-fetched, but I'm using your questions to stimulate broader remarks.

589
00:50:16,730 --> 00:50:19,450
I looked at three embassies and what we collect and how we collect it.

590
00:50:19,450 --> 00:50:24,910
And I came to the conclusion that we collect less than 10% of the local knowledge that is available.

591
00:50:26,730 --> 00:50:34,690
Now, if you want to send that information back electronically, you have to staff the message around the embassy and it has to get coordinated by a whole bunch of people.

592
00:50:34,830 --> 00:50:41,390
On the other hand, if you want to send it back in hard copy, you just put it in the pouch and it goes back to your desk officer and no problem.

593
00:50:41,630 --> 00:50:42,970
What does that really mean?

594
00:50:43,310 --> 00:50:49,690
It means that we send most of our stuff back in hard copy, which means that 80% of it becomes unusable to the rest of the government.

595
00:50:49,950 --> 00:50:55,310
Because it's going back into a little shoebox, rather than into an electronic medium that can be shared.

596
00:50:55,530 --> 00:50:58,650
So we're collecting less than 10% of what's overseas.

597
00:50:58,690 --> 00:51:06,010
We're shipping 80% of that 10% back to Washington in shoebox mode, which means Washington is operating on 2% of the available information.

598
00:51:06,870 --> 00:51:08,590
And that's my informed judgment.

599
00:51:08,650 --> 00:51:09,890
Now, why is that?

600
00:51:09,910 --> 00:51:15,490
The only people in embassies that have the money with which to buy local knowledge are the spies.

601
00:51:15,750 --> 00:51:22,530
And they require that you commit treason and agree to a secret relationship as part of taking their money.

602
00:51:22,530 --> 00:51:26,230
We're literally cutting ourselves off from the world.

603
00:51:26,550 --> 00:51:39,050
We have no vehicle for linking chambers of commerce and general managers of American companies, indeed general managers of all companies, to do ongoing living document risk assessments.

604
00:51:39,110 --> 00:51:42,830
The Asian financial meltdown was not predicted by anybody.

605
00:51:42,830 --> 00:51:45,470
It caught everybody by surprise, including the Australians.

606
00:51:45,470 --> 00:51:46,590
Unless I'm wrong.

607
00:51:46,590 --> 00:51:55,090
I heard a speech by the Australian chief economist for one of their major banks, and we asked him, why did you guys not see the Asian problems coming?

608
00:51:55,270 --> 00:51:56,630
And he said, for three reasons.

609
00:51:56,630 --> 00:52:00,930
One, Asian countries don't have really good financial reporting streams.

610
00:52:00,930 --> 00:52:03,450
Two, the governments do a lousy job of getting that out.

611
00:52:03,450 --> 00:52:05,550
And three, it was below our pain threshold.

612
00:52:05,650 --> 00:52:16,230
It wasn't important to us to actually have an overt network of human people who were looking for warning signals and could kind of sound the alarm, and then you surge up and take a closer look and stuff.

613
00:52:16,230 --> 00:52:23,690
So by and large, we are muddling through our responsibility as a great nation.

614
00:52:23,850 --> 00:52:25,270
And that's domestically as well.

615
00:52:25,270 --> 00:52:28,330
I mean, we should be freaking out over vanishing aquifers right now.

616
00:52:28,330 --> 00:52:32,490
Here in the United States, Las Vegas is going to burp one day and run out of water.

617
00:52:32,870 --> 00:52:34,670
And it's going to be a national crisis.

618
00:52:35,230 --> 00:52:38,710
In the back there, both of you, one after the other.

619
00:52:39,070 --> 00:52:40,850
You first and then the next person.

620
00:52:41,450 --> 00:52:43,290
And then over here, number three.

621
00:52:43,290 --> 00:52:45,390
I'm sorry, we'll get to you, but you've asked a question.

622
00:52:46,230 --> 00:52:49,810
One, two, and three, and just go ahead and ask the question in that order.

623
00:52:59,770 --> 00:53:08,450
I agree with the keynote speaker today that North Korea is not a serious threat in the larger scheme of things.

624
00:53:09,150 --> 00:53:23,430
But I do not underestimate for a minute the ability of North Korea to put a nuclear car bomb in New York and detonate it without thinking through the consequences.

625
00:53:24,850 --> 00:53:35,470
Nobody predicted that the Saudis would assault the Israelis and know that they were going to lose because they said no rational person would do that.

626
00:53:35,810 --> 00:53:45,550
We failed to predict the India-Pakistani nuclear bake-off because our analysts said, oh, these guys are all saying we're going to lock and load our nukes and we're going to explode a nuke.

627
00:53:45,550 --> 00:53:47,470
They can't be serious.

628
00:53:47,730 --> 00:53:48,970
Well, they were.

629
00:53:49,710 --> 00:53:52,130
Okay, so that's called mirror imaging.

630
00:53:53,030 --> 00:53:55,990
Americans are real good at counting tanks.

631
00:53:55,990 --> 00:54:01,290
They're really, really shitty at understanding deep-seated beliefs of others.

632
00:54:01,610 --> 00:54:03,950
We just don't do this well.

633
00:54:04,630 --> 00:54:06,950
It's very arrogant of us.

634
00:54:08,090 --> 00:54:14,990
I have an article coming out on presidential intelligence and I'm really trying to come to grips with it.

635
00:54:16,170 --> 00:54:19,210
Well, not really, and I'll tell you why.

636
00:54:19,210 --> 00:54:23,410
Because presidential intelligence properly done relies on what you know.

637
00:54:23,750 --> 00:54:27,330
But right now the president is literally cut off from private sector knowledge.

638
00:54:27,330 --> 00:54:27,670
The U.S.

639
00:54:27,670 --> 00:54:40,310
Institute for Peace had me do a paper for one of their conferences on virtual diplomacy and my theme was there is a growing gap between people with power and people with knowledge.

640
00:54:40,790 --> 00:54:43,290
And this is a very dangerous gap.

641
00:54:43,490 --> 00:54:47,650
And the American intelligence community is not part of the solution today.

642
00:54:47,650 --> 00:54:50,130
And I want it to be part of the solution.

643
00:54:50,310 --> 00:54:55,130
I want American intelligence to be the smartest people that money can buy.

644
00:54:55,350 --> 00:54:56,390
And what does that mean?

645
00:54:56,390 --> 00:54:58,610
It means not hiring college kids.

646
00:54:58,910 --> 00:55:11,590
It means you don't get to handle code word shit until you've spent ten years in the private sector and you've proved through citation analysis and awards and other things that you're one of the top ten Americans or top ten people in the world.

647
00:55:11,590 --> 00:55:17,630
One of the top three Americans on your specific subject and then we'll let you play with secrets.

648
00:55:17,650 --> 00:55:26,470
Well, that costs money because you've got to pay people like that $100,000 or $75,000 depending if they're academic.

649
00:55:26,510 --> 00:55:34,750
But the point is that's a lot more money than $45,000 for a starting puppy.

650
00:55:41,520 --> 00:55:46,000
Andy, I agree with you but that's too much for me to sell in Washington right now.

651
00:55:48,040 --> 00:55:52,740
I think that in the next ten years we will see my vision.

652
00:55:52,740 --> 00:56:00,520
And my vision basically would create a Director General of National Intelligence who would have oversight authority over two intelligence communities.

653
00:56:00,520 --> 00:56:13,980
A secret intelligence community that focuses very narrowly on secrets and a public intelligence community that is wide open and is doing stuff that is of value to business and is harnessing the academics and so on.

654
00:56:13,980 --> 00:56:20,700
And then the National Intelligence Council will move up to the White House level rather than be down locked in bed with the spies.

655
00:56:21,040 --> 00:56:24,600
And they will then be able to deal freely with everybody.

656
00:56:24,840 --> 00:56:31,840
And out of that, Cold Fusion, I talked about that, the intel chapters, all kinds of really good important stuff that we could do.

657
00:56:32,300 --> 00:56:35,980
The other thing that troubles me is we're not looking...

658
00:56:36,700 --> 00:56:43,660
there's a presidential decision, PDD 35, in which it's decided that Russia, China, and Indian Pakistan are important and everything else is not.

659
00:56:44,560 --> 00:56:46,580
Okay, well that's a problem.

660
00:56:47,560 --> 00:56:50,640
It's a problem because AIDS just got elevated.

661
00:56:50,640 --> 00:56:52,360
They finally figured out AIDS is a problem.

662
00:56:52,360 --> 00:56:55,680
Now I'll give CIA credit, they were saying AIDS was a problem 10 years ago.

663
00:56:56,020 --> 00:56:59,160
And you look at the contrast between South Africa and Thailand.

664
00:56:59,760 --> 00:57:01,980
South Africa is really messed up.

665
00:57:01,980 --> 00:57:06,500
Thailand got it under control and has kept the curve line really low.

666
00:57:06,860 --> 00:57:09,520
That should have been a major national issue.

667
00:57:09,580 --> 00:57:16,800
Because diseases like that, the Finns right now have a major AIDS problem because their Finnish peacekeepers and UN forces brought AIDS home.

668
00:57:17,660 --> 00:57:19,120
Okay , AIDS is now global.

669
00:57:19,260 --> 00:57:21,720
In a very true and real sense.

670
00:57:22,420 --> 00:57:24,440
And so we need to give that more of a priority.

671
00:57:24,440 --> 00:57:27,080
Another question back there, hang on, we'll go back there.

672
00:57:30,860 --> 00:57:33,440
I need water that's uncontaminated.

673
00:57:34,280 --> 00:57:35,120
If somebody...

674
00:57:36,180 --> 00:57:39,520
No, I don't want a beer, but I would like a lot of water.

675
00:57:40,120 --> 00:57:43,860
Or let's say three glasses of water, if somebody could orchestrate that.

676
00:57:43,860 --> 00:57:44,660
Thank you.

677
00:57:56,520 --> 00:57:59,120
The question is, does NORAD actually use the...

678
00:58:04,480 --> 00:58:07,220
Resonant frequency of the earth to use deep sea.

679
00:58:09,300 --> 00:58:14,300
I am not a technical person, I don't know, but my guess is no.

680
00:58:15,140 --> 00:58:24,240
If you really want to get a Navy Admiral really, really pissed off, tell him you figured out how to blow up all those antennas on the golf course outside of Annapolis.

681
00:58:25,540 --> 00:58:29,300
Okay, because that's how they communicate with submarines.

682
00:58:29,300 --> 00:58:32,320
Very low frequency stuff.

683
00:58:32,320 --> 00:58:35,720
And so they have this huge thing, they have another one up in Boston, yes.

684
00:58:47,600 --> 00:58:50,460
Humans have never been valued in intelligence.

685
00:58:51,240 --> 00:58:54,520
Look, I'll tell you, we are really in deep, deep shit.

686
00:58:54,520 --> 00:58:59,920
Because we have spent all of our money on collection technology.

687
00:58:59,960 --> 00:59:03,040
I have a list of 18 technologies when I was...

688
00:59:03,040 --> 00:59:04,500
Thank you very much.

689
00:59:06,320 --> 00:59:09,060
I have a list of... thank you.

690
00:59:09,100 --> 00:59:10,840
By the way, I really want to compliment you guys.

691
00:59:10,840 --> 00:59:18,460
I've told all the media people, and when we turn the lights on, I want to introduce you all to the Canadian and British TV people.

692
00:59:18,940 --> 00:59:25,680
And have them talk for one minute about what they are doing, so those of you that they haven't talked to can choose to talk to them.

693
00:59:25,680 --> 00:59:29,240
They are doing documentaries on the good side of hacking.

694
00:59:29,280 --> 00:59:32,520
And I think it's important that you all really appreciate that.

695
00:59:37,740 --> 00:59:40,880
And if they miss the mark, we'll hunt them down and kill them.

696
00:59:44,540 --> 00:59:52,400
So , going back to that frequency thing, I mean, basically we do this very low frequency.

697
00:59:52,400 --> 00:59:56,440
They just did something neat where they connected to the internet from underwater.

698
00:59:57,140 --> 00:59:59,060
You know, but I've got to tell you something.

699
00:59:59,820 --> 01:00:08,680
Our military infrastructure is not only underfunded, well, it's underfunded, it's being spent on the wrong things, and the wrong things are 20 years old.

700
01:00:09,880 --> 01:00:14,800
Most of our aircraft are going into their 30th to 40th year.

701
01:00:15,460 --> 01:00:17,360
This is really bad shit.

702
01:00:17,360 --> 01:00:24,800
We are buying less and less of more and more expensive things with more and more bells and whistles that can go wrong and bring the plane down.

703
01:00:25,480 --> 01:00:32,660
We have completely lost sight of the fact that the future, the 21st century security environment is four different threat classes.

704
01:00:32,660 --> 01:00:37,500
There's the conventional rogue state, nuclear, conventional armies, tanks, all that stuff.

705
01:00:37,500 --> 01:00:42,220
Then there's the low-intensity conflict, criminals, terrorists, you know, bad people doing violence.

706
01:00:42,300 --> 01:00:48,340
Then you have the hardest one that we are just not willing to come to grips with, and that's what I call the low-tech Sears.

707
01:00:48,340 --> 01:00:50,760
That's the people with brains en masse.

708
01:00:51,160 --> 01:01:01,240
There is a Slavic-Islamic confrontation shaping up that we're nowhere near understanding along the borders of the Soviet Union and the Muslim countries.

709
01:01:01,240 --> 01:01:08,060
And then finally you have the high-tech threat, which is a combination of economic espionage and economic incompetence.

710
01:01:08,060 --> 01:01:11,240
We've talked about Bill Gates and the software impact.

711
01:01:11,240 --> 01:01:15,720
I mean, his software is having a dramatically negative impact on American productivity.

712
01:01:16,320 --> 01:01:19,200
And I don't know what to do about it.

713
01:01:26,140 --> 01:01:27,560
But it's legal.

714
01:01:29,540 --> 01:01:32,480
Oh, that's his idea of giving you a good time, by the way.

715
01:01:39,260 --> 01:01:44,340
I think Melissa is the best thing that ever happened to Bill Gates.

716
01:01:45,100 --> 01:01:46,560
Melinda, whatever.

717
01:01:49,540 --> 01:01:52,540
She just divorced him when his stock took a nosedive.

718
01:01:53,420 --> 01:01:54,460
What?

719
01:01:56,760 --> 01:02:00,860
Well, then maybe Melissa is the best thing that ever happened to him.

720
01:02:00,860 --> 01:02:02,420
Anybody got an umbrella?

721
01:02:03,800 --> 01:02:06,300
Alright, there was a question there, and then this lady here.

722
01:02:06,300 --> 01:02:09,560
Hang on, you guys have asked a question, so I'm going to do first shots.

723
01:02:09,840 --> 01:02:10,660
Yes?

724
01:02:23,030 --> 01:02:27,190
You know, I use Copernic.com to search the Internet.

725
01:02:28,410 --> 01:02:38,870
And there are some things like a center from SRE International that are being used now to search all messages pertaining to SEC matters, to look for insider trading and stuff like that.

726
01:02:40,810 --> 01:02:47,110
My best gut feel is that FBI has already fucked it up and it doesn't really work.

727
01:02:48,510 --> 01:02:50,890
And I wouldn't be too worried about it.

728
01:02:51,570 --> 01:02:59,970
But, of course, everybody should have a signature block that says, you know, terrorism, proliferation, bring down the government, you know, and whatnot.

729
01:03:00,790 --> 01:03:02,170
It's not going to work.

730
01:03:02,230 --> 01:03:03,890
It's not going to work, you know.

731
01:03:04,630 --> 01:03:09,690
Let me go back to the Oklahoma bombing, because I was the only guy that got it right on TV.

732
01:03:09,690 --> 01:03:11,950
I said it was a disgruntled postal worker.

733
01:03:12,010 --> 01:03:14,510
You know, everybody else was saying it was Islamics.

734
01:03:14,670 --> 01:03:16,710
Islamics don't go to Oklahoma.

735
01:03:20,730 --> 01:03:29,650
The Washington Post did a three newsprint page story on the three months in McVeigh's life prior to the bombing.

736
01:03:29,950 --> 01:03:35,550
The man was running his mouth everywhere on what he was planning to do.

737
01:03:35,550 --> 01:03:43,430
But the citizens that were hearing him didn't know what they were hearing and they didn't know who to tell and the government didn't know how to listen.

738
01:03:43,970 --> 01:03:50,930
Now, I have an Italian friend, Alessandro Politti, who at my first conference coined the concept of the intelligence minute man.

739
01:03:51,590 --> 01:03:56,850
And, of course, you've got Calvin Kelly's wonderful book on Out of Control, which was very badly marketed.

740
01:03:56,850 --> 01:04:00,470
But it's one of the top ten books of the decade as far as I'm concerned.

741
01:04:00,650 --> 01:04:04,470
Consilience might be up there too, which I still don't understand.

742
01:04:06,850 --> 01:04:08,450
Hive mind.

743
01:04:08,870 --> 01:04:11,270
The whole idea here is we're all connected.

744
01:04:11,530 --> 01:04:17,890
I mean, a North Korean cell was wrapped up in South Florida because a woman reported their stinking cooking.

745
01:04:18,450 --> 01:04:20,590
I mean, literally, their cooking stunk.

746
01:04:21,150 --> 01:04:26,210
I mean, Korean cooking really smells very potent and powerful.

747
01:04:26,250 --> 01:04:30,670
And that led to an investigation which led to finding people that were out of place.

748
01:04:31,850 --> 01:04:33,850
We all have a responsibility.

749
01:04:33,850 --> 01:04:44,090
And the really, really scary thing, and I know Wynn's done a lot of work in this area, is information attacks, which you know far better than I, can be both very, very catastrophic and very, very anonymous.

750
01:04:44,870 --> 01:04:46,830
The government's not ready for that.

751
01:04:46,990 --> 01:05:00,230
And the government is not going to be ready for that until there is a system in place for people to not only protect themselves, because corporate America is not spending the money it should be spending on protecting data.

752
01:05:00,670 --> 01:05:06,550
The intellectual property of the private sector is the center of gravity for national security in the information age.

753
01:05:06,550 --> 01:05:08,450
But we're not spending the money.

754
01:05:08,450 --> 01:05:10,890
We don't have the laws that require due diligence.

755
01:05:11,090 --> 01:05:14,470
So corporate America is literally fucking the stockholders.

756
01:05:15,190 --> 01:05:22,810
Because the stockholders don't realize that a recipe for Coca-Cola or whatever went out the door long ago.

757
01:05:23,610 --> 01:05:28,570
I mean, Alvin Toffler was one of the first to say, when information is stolen in the digital age, you don't know what's missing.

758
01:05:29,490 --> 01:05:31,530
Because your copy is still there.

759
01:05:31,670 --> 01:05:34,530
These are complex issues that you're much better at than I am.

760
01:05:34,530 --> 01:05:35,970
But I think these are things we have to do.

761
01:05:35,970 --> 01:05:38,010
Now this lady has been waiting very patiently.

762
01:05:38,130 --> 01:05:38,470
Okay

763
01:05:50,590 --> 01:05:52,090
, and we understand.

764
01:05:52,090 --> 01:05:53,310
How are they taking this?

765
01:05:53,310 --> 01:05:57,390
I mean, they're the latest, you know, intelligence agency to be battered.

766
01:05:57,390 --> 01:05:59,370
I mean, people didn't even know they existed.

767
01:05:59,430 --> 01:06:00,950
No such agency.

768
01:06:01,070 --> 01:06:02,210
And the NRO, too.

769
01:06:02,210 --> 01:06:03,250
I mean, it's really great.

770
01:06:03,250 --> 01:06:05,990
I like to torment them when I meet someone from the NRO.

771
01:06:05,990 --> 01:06:08,070
I say, NRO, NRO, NRO.

772
01:06:09,410 --> 01:06:16,270
Because they have this obsessive culture of secrecy that is now irrelevant.

773
01:06:19,150 --> 01:06:29,250
First off, any time I start worrying about the intelligence community getting too big for its britches, Hollywood brings them down a notch, and that's good.

774
01:06:32,470 --> 01:06:35,350
They're not as good as everyone thinks.

775
01:06:37,070 --> 01:06:51,430
Actually, my concern is intelligence community tools getting in the hands of a redneck sheriff who has no capability for being smart.

776
01:06:51,430 --> 01:06:58,250
I mean, the thing about killing the blind guy to get his land, that was pretty scary.

777
01:07:00,150 --> 01:07:03,830
I think we do have a lot of out-of-control people out there.

778
01:07:03,830 --> 01:07:08,790
And so, Hollywood is good in that respect.

779
01:07:10,110 --> 01:07:11,230
Yes, sir?

780
01:07:11,230 --> 01:07:19,650
Of all the data that you've seen throughout the year, it absolutely has to be maintained as a secret.

781
01:07:19,650 --> 01:07:20,850
Less than 10%.

782
01:07:20,850 --> 01:07:22,130
Less than 10%.

783
01:07:22,130 --> 01:07:24,730
How much of that really is maintained?

784
01:07:25,330 --> 01:07:27,150
All of it forever.

785
01:07:28,250 --> 01:07:36,330
So, if you gather 100% of the data, all of that data is classified in some way?

786
01:07:36,330 --> 01:07:36,930
Forever .

787
01:07:37,650 --> 01:07:39,390
They keep refusing to publish it.

788
01:07:39,390 --> 01:08:05,290
In fact, the history of the foreign relations of the United States, about two years ago, had an absolutely unprecedented forward, which said this history is not accurate and cannot be accurate because those assholes over at Langley won't let us declassify the documents on foreign relations that are needed to write the official American history of foreign relations for this period.

789
01:08:07,370 --> 01:08:08,190
First of all

790
01:08:16,080 --> 01:08:22,860
, are there techniques involved in obtaining information, stuff like man-eye trapping, stuff like Tempest, etc.?

791
01:08:23,440 --> 01:08:26,020
To a certain extent, yes.

792
01:08:26,900 --> 01:08:30,400
Go ahead and ask a very specific question about capabilities.

793
01:08:30,400 --> 01:08:38,320
What he had asked was how much of the information I've seen should be secret, 100%, and how much of it will remain secret, 100%.

794
01:08:38,880 --> 01:08:42,760
A specific question about capabilities would be the man-eye trapping.

795
01:08:42,760 --> 01:08:43,940
Is it actually in use?

796
01:08:43,940 --> 01:08:45,380
Is it actively in use?

797
01:08:45,380 --> 01:08:48,100
And what infrastructure is required?

798
01:08:48,220 --> 01:08:49,060
What is the...

799
01:08:49,660 --> 01:08:51,160
VanEck trapping.

800
01:08:51,560 --> 01:08:53,260
Oh, VanEck shit.

801
01:08:54,960 --> 01:08:57,040
Christ, that's old.

802
01:08:59,860 --> 01:09:07,220
The short answer is that that falls in a very narrow area where, yes, we can do it.

803
01:09:07,220 --> 01:09:11,400
Of course we can read a computer screen from across the street out of a van.

804
01:09:12,260 --> 01:09:14,300
But not every case officer can do that.

805
01:09:14,300 --> 01:09:18,340
That requires the technical section to actually do it.

806
01:09:18,460 --> 01:09:20,940
And so we don't do it very much.

807
01:09:20,940 --> 01:09:23,200
Also, let me tell you from personal experience.

808
01:09:24,120 --> 01:09:30,280
When you do an electronic interception, you get a lot of data.

809
01:09:30,420 --> 01:09:33,260
You get more data than a human can handle.

810
01:09:33,760 --> 01:09:44,680
For instance, when I was handling terrorists, there were some very sensitive cases where it was compartmented, and I had to actually type the transcripts myself.

811
01:09:45,140 --> 01:09:57,820
And I will tell you from personal experience that for every hour of conversation, it takes a minimum of four hours, and only if you've been there and know what was said, it takes a minimum of four hours to type it up.

812
01:09:57,960 --> 01:10:01,920
And there will be less than five minutes of valuable information in that transcript.

813
01:10:02,340 --> 01:10:05,600
So the labor economics are not there.

814
01:10:07,160 --> 01:10:11,340
We've had reports officers walk off the job and quit.

815
01:10:12,260 --> 01:10:17,480
I'll tell you what really screwed CIA was the Robert Morris worm.

816
01:10:18,620 --> 01:10:24,820
Because until that happened, we were sucking all kinds of data out of computers all over the world.

817
01:10:25,320 --> 01:10:28,620
And when that happened, a whole bunch of doors slammed shut.

818
01:10:28,680 --> 01:10:33,720
People went in looking for these issues, and we literally got shut out.

819
01:10:35,980 --> 01:10:43,460
It didn't improve your security, and it really didn't do anything constructive other than save them from wasting more of your taxpayer dollars.

820
01:10:44,740 --> 01:10:49,780
But the fact is, we're really bad at post-processing.

821
01:10:49,860 --> 01:10:57,560
We're really bad at doing technical things with what we get, so that a human can then handle it in a reasonable amount of time.

822
01:10:57,940 --> 01:10:58,740
Yes?

823
01:11:00,680 --> 01:11:02,480
Go ahead.

824
01:11:02,480 --> 01:11:07,950
What do they know about us?

825
01:11:09,930 --> 01:11:10,730
Okay.

826
01:11:12,990 --> 01:11:14,990
It is my humble opinion.

827
01:11:14,990 --> 01:11:17,450
By the way, for all the times I haven't said it, it's my humble opinion.

828
01:11:17,450 --> 01:11:19,270
It's my humble opinion.

829
01:11:19,970 --> 01:11:26,150
It's my view that, by and large, the U.S.

830
01:11:26,150 --> 01:11:27,890
government does not spy on you.

831
01:11:28,590 --> 01:11:41,310
If they are spying on you at the federal level, it's because they have a reasonable or probable cause to believe that you are either an agent of a foreign power or you are breaking some federal law.

832
01:11:41,310 --> 01:11:43,910
Now, having said that, people at the...

833
01:11:43,910 --> 01:11:48,830
Yeah, we'll have kind of controlled chaos, and we'll do it like the White House newsroom, and you guys...

834
01:11:49,510 --> 01:11:51,750
This person is next, okay?

835
01:11:51,790 --> 01:11:55,970
Having said that, people abuse that power.

836
01:11:55,970 --> 01:12:03,970
For example, the FBI has at least 900 authorized telephone intercepts around the country.

837
01:12:04,110 --> 01:12:14,990
But I'm pretty sure they've probably done another 2,500 illegally in order to get the focusing they need to go get the court order to get the legal ones.

838
01:12:15,070 --> 01:12:15,450
Okay?

839
01:12:15,450 --> 01:12:19,450
And I think at the state and local level, that probably happens as well.

840
01:12:22,530 --> 01:12:25,550
I still believe we have the best government in the world.

841
01:12:26,370 --> 01:12:30,130
And, I mean, it's a government that's so good that it doesn't matter who's president.

842
01:12:30,430 --> 01:12:31,110
Okay?

843
01:12:31,770 --> 01:12:35,170
And so there's some positive things here.

844
01:12:35,970 --> 01:12:39,050
So I, frankly, am not concerned about domestic spying.

845
01:12:39,050 --> 01:12:41,630
Now, I am concerned about the way we've been treating hackers.

846
01:12:41,630 --> 01:12:46,250
I mean, one of the best books ever written on this was Bruce Sterling's book on hacker crackdown.

847
01:12:49,810 --> 01:12:51,750
I have written to judges.

848
01:12:51,750 --> 01:12:54,150
I tried to keep FiberOptic out of jail.

849
01:12:54,490 --> 01:12:58,090
My wife would have been really pissed if he had had to come live with us.

850
01:12:58,370 --> 01:13:01,410
But I was ready to do that.

851
01:13:02,730 --> 01:13:04,690
You know, it's ignorance.

852
01:13:04,950 --> 01:13:11,450
And one of the things that most impresses me between this year and 1994 is you all have come of age.

853
01:13:11,590 --> 01:13:14,150
I mean, people have to take you seriously.

854
01:13:14,150 --> 01:13:22,890
And I think the media, the media with an open mind that isn't out to make quick book sales, is going to take you seriously.

855
01:13:23,230 --> 01:13:28,310
I'm a little disappointed that we didn't have more CNN and stuff like that.

856
01:13:28,550 --> 01:13:31,770
But I think your story is being told and will get told.

857
01:13:32,150 --> 01:13:37,670
And the best way for you to succeed is, A, do no harm.

858
01:13:38,070 --> 01:13:42,390
I mean, don't give them a reason to sue your ass and send you to jail.

859
01:13:42,970 --> 01:13:45,770
But embarrass the shit out of them.

860
01:13:46,550 --> 01:13:47,670
Okay?

861
01:13:53,530 --> 01:13:55,650
Over there and then over there.

862
01:13:56,390 --> 01:13:57,470
And then there.

863
01:13:58,590 --> 01:14:00,870
Okay, you decide who's next.

864
01:14:01,070 --> 01:14:02,310
Alright, go ahead.

865
01:14:03,110 --> 01:14:06,230
Continuing the question about the Bainette question.

866
01:14:06,530 --> 01:14:17,910
Okay, with the government's experience with Mitnick, Folsom, and maybe others that I'm not saying, how bad does it need to be for them to use that old technology?

867
01:14:18,530 --> 01:14:23,790
What are the cases that need to be in place for them to use that technology?

868
01:14:25,250 --> 01:14:29,250
In other words, how hard should it be for them to scratch?

869
01:14:29,250 --> 01:14:34,650
I... well, first off, what they're doing these days is not using Bainette.

870
01:14:34,650 --> 01:14:39,590
They're putting little beacons inside the computer that is trans...

871
01:14:39,590 --> 01:14:46,050
You're saying that when an actual break-in happens, the computer gets dismounted and the device gets planted inside it?

872
01:14:46,050 --> 01:14:46,570
Yes .

873
01:14:46,570 --> 01:14:47,410
Okay.

874
01:14:47,590 --> 01:14:54,450
That was the suspicion of a number of people using PGP, that the cameras and devices get implanted into...

875
01:14:54,450 --> 01:15:04,470
Well, for those of you that don't know about it, when American PGP comes out, they add 3,600 bits of backdoor and post it all over Europe.

876
01:15:04,530 --> 01:15:09,730
So all you cool dudes from Europe using American PGP, they're reading you.

877
01:15:09,990 --> 01:15:11,110
Over here.

878
01:15:17,500 --> 01:15:31,840
A state investigative body who later tried to bring me on in a more permanent capacity, and they told me, they were quite sanguine about the issue of encryption when I brought it up when I was touring their facilities.

879
01:15:32,500 --> 01:15:45,300
Yes, we have, under certain circumstances, depending on how critical it is to focusing the case, the capability to send encrypted documents off to NSA for decryption.

880
01:15:46,360 --> 01:15:50,700
Where they will be treated like shit and ignored, by and large.

881
01:15:50,700 --> 01:15:53,580
Okay, because it's not national security, but go on.

882
01:15:53,580 --> 01:15:54,260
Right, right.

883
01:15:54,260 --> 01:15:54,820
Well, I mean...

884
01:15:54,820 --> 01:15:57,600
You pretty much answered it.

885
01:15:57,600 --> 01:15:58,840
I didn't know...

886
01:15:59,730 --> 01:16:05,100
Look, by and large, what you got to remember is government is a bureaucracy.

887
01:16:05,280 --> 01:16:10,660
Okay, and bureaucracies are really cumbersome, lazy.

888
01:16:10,760 --> 01:16:13,200
They fall into patterns.

889
01:16:13,200 --> 01:16:17,120
They're largely ignorant of new changes in technology and opportunity.

890
01:16:18,620 --> 01:16:22,540
People don't get fired for muddling through.

891
01:16:23,160 --> 01:16:25,780
So it's really not a major threat.

892
01:16:25,780 --> 01:16:27,140
Another question?

893
01:16:27,140 --> 01:16:28,060
Yeah

894
01:16:33,940 --> 01:16:34,460
?

895
01:16:45,700 --> 01:16:46,680
What's that?

896
01:16:46,680 --> 01:16:48,160
It's warm, too.

897
01:16:48,320 --> 01:16:49,280
It's warm, too.

898
01:16:49,280 --> 01:16:49,680
Yeah.

899
01:16:58,020 --> 01:17:01,800
Well, I think intelligence people retire everywhere.

900
01:17:01,800 --> 01:17:07,600
A lot of them tend to go back to wherever they either went to college or grew up.

901
01:17:07,600 --> 01:17:13,160
No, I mean, my house is northwest of Washington, D.C.

902
01:17:13,160 --> 01:17:18,900
which is good because the prevailing winds for biochemical attack are in the other direction.

903
01:17:19,500 --> 01:17:20,980
And I do worry about that.

904
01:17:20,980 --> 01:17:25,660
I fully anticipate that there will be a biochemical attack on Washington, D.C.

905
01:17:25,660 --> 01:17:27,440
sometime in the next 10 years.

906
01:17:27,700 --> 01:17:32,100
Now, the good news is it kind of blows through quick.

907
01:17:32,280 --> 01:17:36,560
And if you hear about a biochemical attack, go as low as you can in the building.

908
01:17:37,120 --> 01:17:39,420
And with luck, it won't reach down.

909
01:17:39,420 --> 01:17:44,000
But we've got violent plagues out there.

910
01:17:44,000 --> 01:17:45,620
Another question?

911
01:17:48,880 --> 01:17:49,280
Okay .

912
01:17:50,620 --> 01:17:51,560
Loud.

913
01:18:11,210 --> 01:18:13,050
What was the second weapon?

914
01:18:13,150 --> 01:18:16,930
Desktop weapons like Microsoft?

915
01:18:16,930 --> 01:18:17,430
I'm sorry.

916
01:18:17,430 --> 01:18:18,670
Cheap shot.

917
01:18:18,670 --> 01:18:25,410
Is there a possibility that these nanoparticles may reorganize the bacteria?

918
01:18:25,850 --> 01:18:31,590
I'd say, well, first off, you've got a very good army biological lab in Maryland.

919
01:18:34,510 --> 01:18:38,190
I think that we do have stores of biological weapons.

920
01:18:38,190 --> 01:18:42,170
I think we are doing some development, but largely in the vaccine area.

921
01:18:43,050 --> 01:18:46,650
But, of course, we created this problem ourselves in the first place.

922
01:18:47,850 --> 01:18:50,630
On the nano thing, I have no special knowledge.

923
01:18:50,710 --> 01:18:52,550
But I'll also tell you an amusing anecdote.

924
01:18:52,550 --> 01:19:05,250
There was a time, and this is in one of the many books on CIA that I've read, there was a time when the director, it might have been Bill Colby, ordered them to destroy their stock of bioweapons.

925
01:19:05,390 --> 01:19:08,170
Their equivalent to the umbrella poison.

926
01:19:08,510 --> 01:19:15,770
And it got down to the division chief responsible for that, and he chose to ignore the order because he knew that we'd need them one day.

927
01:19:16,650 --> 01:19:17,630
So he didn't fill out the order.

928
01:19:18,050 --> 01:19:26,150
So in this large bureaucracy, there is a lot of stuff that is probably still here and there that is not fixed up.

929
01:19:26,150 --> 01:19:27,130
Over here someplace?

930
01:19:27,130 --> 01:19:27,850
Yes, sir.

931
01:19:43,650 --> 01:19:46,670
With a bomb?

932
01:19:47,170 --> 01:19:48,350
They blew it up?

933
01:19:57,070 --> 01:19:58,990
Same guy that blew up the whale.

934
01:20:06,670 --> 01:20:08,630
Any comment or question?

935
01:20:09,170 --> 01:20:10,650
That was just an observation?

936
01:20:11,010 --> 01:20:13,710
I really am concerned.

937
01:20:14,110 --> 01:20:18,890
Charles Perrow wrote a wonderful book called Normal Accidents Living with High Risk Technologies.

938
01:20:19,590 --> 01:20:20,890
We haven't read it.

939
01:20:21,950 --> 01:20:24,110
I mean, we really need to worry about this shit.

940
01:20:25,210 --> 01:20:30,330
And I don't think, you know, nuclear toxic waste and stuff, and toxic dumping in Africa is another issue.

941
01:20:30,330 --> 01:20:35,290
Okay, over there, and then here, and then there.

942
01:20:35,310 --> 01:20:36,950
I'm still trying to do first.

943
01:20:36,950 --> 01:20:42,290
The NSA decided to do Tao about that.

944
01:20:42,290 --> 01:20:45,310
I think that Mike Hayden is a very smart general.

945
01:20:46,670 --> 01:20:49,290
His biggest problem is his own people.

946
01:20:50,090 --> 01:20:56,070
I helped in a very, very small way encourage Barbara McNamara to move to London.

947
01:20:56,230 --> 01:21:00,530
She was his deputy and he basically came in and she told him to fuck off.

948
01:21:00,550 --> 01:21:04,510
Which senior civilians can do under certain circumstances.

949
01:21:04,870 --> 01:21:07,650
And he finally got her out of town.

950
01:21:07,870 --> 01:21:12,430
London, by the way, is where we send all our people that have been fired at the senior level.

951
01:21:16,370 --> 01:21:17,930
We need NSA.

952
01:21:19,390 --> 01:21:22,810
However, old dogs need to learn new tricks.

953
01:21:22,810 --> 01:21:29,950
Now, I have a speech, I think it's up on my website in the open forum, on all the reasons why encumbered encryption isn't good.

954
01:21:30,550 --> 01:21:33,210
And I don't need to go through them here.

955
01:21:34,170 --> 01:21:37,650
But the reality is the encryption monster is out of the bag.

956
01:21:37,650 --> 01:21:43,190
I mean, I personally have worked in operations where the terrorists were using Swiss encryption boxes.

957
01:21:43,330 --> 01:21:50,110
And the only way to get at their communications was actually do a break in entry and get a print of the thing.

958
01:21:50,110 --> 01:21:51,950
This was back in the 80s.

959
01:21:53,230 --> 01:21:54,390
Encryption is out of the bag.

960
01:21:54,390 --> 01:21:55,870
We have to learn new tricks.

961
01:21:55,870 --> 01:22:01,370
And those tricks include planting audio devices while the stuff is still in the clear.

962
01:22:01,570 --> 01:22:06,630
They include better use of clandestine recruitments across a wider range of targets.

963
01:22:06,850 --> 01:22:12,010
They include use of open source information, which we don't use.

964
01:22:12,010 --> 01:22:19,930
I mean, we don't read the sick newspaper in British Columbia, which talked about the impending nuclear explosion in India, you know, a month and a half.

965
01:22:20,070 --> 01:22:28,550
We don't read the Indian newspapers that have notices telling everybody to evacuate their ass, because on Thursday there's going to be a really big bang.

966
01:22:31,850 --> 01:22:36,090
We don't read provincial newspapers, by and large.

967
01:22:36,230 --> 01:22:45,570
And finally, it really helps to have smart people who can intuit anomalies and detect changes in patterns and so on, based on the feel of the thing.

968
01:22:45,570 --> 01:22:47,730
We haven't made that investment either.

969
01:22:48,370 --> 01:22:49,890
So there's a lot wrong.

970
01:22:50,010 --> 01:22:51,870
Hang on, you guys know who you are.

971
01:22:51,870 --> 01:22:52,950
Next question.

972
01:22:57,070 --> 01:23:00,790
I have no insight to that.

973
01:23:00,790 --> 01:23:05,430
What is the state of NSA's encryption technology?

974
01:23:05,430 --> 01:23:07,470
Oh, decryption technology.

975
01:23:10,330 --> 01:23:18,610
You know, the truth be told, I think that NSA is probably still in the 1970s, at the bottom line level.

976
01:23:18,630 --> 01:23:24,850
Most of their supercomputers and craze and all that stuff are 70s and early 80s stuff.

977
01:23:25,470 --> 01:23:27,090
I mean, we owe them a debt.

978
01:23:27,090 --> 01:23:28,690
They helped fund Cray.

979
01:23:28,990 --> 01:23:30,090
The U.S.

980
01:23:30,090 --> 01:23:32,830
government has kicked off a lot of good things in technology.

981
01:23:33,190 --> 01:23:36,310
But I don't think they're doing a lot of distributed processing.

982
01:23:36,510 --> 01:23:38,770
But here's the real bad part.

983
01:23:39,110 --> 01:23:45,150
They're vacuum cleaning the world, but then they're not able to sort and sift that stuff down.

984
01:23:45,150 --> 01:23:48,230
And they're not able to process enough of it.

985
01:23:48,230 --> 01:23:50,270
Now, I'll also give you another insight.

986
01:23:50,910 --> 01:23:55,450
90% of the value of signals intelligence is not from decrypting the message.

987
01:23:55,470 --> 01:23:57,650
It's from pattern analysis.

988
01:23:58,690 --> 01:24:03,750
90% of the value of signals is from pattern analysis.

989
01:24:03,930 --> 01:24:13,590
If you all of a sudden see a new set of signals going between North Korea and Miami, Florida, this is a clue.

990
01:24:16,850 --> 01:24:19,790
Pattern analysis is where most of it's at.

991
01:24:19,790 --> 01:24:22,810
The reality is we don't have the time.

992
01:24:22,850 --> 01:24:24,570
We certainly don't have the language skills.

993
01:24:25,970 --> 01:24:28,450
I mean, you want to screw with the U.S.

994
01:24:28,450 --> 01:24:35,090
government, just hold all your conversations in Urdu, or Tamil, or Tagalog.

995
01:24:36,870 --> 01:24:39,190
We really stink at foreign languages.

996
01:24:40,190 --> 01:24:49,250
And so what you've got to do is you've got to get to the point where a lot of this stuff is either declassified or it's outsourced to people who speak that language who can do the translation.

997
01:24:49,250 --> 01:24:56,090
I've been trying to tell the intelligence community for years that the private sector can keep a secret without having a clearance.

998
01:24:56,610 --> 01:25:02,050
I mean, most of us want to be able to earn our money honestly and to get that money and that client again.

999
01:25:02,210 --> 01:25:09,510
And so we're willing to, you know, I have people that translate Arabic for me, and Indonesian, and things like that.

1000
01:25:09,510 --> 01:25:12,570
And they're all over the world when I need them.

1001
01:25:12,570 --> 01:25:14,630
And I only pay them for what they do.

1002
01:25:14,630 --> 01:25:16,850
And I'm pretty sure they're not posting everything.

1003
01:25:16,850 --> 01:25:20,670
And even if they did post what they were translating, it doesn't matter because it wasn't secret in the first place.

1004
01:25:21,030 --> 01:25:22,550
Over here, both of you.

1005
01:25:22,550 --> 01:25:23,230
Oh, no, not you.

1006
01:25:23,230 --> 01:25:24,250
You've already asked the question.

1007
01:25:24,250 --> 01:25:24,670
You.

1008
01:25:42,500 --> 01:25:51,180
Well, by and large, if you actually come from that culture or you're married to someone in that culture, you're ineligible for a clearance because you must not be a totally loyal U.S.

1009
01:25:51,180 --> 01:25:51,840
citizen.

1010
01:25:53,540 --> 01:25:54,900
That's our first problem.

1011
01:25:55,600 --> 01:26:04,380
Our second problem is that we have this pattern of hiring from these predominantly white kinds of schools.

1012
01:26:05,640 --> 01:26:07,520
And we hire cheap.

1013
01:26:08,660 --> 01:26:18,120
My personal feeling is that nobody should be allowed to work for the CIA as an analyst or a case officer until they speak the language at the four level on a scale of five.

1014
01:26:18,180 --> 01:26:24,260
Most case officers go out on their first tour speaking the language at a two level, which is just enough to be laughed at.

1015
01:26:26,160 --> 01:26:28,180
We're not taking this seriously.

1016
01:26:28,180 --> 01:26:29,540
We're going through the motions.

1017
01:26:29,540 --> 01:26:38,660
I will tell you right now, I've spoken to the directors of intelligence communities in 18 different countries around the world, or deputy directors, and they usually take me to dinner.

1018
01:26:38,880 --> 01:26:42,360
And I always ask the question, how many of our people have you nailed?

1019
01:26:42,900 --> 01:26:46,180
In other words, how many of the people operating out of the official U.S.

1020
01:26:46,180 --> 01:26:46,600
facility?

1021
01:26:46,600 --> 01:26:48,140
I'm not allowed to say embassy.

1022
01:26:48,720 --> 01:26:52,760
That's the only thing CIA took out of my book was three references to operating out of the U.S.

1023
01:26:52,760 --> 01:26:54,260
embassy, which I didn't make.

1024
01:26:56,580 --> 01:26:58,780
You guys are getting tired, I can tell.

1025
01:26:58,780 --> 01:27:00,200
I'll stop at midnight.

1026
01:27:01,100 --> 01:27:03,200
Or I'll go on as long as you wish.

1027
01:27:05,000 --> 01:27:07,440
Okay, all right, good, thank you.

1028
01:27:09,260 --> 01:27:11,060
I'm glad to be useful.

1029
01:27:14,700 --> 01:27:23,320
In every single case, I have not gotten a direct verbal answer, but as a highly skilled case officer, I will tell you the answer is no less than 75%.

1030
01:27:25,680 --> 01:27:44,240
You know, as my 11-year-old would say, if you're going to run spies, it doesn't make sense to do so out of a known fixed point, where you're bouncing in and out 10, 15 times a day, spending more money than the ambassador has in his personal budget, and you're under 25.

1031
01:27:45,200 --> 01:27:46,640
Duh.

1032
01:27:47,140 --> 01:27:48,260
Okay.

1033
01:27:48,920 --> 01:27:57,440
My personal feeling is fully 75% of our clandestine operations, and probably as much as 90% in most countries of the world, have been compromised.

1034
01:27:58,200 --> 01:28:05,660
Those agents are either under control or they're known, and they're simply letting us stay busy.

1035
01:28:07,040 --> 01:28:09,640
Clandestine intelligence worldwide is a joke.

1036
01:28:09,640 --> 01:28:17,900
And the reason this is dangerous is because the President of the United States thinks he has a clandestine service that can actually do shit.

1037
01:28:18,440 --> 01:28:19,100
Okay?

1038
01:28:19,340 --> 01:28:20,760
And that's scary.

1039
01:28:21,380 --> 01:28:30,380
Now, I don't want to have any repeat questions, so let's... I'll tell you what, everyone who has asked a question before, I'll stay as long as you want to answer your question afterwards, but I want first-timers.

1040
01:28:30,880 --> 01:28:31,900
Yes, sir.

1041
01:28:32,840 --> 01:28:34,780
You, and then you, and then you.

1042
01:28:34,780 --> 01:28:41,180
Going back to domestic, we've read reports...

1043
01:28:41,180 --> 01:28:43,500
Going back to domestic spying, we've read reports...

1044
01:28:43,500 --> 01:28:45,340
...on presidential administrations...

1045
01:28:46,340 --> 01:28:47,480
Presidential administrations.

1046
01:28:47,480 --> 01:28:51,760
...running operations against individual citizens to find information.

1047
01:28:51,760 --> 01:28:52,540
Right.

1048
01:28:52,540 --> 01:28:58,160
What types of checks are in place to prevent that, and how do we put those checks in place?

1049
01:28:58,160 --> 01:29:03,860
Well, at the federal level, I think that our federal officers, by and large, have very high integrity.

1050
01:29:04,120 --> 01:29:05,840
Waco may be an exception.

1051
01:29:06,860 --> 01:29:18,240
You know, I'll tell you, I was surprised, because I went around the country after Waco, and I was expecting people to more or less feel like the government did what it did, and it was the Davidians that were wrong.

1052
01:29:18,240 --> 01:29:26,400
I was stunned at how many of my middle-class professional counterparts had a real deep-seated uneasiness with the government.

1053
01:29:26,400 --> 01:29:27,880
I mean, this was beyond this group.

1054
01:29:27,880 --> 01:29:33,880
This was mainstream, main-street, white-collar professionals.

1055
01:29:35,500 --> 01:29:45,160
By and large, though, I think that one of the good things that's come out of the whistleblowing era is that, first off, the president's never been in charge of anything.

1056
01:29:45,180 --> 01:29:53,660
There's a wonderful book by Richard Neustadt called The Power to Persuade, and George Shultz has said in testimony in Congress that nothing's ever decided in Washington.

1057
01:29:53,660 --> 01:29:56,500
You have to argue the policy every single day.

1058
01:29:56,500 --> 01:30:05,880
But by and large, I think officers of integrity, certainly Dick Helms and Bill Coby over at CIA were officers of integrity, they can say no.

1059
01:30:06,800 --> 01:30:09,520
At the state and local level, I don't know.

1060
01:30:10,400 --> 01:30:15,780
I don't think domestic spying is an issue, my personal feeling.

1061
01:30:15,780 --> 01:30:29,440
On the other hand, hacker crackdown, you have field officers out there that are zealous, they want to get promoted, you look really evil, and that scares them because they don't understand you.

1062
01:30:29,740 --> 01:30:32,900
And so they'll make a case, and they'll go do stuff.

1063
01:30:32,900 --> 01:30:51,300
And I think if I were a hacker, with a whole bunch of metal in my body, wearing really black clothes all the time, and colored spiked hair, and I found out I was under investigation, number one, I wouldn't do any shit that could get me locked up, and number two,

1064
01:30:51,300 --> 01:30:52,780
I'd go public immediately.

1065
01:30:53,320 --> 01:31:02,080
I would go to the newspapers, and I would say, this is who I am, and these guys are investigating me, and here's my life, and I invite everybody to come in and make sure there's nothing to find.

1066
01:31:02,080 --> 01:31:08,480
I invite everybody to come in and look at me, and I would be Little Miss Priss for the next ten years.

1067
01:31:11,040 --> 01:31:13,520
I don't know the case myself.

1068
01:31:15,040 --> 01:31:16,160
What's that?

1069
01:31:17,220 --> 01:31:19,580
Yeah, fiber is a good one.

1070
01:31:19,700 --> 01:31:31,060
My personal opinion, and I have a neighbor that's a secret service officer, and I think secret service officers are good, good people, but I think this guy had his head up his ass.

1071
01:31:31,060 --> 01:31:33,800
I mean, fiber's not a threat to national security.

1072
01:31:34,020 --> 01:31:47,700
But these people, out of genuine deep-seated belief about stuff they don't understand, think so, and they're willing to tell a judge, and until you raise the consciousness level, shit like that's going to happen.

1073
01:31:47,940 --> 01:31:51,660
The good news is, I don't think it's happening very much anymore.

1074
01:31:51,840 --> 01:31:53,200
Tell me if I'm wrong.

1075
01:31:53,840 --> 01:31:55,500
You know, I think you've succeeded.

1076
01:31:55,500 --> 01:31:56,880
You've won this war.

1077
01:31:56,880 --> 01:32:04,300
Now it's a question of whether you want to go corporate and make money fixing these holes, or whether you want to do other things.

1078
01:32:04,300 --> 01:32:08,520
But by and large, I think the days of hacker crackdown per se are over.

1079
01:32:09,660 --> 01:32:14,920
You are now arguably the most important talent on the planet, except for the guys in India.

1080
01:32:17,600 --> 01:32:18,540
What's that?

1081
01:32:23,560 --> 01:32:27,540
I wish I could hire, you know, I'm looking for five million dollars.

1082
01:32:28,420 --> 01:32:30,200
What I do is very hard.

1083
01:32:30,840 --> 01:32:33,100
That's all right.

1084
01:32:33,680 --> 01:32:35,240
We'll figure it out.

1085
01:32:35,240 --> 01:32:36,280
Over here?

1086
01:32:40,840 --> 01:32:42,340
I'd be happy to do that.

1087
01:32:42,340 --> 01:32:49,200
I'm glad that you asked, because that's a useful, very interesting...

1088
01:32:53,090 --> 01:33:02,910
I don't think so, although I'm concerned about these slap lawsuits and intimidation tactics like that.

1089
01:33:04,310 --> 01:33:08,310
Business intelligence, first off, is not very widespread.

1090
01:33:10,030 --> 01:33:11,610
Only 5% of U.S.

1091
01:33:11,610 --> 01:33:17,930
corporations and 9% of European corporations have a structured business intelligence unit.

1092
01:33:18,270 --> 01:33:35,910
And until my partner, Jan Herring, entered the private sector in 1988 and created the first business intelligence unit for Motorola, and then he went on to create them for Monsanto, and Phillips Petroleum, and Ford Credit, and Southwest Bell, and a few others.

1093
01:33:36,310 --> 01:33:52,510
The process of national intelligence, which is requirements definition, collection management, multi-source validation and fusion, and then compelling presentation in a timely fashion, had not been applied in the private sector.

1094
01:33:52,510 --> 01:33:58,730
We have a little circle of competitors as we're looking at our business plan and trying to shop for $5 million.

1095
01:33:58,990 --> 01:34:03,470
And fully half of our competitors are our clients themselves.

1096
01:34:04,710 --> 01:34:13,210
Roughly 20% are middle managers who read the Wall Street Journal and think they know more than anyone, and therefore they're going to make these decisions.

1097
01:34:13,210 --> 01:34:17,910
And they're not really computing the fact that some guy in China is about to eat their lunch.

1098
01:34:20,810 --> 01:34:40,750
Then there's another 20% or so that are the strategic marketing guys, the strategic planning guys, and they're doing a little bit of outsourced research to Forrester and Jupiter and these folks, but they don't have this process in place for getting the question right and then knowing collection management and what's out there and so on and so forth.

1099
01:34:40,750 --> 01:34:45,930
And then you get finally into this other half, which is all these little niche services.

1100
01:34:45,930 --> 01:34:53,970
You have three serious business intelligence outfits in the United States and a number of others that I consider less serious.

1101
01:34:53,970 --> 01:35:01,910
Fulden Company up in Boston, SIS International here in New York, and Kirk Tysons in Chicago.

1102
01:35:01,910 --> 01:35:06,590
These are all little 15 to 30 person mom and pop shops that are not web smart.

1103
01:35:07,310 --> 01:35:20,970
And they basically do it the old fashioned way, which is they combine online research with Dow Jones Interactive, which by the way has eclipsed Dialog and LexisNexis as the best place to start if you're looking at stuff that's less than two years old.

1104
01:35:22,470 --> 01:35:23,690
Okay, I'll get to Pinkerton.

1105
01:35:23,690 --> 01:35:29,410
They're an investigative agency by and large, although they're doing the security thing for cyberspace.

1106
01:35:30,730 --> 01:35:33,450
So you've got three business intelligence outfits by and large.

1107
01:35:33,450 --> 01:35:34,370
You've got the big A.

1108
01:35:34,370 --> 01:35:36,450
You've got Pricewaterhouse and Arthur D.

1109
01:35:36,450 --> 01:35:37,730
Little and all that stuff.

1110
01:35:37,730 --> 01:35:44,970
I reviewed $40 million worth of one of these large companies' production for a year for a major client.

1111
01:35:44,990 --> 01:35:46,610
$40 million.

1112
01:35:46,610 --> 01:35:47,790
You know what it bought?

1113
01:35:47,790 --> 01:36:02,970
It bought a room about this big, full of three ring binders, full of paper, put together by junior MBAs who were clueless about the problem being solved, who did not identify their sources and who did no aggregate analysis.

1114
01:36:03,530 --> 01:36:05,350
And it wasn't delivered in soft copy.

1115
01:36:05,350 --> 01:36:06,810
$40 million.

1116
01:36:09,410 --> 01:36:12,210
That's the level of these big A's.

1117
01:36:13,910 --> 01:36:15,330
Then you have academics.

1118
01:36:15,330 --> 01:36:16,810
You've got the Harvard guys.

1119
01:36:17,190 --> 01:36:20,770
By the way, do we want to take a five minute break and go on?

1120
01:36:20,770 --> 01:36:23,330
Do we want to just go on and you guys just leave and go to the bathroom?

1121
01:36:23,330 --> 01:36:24,450
What do you want me to do?

1122
01:36:26,870 --> 01:36:28,850
I'm here for as long as you want.

1123
01:36:28,870 --> 01:36:30,750
I've got a plane at 9.30 tomorrow.

1124
01:36:31,990 --> 01:36:32,690
A.M.

1125
01:36:32,690 --> 01:36:34,110
or P.M.?

1126
01:36:35,490 --> 01:36:36,410
A.M.

1127
01:36:36,730 --> 01:36:38,390
But I don't need sleep.

1128
01:36:40,370 --> 01:36:41,970
So you have the Harvard consultants.

1129
01:36:41,970 --> 01:36:44,170
They have what are called information brokers.

1130
01:36:44,670 --> 01:36:58,650
If you're a professional and you're looking for information and you want to go beyond the internet and you don't want to subscribe to LexisNexis or Dialog or one of these things, what you do is for $99 you can buy the Burwell Worldwide Directory of Information Brokers.

1131
01:36:58,650 --> 01:37:02,710
This is the best $99 you're ever going to spend on content.

1132
01:37:03,890 --> 01:37:05,090
She's got a website.

1133
01:37:05,090 --> 01:37:07,390
I think it's BurwellInc.com.

1134
01:37:08,150 --> 01:37:12,370
She has a directory of people who do information research for a living.

1135
01:37:12,370 --> 01:37:13,930
These are information brokers.

1136
01:37:14,150 --> 01:37:18,690
Many of them are doing it out of their home as a kind of second career librarians, whatever.

1137
01:37:19,110 --> 01:37:24,770
And at my suggestion, well first off, she has an index by topic and by country.

1138
01:37:24,770 --> 01:37:32,790
So you can find the little old lady in tennis shoes who speaks Portuguese and has spent her entire career doing the Brazilian nuclear industry.

1139
01:37:33,150 --> 01:37:34,290
This is useful.

1140
01:37:34,370 --> 01:37:39,170
And at my suggestion, in 1994, she added an index by language.

1141
01:37:39,250 --> 01:37:46,690
So if you need someone who speaks Urdu or Tamil and is an information professional, you can go in there and if they're in her directory, you'll find them.

1142
01:37:46,690 --> 01:37:47,950
These people are very reasonable.

1143
01:37:47,950 --> 01:37:52,310
They're generally about $75 an hour plus the cost of collection.

1144
01:37:52,310 --> 01:38:00,610
And so for anywhere from $250 to $1,000, you can get a pretty decent commercial online pull of this stuff.

1145
01:38:00,610 --> 01:38:01,950
And it's valuable.

1146
01:38:02,010 --> 01:38:07,370
But nobody has actually put it all together because now you get into these other niches.

1147
01:38:07,670 --> 01:38:13,670
If you're doing Caspian Sea oil production or pipeline planning, it's really helpful to have a map.

1148
01:38:13,930 --> 01:38:18,010
But we don't have maps of the Caspian Sea energy area.

1149
01:38:18,350 --> 01:38:19,810
The Russians do.

1150
01:38:19,810 --> 01:38:24,950
For $300 a map sheet, I can get just about any Russian military map.

1151
01:38:24,950 --> 01:38:29,130
In fact, I was stunned to find out that I could get Vladivostok.

1152
01:38:30,490 --> 01:38:31,110
Huh?

1153
01:38:32,050 --> 01:38:34,110
No, Terraserver is shit.

1154
01:38:34,810 --> 01:38:38,350
Well, no, Terraserver is actually not making any sales.

1155
01:38:39,050 --> 01:38:42,170
Terraserver is getting millions of hits and no buyers.

1156
01:38:42,390 --> 01:38:44,170
And that's too bad.

1157
01:38:46,370 --> 01:38:47,830
Yes and no.

1158
01:38:48,370 --> 01:38:51,570
Let me run through the commercial imagery options.

1159
01:38:51,990 --> 01:39:07,770
The only company in the world that has the entire earth at 10 meters, which is the least acceptable, you know, the highest acceptable resolution, entire earth, roughly less than three years old, cloud free, is spot image.

1160
01:39:08,150 --> 01:39:13,710
And they're based in Toulouse, France, and they're French, so the Americans aren't going to buy shit from them, which is really dumb.

1161
01:39:14,490 --> 01:39:20,910
Next best is Canadian radar sat, which has the real advantage of being able to see in the night.

1162
01:39:21,190 --> 01:39:29,630
It's all weather, you know, it can take an image any time, it can get through clouds and all that stuff, but it's a really ugly baby.

1163
01:39:29,870 --> 01:39:32,990
And there are a lot of people who can't deal with that kind of source.

1164
01:39:33,110 --> 01:39:40,530
Then you have Indian five meter, but it only has one satellite, so it's too long between double looks to do contour lines and all that stuff.

1165
01:39:40,530 --> 01:39:47,210
And then you have Russian two meter, only mysteriously it doesn't lose resolution when you pump it to one meter.

1166
01:39:47,210 --> 01:39:49,750
They're selling one meter and pretending it's two meter.

1167
01:39:50,290 --> 01:39:56,770
And then you have American one meter, but the problem with all of these other sources is they have to go take the picture.

1168
01:39:56,910 --> 01:39:58,050
They're not in the archives.

1169
01:39:58,050 --> 01:40:00,070
It's harder to pull together all of this stuff.

1170
01:40:00,070 --> 01:40:06,130
It's also very expensive if you're the first buyer and they're doing the collection just for you, it's much better to buy from the archives.

1171
01:40:06,530 --> 01:40:10,170
So you have Russian military maps, you have commercial imagery.

1172
01:40:10,530 --> 01:40:15,170
You can put boots on the ground with a digital camera and an engineering degree anywhere in the world in 48 hours.

1173
01:40:15,390 --> 01:40:26,350
By going to an outfit in England that has all these SAS guys that are trained combat engineer surveyors who can go in and do a road survey, they can tell you what the bridge loading capability is.

1174
01:40:26,350 --> 01:40:30,210
Did you know the United States doesn't know what bridge loading capability is all around the world?

1175
01:40:30,590 --> 01:40:35,090
We build 70 ton tanks because we thought it was a good idea.

1176
01:40:35,090 --> 01:40:37,990
Now let's deconstruct that a little bit.

1177
01:40:37,990 --> 01:40:40,770
Okay, 70 ton tank.

1178
01:40:40,770 --> 01:40:44,770
Now Navy ships, first off, weren't built to carry 70 ton tanks.

1179
01:40:45,070 --> 01:40:48,270
And Navy landing craft weren't built to carry 70 ton tanks.

1180
01:40:48,270 --> 01:40:53,370
So when you put a 70 ton tank in there, you lose like five trucks and three artillery pieces.

1181
01:40:55,130 --> 01:41:00,310
Turns out, only 50% of the world has a port that will allow pier side offload.

1182
01:41:00,310 --> 01:41:05,350
Because we need a depth of five fathoms, about 35 feet.

1183
01:41:05,350 --> 01:41:07,030
We need a turning radius for the ships.

1184
01:41:07,030 --> 01:41:08,530
We need all kinds of shit, right?

1185
01:41:08,710 --> 01:41:19,490
So okay, we are going to take a 70 ton tank and we are going to take it from a ship moving nine different directions at once into a landing craft moving nine different directions at once and then we are going to take it to this beach.

1186
01:41:20,070 --> 01:41:23,230
Well, 80% of the world has no cross country mobility.

1187
01:41:24,090 --> 01:41:27,870
Okay, so the 70 ton tank is going to sit and look real pretty on this beach.

1188
01:41:28,170 --> 01:41:30,230
Except for six countries in the world.

1189
01:41:31,850 --> 01:41:38,870
And, oh by the way, Europe doesn't sell trucks to the third world, if we move it on the road, that weigh more than 30 tons.

1190
01:41:38,870 --> 01:41:40,350
There is a reason for this.

1191
01:41:42,130 --> 01:41:47,750
So this 70 ton tank, which can shoot 3,000 meters, I mean it is a really mean, mean, mean thing.

1192
01:41:47,750 --> 01:41:49,750
It can kill a fly at 3,000 meters.

1193
01:41:49,970 --> 01:41:54,230
Well, it turns out your line of sight distance in most of the world is under 1,000 meters.

1194
01:41:54,230 --> 01:41:55,870
Except for six countries.

1195
01:41:55,870 --> 01:42:03,750
Okay, and it is just an incredible thing.

1196
01:42:03,930 --> 01:42:06,490
Let's take aviation as an example.

1197
01:42:06,490 --> 01:42:08,310
Because this was my first study.

1198
01:42:08,350 --> 01:42:12,990
We build airplanes for a standard aviation day that is warm and not humid.

1199
01:42:13,530 --> 01:42:16,140
Roughly 65 degrees and not humid.

1200
01:42:16,510 --> 01:42:24,370
It turns out that all these countries where we are going to, the Somalias and Burundis of the world, are 80 degrees and humid.

1201
01:42:24,370 --> 01:42:33,790
This is a 50% difference in how far you can go, how much you can carry, and how long you can stay overhead.

1202
01:42:34,550 --> 01:42:39,950
Our aircraft are literally at 50% of their operating capacity in all these hot countries.

1203
01:42:39,950 --> 01:42:42,490
But try and explain that to the colonel in charge.

1204
01:42:43,110 --> 01:42:51,510
And basically all of the embassies are more than the round trip refueling distance of the CH-46 helicopter from the Navy platform.

1205
01:42:51,510 --> 01:42:54,390
We will pretend that the Navy will come into the Five Fathom Line.

1206
01:42:54,390 --> 01:42:56,790
In fact, the Navy likes to stay way, way, way out.

1207
01:42:56,810 --> 01:43:01,990
Because we are outgunned by coastal artillery from most nations of the world, including Pisan nations.

1208
01:43:02,250 --> 01:43:05,010
Okay, so Navy stays way out.

1209
01:43:05,010 --> 01:43:12,710
Well, it means you are going to have to set up a forward area refueling point to refuel all these helicopters as you are trying to get all these Americans out of the embassies.

1210
01:43:12,710 --> 01:43:18,110
And oh, by the way, ambassadors refuse to evacuate their embassies until they are actually coming over the wall.

1211
01:43:18,110 --> 01:43:24,070
So this makes it real hard to keep them from coming over the wall and get 600 people out at the same time.

1212
01:43:24,870 --> 01:43:27,590
So these are what I call strategic generalizations.

1213
01:43:27,590 --> 01:43:31,090
The Pentagon is clueless on strategic generalizations.

1214
01:43:31,230 --> 01:43:37,930
They don't buy weapons systems based on need and they don't buy weapons systems based on global, worldwide realities.

1215
01:43:38,570 --> 01:43:46,310
And that is why you have a Department of Defense that is largely irrelevant to the threat facing the United States in the 21st century.

1216
01:43:46,310 --> 01:43:47,170
Bradley fighting?

1217
01:43:47,370 --> 01:43:49,810
Oh, the arsenal ship!

1218
01:43:49,810 --> 01:43:51,370
The arsenal ship!

1219
01:43:51,370 --> 01:43:54,790
The United States Navy had a great idea.

1220
01:43:54,990 --> 01:43:59,310
They decided we don't like sailors getting killed and we are running out, you know.

1221
01:43:59,310 --> 01:44:07,730
So they came up with an arsenal ship, which is a ship that is bigger than an aircraft carrier, run by 50 people, which shoots precision munitions.

1222
01:44:08,110 --> 01:44:10,170
Well, let's deconstruct that a little bit.

1223
01:44:10,770 --> 01:44:14,050
First off, what you really need in the U.S.

1224
01:44:14,050 --> 01:44:26,490
Navy is a global presence that allows you to put one platoon of Marines anywhere in 24 hours, a company in 48, a battalion in 72, and a full up Marine Expeditionary Force in a week.

1225
01:44:26,770 --> 01:44:27,590
What does that mean?

1226
01:44:27,590 --> 01:44:31,390
It means you have to have that kind of ship thing, right?

1227
01:44:31,390 --> 01:44:38,510
So you have to have a whole bunch of frigates out there, destroyers, you have to have small amphibious vehicles that carry a company at a time.

1228
01:44:38,510 --> 01:44:42,530
They are all spread out and then you have what I call the pile-on concept.

1229
01:44:42,990 --> 01:44:52,390
Marines kept our embassy in Somalia from being taken over because they flew from 400 miles out, they put a platoon on the ground as they were coming over the wall.

1230
01:44:52,790 --> 01:44:55,870
Usually one platoon will do it and then you beef up.

1231
01:44:55,890 --> 01:44:56,610
We don't do that.

1232
01:44:56,610 --> 01:44:59,270
The United States Navy likes things that are really big.

1233
01:44:59,490 --> 01:45:05,090
So they will put 1,000 Marines on one ship that a single diesel subskipper can take out.

1234
01:45:05,090 --> 01:45:09,590
Because, oh by the way, Marine operations aren't important enough for an aircraft carrier to protect.

1235
01:45:09,930 --> 01:45:13,790
So we send the Marines in harm's way without aircraft carriers.

1236
01:45:14,110 --> 01:45:16,990
This is just insanity.

1237
01:45:17,290 --> 01:45:18,410
Insanity.

1238
01:45:24,030 --> 01:45:25,430
That's cool.

1239
01:45:29,270 --> 01:45:32,930
We've proposed an aircraft carrier the size of a small island.

1240
01:45:33,070 --> 01:45:39,230
Americans don't like programs unless they are really, really big, really, really expensive and very likely to fail.

1241
01:45:39,970 --> 01:45:42,370
In the United States intelligence community anyway.

1242
01:45:42,370 --> 01:45:43,990
There was a question here, sir.

1243
01:45:47,170 --> 01:45:48,670
Desert countries.

1244
01:45:51,010 --> 01:45:55,950
Which six countries could the M1A1 reach out over 3,000 meters?

1245
01:45:55,950 --> 01:46:02,190
Had Saddam Hussein swung right and kicked some ass in the other Arab countries, we might not have been able to get him out.

1246
01:46:02,950 --> 01:46:09,790
He gave us the luxury of six months to build up to the perfect thing.

1247
01:46:11,690 --> 01:46:16,810
I will tell you with certainty, we could not do the Gulf War again today.

1248
01:46:18,230 --> 01:46:29,090
I won a war game once by sinking a ship in Charleston Harbor and wrapping C4 det cord around the nose wheels of all of the aerial tankers and all of the AWACS planes.

1249
01:46:29,770 --> 01:46:31,330
Americans were out of Schlitz.

1250
01:46:31,890 --> 01:46:38,470
I took out their airborne tankers, their airborne command and control craft, and I stopped all the strategic movement out of Charleston Harbor.

1251
01:46:38,470 --> 01:46:43,410
By sinking a freighter in there, a Colombian freighter.

1252
01:46:44,650 --> 01:46:47,530
We don't think in these terms.

1253
01:46:48,130 --> 01:46:55,350
It would be really neat if we had a DOD that actually thought about the world and what it needs.

1254
01:46:55,650 --> 01:47:00,250
Ike Eisenhower warned us about the military industrial complex.

1255
01:47:00,250 --> 01:47:11,270
Well, we are reaping the dividends now of a military industrial complex that's run amok with old technology that's highly secret that none of you can impact on.

1256
01:47:11,810 --> 01:47:12,910
That's a shame.

1257
01:47:12,910 --> 01:47:14,030
Someone else?

1258
01:47:16,340 --> 01:47:17,580
Okay, what agency?

1259
01:47:17,580 --> 01:47:19,440
This sounds like an interesting question.

1260
01:47:25,080 --> 01:47:26,540
The U.S.

1261
01:47:26,540 --> 01:47:29,480
Army's Land Information Warfare Agency is certainly here.

1262
01:47:31,660 --> 01:47:32,720
The U.S.

1263
01:47:32,720 --> 01:47:37,480
Air Force Special Security guys are here and they've learned not to wear black shoes.

1264
01:47:38,740 --> 01:47:41,080
I thought that was hysterical at HOPE.

1265
01:47:41,080 --> 01:47:49,440
At HOPE 94 there were all these two-man teams walking around looking like male models in white t-shirts and shorts and black military shoes.

1266
01:47:49,440 --> 01:47:51,500
It was too cool for words.

1267
01:47:53,180 --> 01:47:55,680
Let me tell you, these people are your friends.

1268
01:47:55,680 --> 01:48:02,820
And one of the things that I wish they would do is what's done at DEFCON, which is they identify themselves and they learn from you.

1269
01:48:04,460 --> 01:48:05,520
What's that?

1270
01:48:09,880 --> 01:48:15,840
If anyone wants to take off their clothes and identify themselves as a federal officer, you're welcome to do so.

1271
01:48:17,420 --> 01:48:23,820
But you know, really, these people, I happen to think a lot of Lee was.

1272
01:48:23,820 --> 01:48:26,940
I think it's probably the best outfit we've got in this area.

1273
01:48:27,780 --> 01:48:34,120
I suspect the FBI has several people here and they figured out I don't have an artificial leg and I'm not Agent Steele.

1274
01:48:34,220 --> 01:48:36,780
They tried to arrest me in Chicago.

1275
01:48:36,780 --> 01:48:39,240
It was two football captains and a prom queen.

1276
01:48:39,300 --> 01:48:42,040
And I had just flown in from Australia.

1277
01:48:42,040 --> 01:48:46,440
Got in at 5 in the morning and they wake me up at 5.30 with room service.

1278
01:48:47,540 --> 01:48:49,720
I didn't order, room service.

1279
01:48:49,720 --> 01:48:52,500
So it was a very tentative little voice that says FBI.

1280
01:48:54,060 --> 01:49:04,460
So I walked naked to the door, opened the door partly, and they immediately established that I did not have a false leg and they let me go back to sleep for my 8.30 meeting.

1281
01:49:05,720 --> 01:49:08,680
You know, they're your friends too.

1282
01:49:08,680 --> 01:49:13,700
Mike Vaddis is running a critical infrastructures protection outfit that is out of money.

1283
01:49:13,700 --> 01:49:14,740
He's broke.

1284
01:49:15,240 --> 01:49:18,320
He doesn't have what he needs to do his job.

1285
01:49:18,780 --> 01:49:26,580
And I'll also tell you, in my judgment, we're in deep shit because the government isn't the one that's going to have to solve this problem.

1286
01:49:26,580 --> 01:49:28,040
It's the private sector.

1287
01:49:28,220 --> 01:49:34,880
All the government can do is set standards and legislate due diligence and provide some threat intelligence and guidance.

1288
01:49:34,880 --> 01:49:39,240
The private sector is still stonewalling this issue from what I can see.

1289
01:49:40,120 --> 01:49:44,480
And so it needs to become more public and frankly it's going to be typical American.

1290
01:49:44,480 --> 01:49:48,040
We're going to need a Pearl Harbor, which is Wynn's phrase by the way.

1291
01:49:48,220 --> 01:49:49,840
We're going to need a Pearl Harbor.

1292
01:49:49,840 --> 01:49:51,240
We're going to need a major meltdown.

1293
01:49:51,240 --> 01:49:57,180
Aside from terrorism, what are your thoughts speaking with Pearl Harbor

1294
01:50:00,760 --> 01:50:03,300
as a major event?

1295
01:50:03,560 --> 01:50:05,580
It's going to happen.

1296
01:50:05,580 --> 01:50:13,380
Does the government stand on how they're going to deal with it unless they're so ignorant they haven't even come up with the idea that it's possible?

1297
01:50:13,580 --> 01:50:17,460
And what are they going to do about it?

1298
01:50:17,680 --> 01:50:18,740
Clean up.

1299
01:50:19,940 --> 01:50:24,400
You know, the Federal Emergency Management Agency is a very important agency.

1300
01:50:24,820 --> 01:50:31,180
And I think it's got its act together with respect to its vehicles and things that it moves and all this stuff.

1301
01:50:31,220 --> 01:50:33,380
I think we're just going to have to take our hits.

1302
01:50:34,860 --> 01:50:36,840
And shit happens.

1303
01:50:37,260 --> 01:50:40,000
And this is now an era where that's going to happen.

1304
01:50:40,000 --> 01:50:51,600
Now the good news is that all the druggies and criminals and most of these people are not going to cause such a problem because they're making too much money stealing us blind.

1305
01:50:52,360 --> 01:51:01,380
And so I think the people that are really good at this stuff are doing the percentage shaves on money and the transfers of inactive accounts and things like that.

1306
01:51:01,380 --> 01:51:04,200
And I have no personal technical knowledge in this area.

1307
01:51:04,440 --> 01:51:09,580
Well, I'm actually speaking more along the lines of people making statements through terrorist activities

1308
01:51:12,670 --> 01:51:12,930
.

1309
01:51:12,930 --> 01:51:20,490
So bringing down large systems and such to make a statement against the United States and how the United States is dealing with that.

1310
01:51:20,490 --> 01:51:29,790
I know FEMA handles a lot of the emergency stuff and they do wonderful cleanup work and they have a relatively well organized organization.

1311
01:51:29,870 --> 01:51:40,910
But what I'm talking about is not necessarily... it's more oriented towards what's going to happen when people are making a statement on a digital level.

1312
01:51:41,270 --> 01:51:47,830
It's going to cause... you know, it's funny, Y2K really disappointed everybody.

1313
01:51:49,070 --> 01:51:54,910
Because Stuart Brand sent me an email and he was saying, you know, Y2K is a whiff of the carnage to come.

1314
01:51:54,910 --> 01:52:02,330
But it turned out to be a little hiccup, mostly because we spent a lot of money on it and the Swedes and the Russians fixed their nuclear code and stuff like that.

1315
01:52:03,370 --> 01:52:07,910
I'll tell you, I think in all probability these people would probably choose to blackmail us.

1316
01:52:07,910 --> 01:52:14,830
For instance, I worry, you know, most of our code, most of our critical code is written in Moscow and Calcutta.

1317
01:52:15,390 --> 01:52:18,970
And nothing against all of my bright Indian friends that are here.

1318
01:52:19,070 --> 01:52:31,430
But I worry about the day when India decides to nuke Pakistan and they tell us in advance and they say, oh, by the way, keep your fucking mouth shut or all that code that we've planted is going to self-activate tomorrow.

1319
01:52:31,710 --> 01:52:36,090
And if you let us go for 30 days, at the end of 30 days we'll give you a partial anecdote.

1320
01:52:37,510 --> 01:52:38,110
Anecdote?

1321
01:52:38,290 --> 01:52:38,990
Antidote?

1322
01:52:38,990 --> 01:52:40,890
I'm a marine, you know, I can't speak English.

1323
01:52:41,510 --> 01:52:43,890
Okay, hang on a second.

1324
01:52:43,890 --> 01:52:46,490
Is there anybody that hasn't asked a question?

1325
01:52:47,810 --> 01:52:50,450
Okay, are you guys trying to throw us out?

1326
01:52:50,450 --> 01:52:51,870
I mean, I work well in the dark.

1327
01:52:51,870 --> 01:52:52,970
I'm from the government.

1328
01:52:55,550 --> 01:52:56,950
Okay, over here.

1329
01:52:56,950 --> 01:53:03,710
Alright, we're going to go one, two, three, four, five, and then six.

1330
01:53:03,930 --> 01:53:05,110
First-timers only.

1331
01:53:05,110 --> 01:53:05,910
Go ahead.

1332
01:53:06,910 --> 01:53:09,270
I need three more glasses of water.

1333
01:53:11,670 --> 01:53:16,290
Every major fuck-up that's gone on in this country has stemmed from the CIA.

1334
01:53:17,570 --> 01:53:19,630
The taking of Noriega.

1335
01:53:19,910 --> 01:53:27,310
That started with a Florida district attorney that way overstepped his bounds and then a sequence of events happened.

1336
01:53:27,450 --> 01:53:28,690
That was not CIA.

1337
01:53:28,690 --> 01:53:33,030
CIA called a no-shoot from CLT3 during Desert Storm.

1338
01:53:34,490 --> 01:53:36,830
And the list goes on.

1339
01:53:36,910 --> 01:53:39,750
All they do is provide bad intelligence.

1340
01:53:39,750 --> 01:53:41,750
Well, let me tell you...

1341
01:53:46,590 --> 01:53:52,890
Look, I am privileged to support... I mean, if you've got a hard-on for CIA, that's okay with me.

1342
01:53:55,190 --> 01:54:03,250
I am privileged to support the Special Operations Command, and I believe that we suck at providing intelligence to military activities.

1343
01:54:03,250 --> 01:54:07,250
We suck even more at providing intelligence support for diplomatic activities.

1344
01:54:11,250 --> 01:54:13,020
That's a real good question.

1345
01:54:13,290 --> 01:54:15,710
My personal feeling is... thank you very much.

1346
01:54:15,710 --> 01:54:26,730
My personal feeling is that the $30 billion that we're spending... and by the way, it's really $50 billion if you count all the military people that move things around and provide infrastructure support and all of that.

1347
01:54:27,050 --> 01:54:33,870
My personal feeling is that the American public is not getting its money's worth from American intelligence today.

1348
01:54:33,870 --> 01:54:41,030
And that this problem will continue until we have a Director of Central Intelligence that comes to grips with two key facts.

1349
01:54:41,030 --> 01:54:44,910
The first is that he doesn't know 90% of what he needs to know.

1350
01:54:44,930 --> 01:54:51,070
And the second is that his job is to inform the President that he needs to do that in partnership with the private sector.

1351
01:54:51,070 --> 01:54:53,650
And do it in an open, legal, and ethical way.

1352
01:54:55,530 --> 01:54:58,170
I mean, I've done all this shit, and I'll tell you something.

1353
01:54:58,170 --> 01:55:01,270
There's one good thing about Phil Agee's book.

1354
01:55:01,930 --> 01:55:08,450
Which is that he documents the pedestrian, day-to-day nature of a CIA case officer's life overseas.

1355
01:55:08,990 --> 01:55:14,450
And in any given third world country, we're not there to find out anything about that pissant country.

1356
01:55:14,450 --> 01:55:16,530
We're there to chase the Soviets.

1357
01:55:16,610 --> 01:55:21,390
And the Soviets hate that pissant country too, so they're happy to have drinks with us.

1358
01:55:22,010 --> 01:55:25,210
We're really not out there to learn anything about that country.

1359
01:55:25,210 --> 01:55:29,010
We're there to chase Soviets and Chinese and maybe the occasional Pakistani.

1360
01:55:30,030 --> 01:55:38,250
So we have a really flawed approach to what is our mission and how do we accomplish that mission.

1361
01:55:38,330 --> 01:55:41,710
And my book, I guarantee it will put you to sleep.

1362
01:55:41,810 --> 01:55:49,670
It is a hard book to read, but it's a book that tries to create a smart nation.

1363
01:55:49,670 --> 01:55:55,950
It tries to create a nation in which a SEAL team going into Colombia, for example.

1364
01:55:55,950 --> 01:55:58,630
And I know SOCOM's doing some really cool shit.

1365
01:55:58,630 --> 01:56:11,470
If you're going to put an observation team in clandestinely into, let's say, the Amazon, you can do commercial imagery so good that you can actually drop down in and do as if you were on the ground and just do a 360.

1366
01:56:11,650 --> 01:56:13,250
This is great.

1367
01:56:13,250 --> 01:56:15,570
This is what we should be doing.

1368
01:56:15,570 --> 01:56:17,410
And this is really good stuff.

1369
01:56:17,410 --> 01:56:26,830
But it's very expensive stuff, and NEMA only has $2.98 in its budget this year, and so they're not going to buy commercial imagery to support that kind of stuff.

1370
01:56:26,830 --> 01:56:28,410
They refuse to buy Russian military.

1371
01:56:28,410 --> 01:56:29,750
Here's a true story.

1372
01:56:30,710 --> 01:56:41,750
My friend Kent Lee from ECU Publications, and by the way, a lot of the companies that I talk about, my entire website is free, OSS.net, except for the 500,000 that's hidden behind client access.

1373
01:56:42,890 --> 01:56:49,210
But all these companies that I've referred to are in the open source marketplace, where there's a direct link through to their website.

1374
01:56:49,210 --> 01:56:50,930
There's no money involved.

1375
01:56:51,350 --> 01:57:06,150
Kent Lee got a price from the Russians for selling all of the Russian military maps for China at the $1,000 to $50,000 and $1,000 to $100,000 level for $5 million.

1376
01:57:06,770 --> 01:57:10,350
He went to the CIA and said, would you like to buy this?

1377
01:57:10,350 --> 01:57:11,310
And they said no.

1378
01:57:11,750 --> 01:57:13,470
He went to NEMA.

1379
01:57:13,470 --> 01:57:16,690
For those of you that don't know, NEMA, it's National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

1380
01:57:16,690 --> 01:57:17,870
They said no.

1381
01:57:18,290 --> 01:57:27,550
Six months later, the fact that the warehouse holding all these one-of maps, because they do one and then, you know, they can reproduce and if they have to, it burned down.

1382
01:57:28,610 --> 01:57:36,810
We're talking here of 100 million years of data extraction time on top of one meter imagery coverage of China.

1383
01:57:37,810 --> 01:57:39,990
This is how stupid we are.

1384
01:57:40,190 --> 01:57:44,630
NEMA is just hell-bent on not buying foreign commercial imagery or Russian military maps.

1385
01:57:44,630 --> 01:57:45,650
And it's a mistake.

1386
01:57:45,650 --> 01:57:46,370
It's wrong.

1387
01:57:46,370 --> 01:57:48,810
And the military guys, I have been spending...

1388
01:57:50,990 --> 01:57:55,770
Okay, security needs to break things down and manage the crowd.

1389
01:57:55,770 --> 01:57:56,630
Great talk.

1390
01:57:56,630 --> 01:57:57,110
Thanks.

1391
01:57:57,110 --> 01:57:58,650
Get the fuck off the stage.

1392
01:57:58,650 --> 01:57:59,970
Okay, no problem.

1393
01:58:00,270 --> 01:58:01,730
What do you want me to do?

1394
01:58:02,590 --> 01:58:05,090
I think security should work around me.

1395
01:58:06,170 --> 01:58:10,370
If you want... Look, anybody that wants to leave, go.

1396
01:58:10,370 --> 01:58:14,550
I mean, I'm only doing this as long as some of you want me to do this.

1397
01:58:15,790 --> 01:58:22,250
No, hey, security people, do your job.

1398
01:58:22,250 --> 01:58:23,870
Can this microphone stay active?

1399
01:58:29,020 --> 01:58:32,700
Listen, I'm cool with whatever you want to do.

1400
01:58:32,700 --> 01:58:34,140
I just can't do this again.

1401
01:58:35,600 --> 01:58:36,400
Okay.

1402
01:58:40,350 --> 01:58:43,630
This guy works for CIA and this is like Nodiega.

1403
01:58:43,630 --> 01:58:46,490
Remember where they played the rock music outside the embassy?

1404
01:58:47,630 --> 01:58:49,210
Okay, I'm leaving.

1405
01:58:52,550 --> 01:58:54,670
Alright, last question.

1406
01:58:57,970 --> 01:58:59,650
That's how I think of them.

1407
01:59:00,490 --> 01:59:02,190
Alright, last question.

1408
01:59:04,270 --> 01:59:07,270
Whoever thinks they have the most important question, shout it out.

1409
01:59:11,150 --> 01:59:11,910
Yes.

1410
01:59:11,910 --> 01:59:16,350
Of all the intelligence gathering that I did...

1411
01:59:26,710 --> 01:59:28,750
That's a good fucking question.

1412
01:59:28,750 --> 01:59:34,550
The question is, of all the intelligence that I did as a CIA person, and I think...

1413
01:59:34,970 --> 01:59:38,430
What we're going to do with all of these, in fact, could security do this now?

1414
01:59:38,430 --> 01:59:40,150
Take all of these out there.

1415
01:59:41,430 --> 01:59:44,850
Whatever you want to do, but put them out there so that we don't have a two-way thing.

1416
01:59:44,850 --> 01:59:46,990
Only the people that want to talk to me come up here.

1417
01:59:46,990 --> 01:59:51,310
And everybody else that wants one of these cool little globes, just get it on the table on the way out.

1418
01:59:52,650 --> 01:59:57,850
The question was, how much of the intelligence I did was broken down between informants and technical?

1419
01:59:57,850 --> 01:59:59,290
And what was the second half?

1420
02:00:03,230 --> 02:00:05,970
Alright, and what types of checks and balances did I have to...

1421
02:00:05,970 --> 02:00:08,750
That's an excellent question upon which to close.

1422
02:00:09,370 --> 02:00:12,310
This will be my last answer on this mic.

1423
02:00:15,990 --> 02:00:18,430
Ninety percent of the intelligence...

1424
02:00:18,970 --> 02:00:21,570
Can you at least let me finish this question without the radio?

1425
02:00:22,490 --> 02:00:24,250
Turn off the radios.

1426
02:00:24,430 --> 02:00:26,730
Let me have five minutes and then we're out of here.

1427
02:00:30,730 --> 02:00:36,330
By the way, I think security has done a great job, but I can see where the Nazis got into their thing.

1428
02:00:37,270 --> 02:00:40,450
You give somebody authority and they become Nazis.

1429
02:00:42,350 --> 02:00:44,110
Sorry, that's a cheap shot.

1430
02:00:44,350 --> 02:00:45,790
But you really did a good job.

1431
02:00:46,270 --> 02:00:49,970
Ninety percent of what I did was from recruiting people.

1432
02:00:50,330 --> 02:00:53,350
Where you basically spot someone.

1433
02:00:53,530 --> 02:01:02,950
By the way, what you're supposed to do is decide what your target is and then identify people that have access to the information you want and then gradually recruit them so that you get what it is you really need.

1434
02:01:02,950 --> 02:01:04,150
We don't do that.

1435
02:01:04,230 --> 02:01:11,190
What we do is we kind of stand out on the street corner with money in our hand and anybody that stops, we say, you now work for the CIA.

1436
02:01:11,850 --> 02:01:14,930
And then whatever they tell us is what goes back to Washington.

1437
02:01:14,990 --> 02:01:17,610
Ninety percent came from clandestine human.

1438
02:01:18,750 --> 02:01:24,550
Ten percent came from technical devices that we supported the implantation of.

1439
02:01:28,170 --> 02:01:35,250
And as far as accountability, what happens, first off, the case officer is supposed to be the first source of accountability.

1440
02:01:35,450 --> 02:01:50,190
And a case officer provides accountability by number one, reading the case files, except they're not in the field and most case officers don't go to headquarters to read the files, so they start their accounts with a clean sheet, meaning they know nothing about what's been reported previously by that asset.

1441
02:01:50,250 --> 02:01:59,450
Second is the case officers are supposed to be reading the local newspapers and have an understanding of the target and the context and the historical and all that, but they don't do that either.

1442
02:01:59,810 --> 02:02:08,450
So it's perfectly possible, and it happens very often, that an agent will read local, open-source information and then will concoct a relative.

1443
02:02:08,490 --> 02:02:13,550
We don't actually check to see if they have a relative in the foreign ministry.

1444
02:02:14,150 --> 02:02:15,590
And so that's the first level.

1445
02:02:15,590 --> 02:02:23,410
Then the second level is there's someone called a reports officer in every station, and that reports officer is an operational analyst.

1446
02:02:23,410 --> 02:02:29,630
That's the person who's responsible for reading the reports, making sure that they have all the right facts and everything.

1447
02:02:29,650 --> 02:02:41,210
Usually that person spends most of their time taking a really excellent report that's five or six or seven pages long and saying, this needs to become seven one-page reports because our numbers are down this month.

1448
02:02:41,590 --> 02:02:47,710
And so case officers spend half their time turning really good reports into seven really bad reports.

1449
02:02:47,930 --> 02:03:00,470
And then it goes back to Washington where there's another reports officer, who's still on the DO side now, who kind of checks it to see who should get it and release it and double-check the source description, which have now gotten pretty useless.

1450
02:03:00,470 --> 02:03:08,230
It used to be that you'd get source descriptions like a West German businessman who travels frequently to Brazil and understands the nuclear industry.

1451
02:03:08,510 --> 02:03:22,590
And now, because we've had some issues, as my 11-year-old would say, I think it needs to be converted, this is all in my book, it needs to be converted into a national intelligence agency that has world-class analysts and another thousand of them.

1452
02:03:22,630 --> 02:03:33,350
We need to kick the clandestine service out of town and create a clandestine service agency that's based in Philadelphia, doesn't wear button-down shirts, and is not allowed to visit Washington or work out of embassies.

1453
02:03:34,470 --> 02:03:38,850
Because it's halfway between New York and Washington and the guy that I want to run it likes Philly.

1454
02:03:40,070 --> 02:03:53,630
But actually what I do is I put the non-official cover offices for Latin America and Miami, for Europe and Boston, for Asia and Seattle, and , I don't know, for Africa.

1455
02:03:53,650 --> 02:03:58,010
Africa, I'd actually like to have a joint thing with the Brits out of London.

1456
02:04:01,010 --> 02:04:05,530
We're getting academics now to sit side-by-side with the analysts and so on.

1457
02:04:06,350 --> 02:04:13,190
But at the end of the day, and I will end with a line, and it's a little more negative than I'd like to end with, but it's highly relevant.

1458
02:04:13,190 --> 02:04:25,590
Herb Meyer, special assistant to Bill Casey, is quoted in Persico's biography of Basie as saying, these guys believe the only intelligence worth having is what they can steal.

1459
02:04:25,910 --> 02:04:28,630
They need to get reconnected to reality.

1460
02:04:29,490 --> 02:04:31,230
So that's where we're at.

1461
02:04:31,910 --> 02:04:42,850
I think we need national intelligence, we need to do a little bit of secrets, but my two most well-known sound lines are, number one, don't send a spy where a schoolboy can go, and number two, the problem with spies is they only know secrets.

1462
02:04:43,290 --> 02:04:45,610
And if you think about that, that's pretty scary.

1463
02:04:45,610 --> 02:04:46,810
Thank you very much.

1464
02:04:53,360 --> 02:05:04,660
I will be next door in the network room for as long as anyone wants to talk to me, if they're sober.

1465
02:05:06,900 --> 02:05:11,660
I'll just be in an informal system with no PA in the next room.