1 00:00:06,209 --> 00:00:08,769 hey welcome to cloud on air live 2 00:00:08,769 --> 00:00:11,199 webinars from Google cloud we're hosting 3 00:00:11,199 --> 00:00:13,210 webinars every Tuesday my name is 4 00:00:13,210 --> 00:00:15,339 Anthony possum art the head of product 5 00:00:15,339 --> 00:00:17,829 for our cloud IOT offering and today 6 00:00:17,829 --> 00:00:19,239 we're gonna be talking about IOT 7 00:00:19,239 --> 00:00:21,550 security and how to make your solutions 8 00:00:21,550 --> 00:00:24,670 secure you can ask questions anytime on 9 00:00:24,670 --> 00:00:26,320 the platform and we have Google Earth on 10 00:00:26,320 --> 00:00:29,169 standby to answer them so let's get 11 00:00:29,169 --> 00:00:30,268 started 12 00:00:30,268 --> 00:00:33,850 so making IOT solutions secure security 13 00:00:33,850 --> 00:00:36,159 is top of mind for everybody it's it 14 00:00:36,159 --> 00:00:38,619 it's mostly driven because of all the 15 00:00:38,619 --> 00:00:40,799 recent attacks and it's been in the news 16 00:00:40,799 --> 00:00:44,049 around a IOT security you know think 17 00:00:44,049 --> 00:00:46,859 about Mira Mira I was taking over some 18 00:00:46,859 --> 00:00:49,570 cameras in the wild and using them to do 19 00:00:49,570 --> 00:00:51,369 didn't distributed denial-of-service 20 00:00:51,369 --> 00:00:54,039 attacks that was 2.5 million devices 21 00:00:54,039 --> 00:00:56,590 affected by this kind of attack more 22 00:00:56,590 --> 00:00:59,189 recently things like meltdown inspector 23 00:00:59,189 --> 00:01:01,988 literally touched about every computer 24 00:01:01,988 --> 00:01:04,719 out there including IOT devices that 25 00:01:04,719 --> 00:01:06,640 without was that was a big one that 26 00:01:06,640 --> 00:01:08,230 needed to be solved so all those 27 00:01:08,230 --> 00:01:10,659 security issues and even a more recent 28 00:01:10,659 --> 00:01:12,849 one with z-wave are putting a lot of 29 00:01:12,849 --> 00:01:15,640 pressure into IT professionals and and 30 00:01:15,640 --> 00:01:19,000 people working in IOT to really make 31 00:01:19,000 --> 00:01:21,040 those solutions secure so today we're 32 00:01:21,040 --> 00:01:23,730 going to talk about how to make that 33 00:01:23,730 --> 00:01:27,549 secure there's more and more devices out 34 00:01:27,549 --> 00:01:29,140 there you know a lot of people throw big 35 00:01:29,140 --> 00:01:31,209 numbers what I like to look at is the 36 00:01:31,209 --> 00:01:33,670 current number of devices and the growth 37 00:01:33,670 --> 00:01:35,290 it's about eighty four point eight point 38 00:01:35,290 --> 00:01:37,480 four billion devices connected today 39 00:01:37,480 --> 00:01:40,750 it's growing about 30% a year what that 40 00:01:40,750 --> 00:01:42,640 tells me it's the attack surface is 41 00:01:42,640 --> 00:01:44,349 actually growing rapidly it's not so 42 00:01:44,349 --> 00:01:46,120 much the number of devices just every 43 00:01:46,120 --> 00:01:47,680 new device out there is a new 44 00:01:47,680 --> 00:01:50,200 opportunity for an attacker to take over 45 00:01:50,200 --> 00:01:53,049 and cause sun damage so that's that's 46 00:01:53,049 --> 00:01:55,030 what worries some about the growth and 47 00:01:55,030 --> 00:01:57,310 it can come from everywhere we've seen 48 00:01:57,310 --> 00:02:00,480 for example there was a hack in a casino 49 00:02:00,480 --> 00:02:04,959 in the US where the casino got hacked 50 00:02:04,959 --> 00:02:07,719 through a fishtank thermostat so some 51 00:02:07,719 --> 00:02:10,118 attacker got into that thermostat I was 52 00:02:10,118 --> 00:02:11,650 in the casino and through that 53 00:02:11,650 --> 00:02:13,628 thermostat I get access to the network 54 00:02:13,628 --> 00:02:16,150 and got access to a bunch of data from 55 00:02:16,150 --> 00:02:18,098 the players in the casino that was a 56 00:02:18,098 --> 00:02:19,659 pretty big deal they actually didn't 57 00:02:19,659 --> 00:02:21,159 discover that attack for a little bit of 58 00:02:21,159 --> 00:02:23,379 time and we're wondering why this 59 00:02:23,379 --> 00:02:25,090 thermistor I was sending so much data 60 00:02:25,090 --> 00:02:27,250 out to the cloud well now they know what 61 00:02:27,250 --> 00:02:29,919 it was a little bit of a big deal but 62 00:02:29,919 --> 00:02:31,150 that shows you the importance of 63 00:02:31,150 --> 00:02:33,759 securing the IOT devices not only the 64 00:02:33,759 --> 00:02:37,719 network itself 71 percent of the attacks 65 00:02:37,719 --> 00:02:40,180 go and detected so that's that's a big 66 00:02:40,180 --> 00:02:42,189 number we need to do better here and 67 00:02:42,189 --> 00:02:43,990 it's really more than money it's also 68 00:02:43,990 --> 00:02:46,360 the reputation you've probably heard 69 00:02:46,360 --> 00:02:49,780 about the Equifax breach where all those 70 00:02:49,780 --> 00:02:51,819 social security number information about 71 00:02:51,819 --> 00:02:55,020 users were pulled out of their system 72 00:02:55,020 --> 00:02:57,400 early really really worrisome to be 73 00:02:57,400 --> 00:02:59,409 honest their stock price fell 30 percent 74 00:02:59,409 --> 00:03:01,569 right the same day I mean the day after 75 00:03:01,569 --> 00:03:04,530 the the the attack was was unveiled and 76 00:03:04,530 --> 00:03:08,469 that's that's pretty rough I know you're 77 00:03:08,469 --> 00:03:10,210 talking millions of dollars lost because 78 00:03:10,210 --> 00:03:12,520 of that attack so it's not just money 79 00:03:12,520 --> 00:03:14,650 it's also a reputation I don't know if I 80 00:03:14,650 --> 00:03:17,860 would trust Equifax anymore maybe but 81 00:03:17,860 --> 00:03:19,900 it's you got to really consider the the 82 00:03:19,900 --> 00:03:22,659 cost of being hacked as a device and 83 00:03:22,659 --> 00:03:24,699 being in the news and people talking 84 00:03:24,699 --> 00:03:26,500 about your your devices being hacked 85 00:03:26,500 --> 00:03:28,870 that's sometimes more important than 86 00:03:28,870 --> 00:03:32,979 just the money so security cannot be an 87 00:03:32,979 --> 00:03:34,810 afterthought it has to be built in your 88 00:03:34,810 --> 00:03:37,030 system has to start from the ground up 89 00:03:37,030 --> 00:03:38,919 as you're building your solution and 90 00:03:38,919 --> 00:03:41,709 also we'll look at how you know some 91 00:03:41,709 --> 00:03:43,569 ways to retrofit those solutions but it 92 00:03:43,569 --> 00:03:45,159 cannot be an afterthought and this is 93 00:03:45,159 --> 00:03:47,830 the subject here the problem is it's 94 00:03:47,830 --> 00:03:50,139 really complicated you talk about 95 00:03:50,139 --> 00:03:52,930 mechanical designs and PCB designs we're 96 00:03:52,930 --> 00:03:54,340 talking about the supply chain and 97 00:03:54,340 --> 00:03:56,620 securing the supply chain talking about 98 00:03:56,620 --> 00:03:58,060 the firmware development and security 99 00:03:58,060 --> 00:04:01,389 firmware the network connectivity your 100 00:04:01,389 --> 00:04:03,550 cloud back in your mobile and web apps 101 00:04:03,550 --> 00:04:06,459 even the processing and analytics the 102 00:04:06,459 --> 00:04:08,379 support over time something that people 103 00:04:08,379 --> 00:04:10,360 overlooked often they'll secure device 104 00:04:10,360 --> 00:04:12,069 but what happens two years from now five 105 00:04:12,069 --> 00:04:13,629 years from now how do you keep that 106 00:04:13,629 --> 00:04:16,389 device secure and the overall cost and 107 00:04:16,389 --> 00:04:18,790 ROI and the business model associated 108 00:04:18,790 --> 00:04:20,829 you have to think about all of this as 109 00:04:20,829 --> 00:04:23,199 you're building a solution and security 110 00:04:23,199 --> 00:04:25,269 has to come in all of those items as 111 00:04:25,269 --> 00:04:28,300 well so we're going to look at four 112 00:04:28,300 --> 00:04:30,970 different areas of your solution 113 00:04:30,970 --> 00:04:33,310 starting from hardware and connectivity 114 00:04:33,310 --> 00:04:36,430 how to secure that the IOT platform the 115 00:04:36,430 --> 00:04:39,009 device management the ETL ingestion how 116 00:04:39,009 --> 00:04:41,949 to secure that the Big Data ml and AI 117 00:04:41,949 --> 00:04:44,350 and then the mobile web and back-end 118 00:04:44,350 --> 00:04:46,860 that cuts across the stree three buckets 119 00:04:46,860 --> 00:04:49,779 will focus more on the hardware in 120 00:04:49,779 --> 00:04:51,610 connectivity and the IOT platform today 121 00:04:51,610 --> 00:04:54,430 we'll assume that the security of mobile 122 00:04:54,430 --> 00:04:56,439 apps web apps and you know big data on 123 00:04:56,439 --> 00:04:58,050 email that's kind of taken care of 124 00:04:58,050 --> 00:05:00,579 because the subject is more around the 125 00:05:00,579 --> 00:05:04,360 IOT side of things so first thing is to 126 00:05:04,360 --> 00:05:06,790 choose a platform that is secure and you 127 00:05:06,790 --> 00:05:08,379 know you can cover yourself you trust 128 00:05:08,379 --> 00:05:10,839 but you have to verify this why for 129 00:05:10,839 --> 00:05:13,810 example the Google cloud platform as ISO 130 00:05:13,810 --> 00:05:16,149 certification HIPAA compliance no 131 00:05:16,149 --> 00:05:18,550 FedRAMP a lot of the certification that 132 00:05:18,550 --> 00:05:21,100 are verified by third-party vendors to 133 00:05:21,100 --> 00:05:23,199 say yes Google Cloud is secure you can 134 00:05:23,199 --> 00:05:26,290 trust them put your data in there but 135 00:05:26,290 --> 00:05:28,300 also we are working with other 136 00:05:28,300 --> 00:05:30,910 institutions like the FDIC or no some 137 00:05:30,910 --> 00:05:33,040 some of the other logos in there to 138 00:05:33,040 --> 00:05:35,439 really stay ahead and look at the 139 00:05:35,439 --> 00:05:37,300 security holistically and really try to 140 00:05:37,300 --> 00:05:39,790 find those those problems before they 141 00:05:39,790 --> 00:05:41,949 occur so that's a very important effort 142 00:05:41,949 --> 00:05:44,079 that Google's undertaking making the 143 00:05:44,079 --> 00:05:46,149 Google cloud platform extremely secure 144 00:05:46,149 --> 00:05:49,720 for your solution we really built that 145 00:05:49,720 --> 00:05:52,300 solution at Google from the ground that 146 00:05:52,300 --> 00:05:54,250 we're thinking security at the hardware 147 00:05:54,250 --> 00:05:57,160 level any software the storage the 148 00:05:57,160 --> 00:05:59,740 identity you know looking at the network 149 00:05:59,740 --> 00:06:01,629 and operations of that network really 150 00:06:01,629 --> 00:06:05,170 thinking security at every layer of that 151 00:06:05,170 --> 00:06:08,050 cake here to make sure that we offer 152 00:06:08,050 --> 00:06:10,029 those secure solution for you and you 153 00:06:10,029 --> 00:06:12,129 can trust that cloud infrastructure for 154 00:06:12,129 --> 00:06:14,079 your application your analytics your ml 155 00:06:14,079 --> 00:06:16,420 and AI you can trust those to build your 156 00:06:16,420 --> 00:06:21,279 IT solution so to illustrate how you can 157 00:06:21,279 --> 00:06:23,560 secure your IT solution we really want 158 00:06:23,560 --> 00:06:25,089 it to go through a little bit of a story 159 00:06:25,089 --> 00:06:28,060 time and tell the story of a company and 160 00:06:28,060 --> 00:06:29,649 you know you can pick any name I'll take 161 00:06:29,649 --> 00:06:33,129 Acme who for example and take a company 162 00:06:33,129 --> 00:06:35,529 that wants to build an IOT device today 163 00:06:35,529 --> 00:06:37,750 what do they have to look at and what do 164 00:06:37,750 --> 00:06:40,899 they go through in their journey to a 165 00:06:40,899 --> 00:06:43,569 solution and to make that secure so they 166 00:06:43,569 --> 00:06:45,610 have to look at encryption obviously of 167 00:06:45,610 --> 00:06:46,439 data 168 00:06:46,439 --> 00:06:49,559 authentication of devices and users at 169 00:06:49,559 --> 00:06:52,499 the manufacturing security at the boot 170 00:06:52,499 --> 00:06:55,348 and at the key rotation over time so 171 00:06:55,348 --> 00:06:57,300 those are five elements that are really 172 00:06:57,300 --> 00:06:58,709 important to look at as they're building 173 00:06:58,709 --> 00:06:59,848 your solution so we're going to go 174 00:06:59,848 --> 00:07:02,848 through each of them and see how to to 175 00:07:02,848 --> 00:07:05,519 make that secure so the first thing is 176 00:07:05,519 --> 00:07:08,550 data encryption so data encryption here 177 00:07:08,550 --> 00:07:09,869 we're talking about data encryption in 178 00:07:09,869 --> 00:07:13,259 transit TLS is what most people should 179 00:07:13,259 --> 00:07:16,338 be using it's a very standard protocol 180 00:07:16,338 --> 00:07:18,809 you can know it's used to connect to 181 00:07:18,809 --> 00:07:21,838 your bank if you're familiar with that 182 00:07:21,838 --> 00:07:23,610 I mean TLS is very well known it's very 183 00:07:23,610 --> 00:07:24,949 well deployed it's been battle tested 184 00:07:24,949 --> 00:07:27,149 this is something that you should always 185 00:07:27,149 --> 00:07:29,309 have between your device and the cloud 186 00:07:29,309 --> 00:07:30,778 platform the Google cloud platform you 187 00:07:30,778 --> 00:07:33,238 should be using TLS for data encryption 188 00:07:33,238 --> 00:07:35,610 in transit that's very important and 189 00:07:35,610 --> 00:07:37,860 that's a given that's the first thing so 190 00:07:37,860 --> 00:07:39,629 they say okay well use ACK missus well 191 00:07:39,629 --> 00:07:41,218 use TLS to communicate between our 192 00:07:41,218 --> 00:07:42,658 device and we will go have that for 193 00:07:42,658 --> 00:07:45,629 great now how do you efendi Kate we have 194 00:07:45,629 --> 00:07:47,399 encryption we need to authenticate those 195 00:07:47,399 --> 00:07:50,639 devices there's two really two ways to 196 00:07:50,639 --> 00:07:52,319 authenticate devices if you wish there's 197 00:07:52,319 --> 00:07:53,848 kind of a certificate based 198 00:07:53,848 --> 00:07:55,709 authentication and a password based 199 00:07:55,709 --> 00:07:59,189 authentication do not use password based 200 00:07:59,189 --> 00:08:02,908 for devices password are for human you 201 00:08:02,908 --> 00:08:05,579 know password is what is a is an element 202 00:08:05,579 --> 00:08:09,028 that somebody has in their head and the 203 00:08:09,028 --> 00:08:11,069 head is the secure storage you're not 204 00:08:11,069 --> 00:08:12,658 supposed to write it down in a post-it 205 00:08:12,658 --> 00:08:14,038 and put it on your keyboard that's not 206 00:08:14,038 --> 00:08:15,658 how you do it you keep it in your head 207 00:08:15,658 --> 00:08:18,088 and then because I know the password I 208 00:08:18,088 --> 00:08:20,069 can authenticate so that I'm the secure 209 00:08:20,069 --> 00:08:22,709 element here the problem with the 210 00:08:22,709 --> 00:08:24,658 password is if somebody else knows your 211 00:08:24,658 --> 00:08:27,598 password that other person is you 212 00:08:27,598 --> 00:08:30,509 there's no validation that you are you 213 00:08:30,509 --> 00:08:32,250 are the person you say you are you're 214 00:08:32,250 --> 00:08:34,679 just showing a password and it says I am 215 00:08:34,679 --> 00:08:36,778 me and it's that's why the secure 216 00:08:36,778 --> 00:08:38,818 storage in your head is very important 217 00:08:38,818 --> 00:08:40,469 is to prove that it is you but the 218 00:08:40,469 --> 00:08:42,179 problem that's the main issue with the 219 00:08:42,179 --> 00:08:44,458 password password is you with a 220 00:08:44,458 --> 00:08:46,350 certificate there's a certificate 221 00:08:46,350 --> 00:08:48,509 authority that validates that what 222 00:08:48,509 --> 00:08:50,610 you're presenting as an identity is 223 00:08:50,610 --> 00:08:52,438 actually you so that authority will say 224 00:08:52,438 --> 00:08:54,778 yes yes that public key that certificate 225 00:08:54,778 --> 00:08:58,289 great that's device ABC and that's great 226 00:08:58,289 --> 00:09:00,309 so you should always use sir 227 00:09:00,309 --> 00:09:01,990 ticket for devices because you don't 228 00:09:01,990 --> 00:09:04,960 have a head as a secure storage as a 229 00:09:04,960 --> 00:09:07,179 human does so this is very important and 230 00:09:07,179 --> 00:09:10,059 also that third-party validation of the 231 00:09:10,059 --> 00:09:12,399 identity is very important so use 232 00:09:12,399 --> 00:09:14,799 certificate for devices fine 233 00:09:14,799 --> 00:09:16,659 so Acme says okay well use TLS for 234 00:09:16,659 --> 00:09:19,059 encryption will use certificate for 235 00:09:19,059 --> 00:09:21,669 identity but then I have a I have 236 00:09:21,669 --> 00:09:24,100 certificate so I have public keys and 237 00:09:24,100 --> 00:09:26,559 private keys how do I give those keys to 238 00:09:26,559 --> 00:09:28,450 my manufacturer how do I put those keys 239 00:09:28,450 --> 00:09:30,580 on my device and that's actually a 240 00:09:30,580 --> 00:09:33,399 pretty big problem it is there there's 241 00:09:33,399 --> 00:09:35,339 several ways you can do that you can 242 00:09:35,339 --> 00:09:38,169 create a file with all the keys and send 243 00:09:38,169 --> 00:09:40,299 that file to your manufacturer that's 244 00:09:40,299 --> 00:09:42,940 one way to do it you have to trust your 245 00:09:42,940 --> 00:09:44,409 manufacturer at this point because the 246 00:09:44,409 --> 00:09:46,778 manufacturer has like seize your keys 247 00:09:46,778 --> 00:09:49,089 and they can actually copy those keys if 248 00:09:49,089 --> 00:09:52,600 their malicious a bit it does happen 249 00:09:52,600 --> 00:09:55,149 fairly often then the manufacturer will 250 00:09:55,149 --> 00:09:56,919 generate all your devices and your 251 00:09:56,919 --> 00:09:58,269 device is fine and then all of a sudden 252 00:09:58,269 --> 00:10:00,669 you see maybe 10% of those devices or 253 00:10:00,669 --> 00:10:03,429 rogue devices are fake devices but using 254 00:10:03,429 --> 00:10:06,039 valid keys the copies of existing keys 255 00:10:06,039 --> 00:10:07,600 because they were in a file and they've 256 00:10:07,600 --> 00:10:08,919 been copied so it's a little bit of an 257 00:10:08,919 --> 00:10:11,409 issue so that's not really a good way to 258 00:10:11,409 --> 00:10:13,809 do it the other ways to say hey 259 00:10:13,809 --> 00:10:15,549 manufacturer you're gonna put you're 260 00:10:15,549 --> 00:10:17,649 gonna do an API call every time you're 261 00:10:17,649 --> 00:10:19,179 gonna flash that firmware and my 262 00:10:19,179 --> 00:10:20,830 identities you're gonna do an API call 263 00:10:20,830 --> 00:10:23,019 to a back-end to get the keys right on 264 00:10:23,019 --> 00:10:26,559 time the manufacturers hate that because 265 00:10:26,559 --> 00:10:28,750 it slows down the manufacturing process 266 00:10:28,750 --> 00:10:31,000 so imagine that you will call they get 267 00:10:31,000 --> 00:10:33,009 the kid the key that's a roundtrip 268 00:10:33,009 --> 00:10:34,480 you know they get to download that key 269 00:10:34,480 --> 00:10:35,950 they have to flash it then they go to 270 00:10:35,950 --> 00:10:37,809 the next device that's fairly slow and 271 00:10:37,809 --> 00:10:39,519 what happens sometimes is that call 272 00:10:39,519 --> 00:10:42,100 doesn't work but that calls to slow its 273 00:10:42,100 --> 00:10:44,320 slowing down the manufacturing process 274 00:10:44,320 --> 00:10:47,080 which adds cost to you so when they do 275 00:10:47,080 --> 00:10:48,879 that they will actually charge you way 276 00:10:48,879 --> 00:10:51,070 more than just a standard manufacturing 277 00:10:51,070 --> 00:10:53,500 process that goes really fast so that's 278 00:10:53,500 --> 00:10:55,179 costing a lot of money and they usually 279 00:10:55,179 --> 00:10:56,649 don't like that actually a lot of math 280 00:10:56,649 --> 00:10:58,690 structures don't even have their 281 00:10:58,690 --> 00:11:00,190 manufacturing line connected to the 282 00:11:00,190 --> 00:11:01,929 internet that they don't even allow you 283 00:11:01,929 --> 00:11:04,539 to do this so you revert to giving them 284 00:11:04,539 --> 00:11:07,000 a file with the copies of the keys so 285 00:11:07,000 --> 00:11:09,399 that's not that's not great so we need 286 00:11:09,399 --> 00:11:11,139 to find we need to find a solution for 287 00:11:11,139 --> 00:11:13,750 that 288 00:11:13,750 --> 00:11:17,049 Els mutual authentication so this is the 289 00:11:17,049 --> 00:11:18,250 authentication we say what we're gonna 290 00:11:18,250 --> 00:11:20,259 use we were going to use certificates 291 00:11:20,259 --> 00:11:23,740 great so the certificate can be used to 292 00:11:23,740 --> 00:11:25,870 authenticate the cloud like you would 293 00:11:25,870 --> 00:11:27,820 authenticate with your bank when you do 294 00:11:27,820 --> 00:11:29,860 that the bank knows it's you know it's 295 00:11:29,860 --> 00:11:31,299 the bank but the bank doesn't know it's 296 00:11:31,299 --> 00:11:32,590 you until you put your username password 297 00:11:32,590 --> 00:11:34,600 it's the same for device they can 298 00:11:34,600 --> 00:11:37,809 authenticate the cloud the cloud needs 299 00:11:37,809 --> 00:11:39,789 to authenticate the device so it's a 300 00:11:39,789 --> 00:11:42,460 mutual authentication both ways and you 301 00:11:42,460 --> 00:11:44,259 can use TLS with you a lot to do that 302 00:11:44,259 --> 00:11:46,720 there's good and bad for it it's not all 303 00:11:46,720 --> 00:11:50,769 good so we'll look at that and finally 304 00:11:50,769 --> 00:11:53,429 secure boot we want to make sure that 305 00:11:53,429 --> 00:11:56,049 what the device is running when it boots 306 00:11:56,049 --> 00:11:58,210 is what's supposed to be running the 307 00:11:58,210 --> 00:11:59,830 first thing that a hacker will do when 308 00:11:59,830 --> 00:12:01,120 they get on to a device they'll modify 309 00:12:01,120 --> 00:12:03,759 the firmware so the device cannot do 310 00:12:03,759 --> 00:12:05,500 what it's supposed to be doing Mira I 311 00:12:05,500 --> 00:12:07,210 was doing that Mira I would get on the 312 00:12:07,210 --> 00:12:09,610 device shut off everything every other 313 00:12:09,610 --> 00:12:11,889 connection and reconfigure itself so 314 00:12:11,889 --> 00:12:14,049 nobody else could come in actually would 315 00:12:14,049 --> 00:12:16,000 shut down any other Mira attack which 316 00:12:16,000 --> 00:12:17,830 was pretty good but it would shut down 317 00:12:17,830 --> 00:12:20,049 any access to the device then it would 318 00:12:20,049 --> 00:12:21,700 reconfigure the device to do what it 319 00:12:21,700 --> 00:12:24,490 wanted it to be to do so make sure that 320 00:12:24,490 --> 00:12:26,740 when the device boots there's a 321 00:12:26,740 --> 00:12:28,509 validation of the firmware that says yes 322 00:12:28,509 --> 00:12:30,549 yes it is right it is the right firmware 323 00:12:30,549 --> 00:12:32,049 and it's supposed to boot the right way 324 00:12:32,049 --> 00:12:33,970 and it's doing the right thing so I let 325 00:12:33,970 --> 00:12:35,620 the device boot so that's secure boot 326 00:12:35,620 --> 00:12:37,419 and that's really important to implement 327 00:12:37,419 --> 00:12:42,460 in your device and the key rotation is 328 00:12:42,460 --> 00:12:44,440 something that is actually forgotten 329 00:12:44,440 --> 00:12:47,889 quite often you need to think more than 330 00:12:47,889 --> 00:12:50,139 a year away you know think four years 331 00:12:50,139 --> 00:12:51,850 five ten years fifteen years in 332 00:12:51,850 --> 00:12:53,679 manufacturing we see 15 20 years 333 00:12:53,679 --> 00:12:57,039 sometimes Keys will rotate will have to 334 00:12:57,039 --> 00:12:58,779 be rotated sometimes they're corrupted 335 00:12:58,779 --> 00:13:00,279 there's been a hack in your back-end 336 00:13:00,279 --> 00:13:03,100 system in your CA the keys have been 337 00:13:03,100 --> 00:13:05,379 exposed you have to rotate them maybe 338 00:13:05,379 --> 00:13:07,990 the CA has to be rotated at a few years 339 00:13:07,990 --> 00:13:10,029 and that's very important that's hard to 340 00:13:10,029 --> 00:13:12,299 do so you have to really consider 341 00:13:12,299 --> 00:13:15,190 throughout your design that the keys are 342 00:13:15,190 --> 00:13:17,919 ephemeral and will have to be changed so 343 00:13:17,919 --> 00:13:19,389 that's something very important to 344 00:13:19,389 --> 00:13:21,639 consider when you build your device 345 00:13:21,639 --> 00:13:24,299 think that your key are not going to be 346 00:13:24,299 --> 00:13:26,830 permanent and will have to be rotated 347 00:13:26,830 --> 00:13:27,519 how 348 00:13:27,519 --> 00:13:30,490 your software and humor manages that to 349 00:13:30,490 --> 00:13:32,559 make sure that that's feasible over time 350 00:13:32,559 --> 00:13:34,149 that's very that's a very important 351 00:13:34,149 --> 00:13:37,870 point that's often time overlooked so if 352 00:13:37,870 --> 00:13:39,429 you look at all the challenges so you 353 00:13:39,429 --> 00:13:41,320 need certificates and a certificate 354 00:13:41,320 --> 00:13:43,509 authority and there's complexity coming 355 00:13:43,509 --> 00:13:46,029 with that the manufacturing cost and 356 00:13:46,029 --> 00:13:47,679 risk associated with transferring the 357 00:13:47,679 --> 00:13:49,330 keys to your manufacturer that's the 358 00:13:49,330 --> 00:13:50,070 problem 359 00:13:50,070 --> 00:13:54,370 TLS and TLS mutual loss is actually a 360 00:13:54,370 --> 00:13:56,500 little bit bloated and hard to maintain 361 00:13:56,500 --> 00:13:58,090 so we'll see we'll see how we can solve 362 00:13:58,090 --> 00:14:01,570 this keys are extremely difficult to 363 00:14:01,570 --> 00:14:05,289 store securely in fear Moya if it's fume 364 00:14:05,289 --> 00:14:07,840 wear or software somebody can have 365 00:14:07,840 --> 00:14:10,899 access to it somebody can reverse 366 00:14:10,899 --> 00:14:13,389 engineer the code can decompile and can 367 00:14:13,389 --> 00:14:15,309 get access to those keys it's extremely 368 00:14:15,309 --> 00:14:18,929 hard to secure any key in a theme where 369 00:14:18,929 --> 00:14:21,490 you have to do secure boot and you have 370 00:14:21,490 --> 00:14:23,679 to have key rotation management so those 371 00:14:23,679 --> 00:14:25,600 are six points that are really big 372 00:14:25,600 --> 00:14:27,399 challenges and at this point you're 373 00:14:27,399 --> 00:14:29,830 probably thinking man this is a problem 374 00:14:29,830 --> 00:14:31,570 like how am I going to secure my IOT 375 00:14:31,570 --> 00:14:34,149 devices this is too complicated so let's 376 00:14:34,149 --> 00:14:36,330 see how we can help with that 377 00:14:36,330 --> 00:14:39,070 so let's talk a bit about Google Cloud 378 00:14:39,070 --> 00:14:41,230 IRT the Google car diode chip platform 379 00:14:41,230 --> 00:14:44,080 is a set of services one of the most 380 00:14:44,080 --> 00:14:46,720 recent it's called coyote quartz the big 381 00:14:46,720 --> 00:14:49,840 one on the left here clarity core has 382 00:14:49,840 --> 00:14:51,909 two components a device manager where 383 00:14:51,909 --> 00:14:53,590 you'll declare your devices your 384 00:14:53,590 --> 00:14:55,299 attributes your registries your access 385 00:14:55,299 --> 00:14:57,610 controls all of that and your keys 386 00:14:57,610 --> 00:14:58,899 you're gonna store your keys in there 387 00:14:58,899 --> 00:15:03,009 the public keys and then you have a data 388 00:15:03,009 --> 00:15:07,090 bridge or broker for mqtt and HTTP to be 389 00:15:07,090 --> 00:15:09,100 able to communicate bi-directionally 390 00:15:09,100 --> 00:15:12,100 with the devices and between the devices 391 00:15:12,100 --> 00:15:14,649 and the cloud all the data coming into 392 00:15:14,649 --> 00:15:16,600 cloud IT core is passed on to cloud 393 00:15:16,600 --> 00:15:20,440 pub/sub a globally available messaging 394 00:15:20,440 --> 00:15:22,360 service from pub/sub you can trigger 395 00:15:22,360 --> 00:15:24,250 your cloud function serverless functions 396 00:15:24,250 --> 00:15:26,649 and compute you can trigger data flows 397 00:15:26,649 --> 00:15:29,139 that can do streaming analytics over a 398 00:15:29,139 --> 00:15:30,399 certain period of time can do 399 00:15:30,399 --> 00:15:32,919 transformation and any kind of operation 400 00:15:32,919 --> 00:15:35,649 at very high scale from there you'll go 401 00:15:35,649 --> 00:15:37,889 into storage in BigTable 402 00:15:37,889 --> 00:15:40,990 bigquery maybe fire store 403 00:15:40,990 --> 00:15:43,870 and trigger cloud ml training if knitted 404 00:15:43,870 --> 00:15:45,370 those trainings could be used by data 405 00:15:45,370 --> 00:15:48,190 flow or cloud functions to do inferences 406 00:15:48,190 --> 00:15:51,250 and then pass back to the device 407 00:15:51,250 --> 00:15:54,458 eventually on the far right data studio 408 00:15:54,458 --> 00:15:56,350 and data lab and analytics are allow you 409 00:15:56,350 --> 00:15:58,899 to visualize data silly little time 410 00:15:58,899 --> 00:16:01,120 series you know see any information you 411 00:16:01,120 --> 00:16:03,039 need about your your your data coming 412 00:16:03,039 --> 00:16:04,120 from the devices 413 00:16:04,120 --> 00:16:07,330 that's our cloud IOT platform it's a 414 00:16:07,330 --> 00:16:09,850 fully managed platform quadratic or is 415 00:16:09,850 --> 00:16:13,240 not installed or deployed or configured 416 00:16:13,240 --> 00:16:15,789 in terms of shard size or anything it's 417 00:16:15,789 --> 00:16:18,490 a global service it will be accessible 418 00:16:18,490 --> 00:16:20,559 anywhere in the world and it's scalable 419 00:16:20,559 --> 00:16:22,958 for you one device million device 420 00:16:22,958 --> 00:16:24,730 doesn't really matter you just throw 421 00:16:24,730 --> 00:16:26,500 whatever you have at it it will scale up 422 00:16:26,500 --> 00:16:31,899 and down to you need so how do we secure 423 00:16:31,899 --> 00:16:36,399 that step one use a secure element use a 424 00:16:36,399 --> 00:16:39,220 crypto chip this is super important I 425 00:16:39,220 --> 00:16:42,278 cannot emphasize that enough you should 426 00:16:42,278 --> 00:16:44,500 use a crypto chip in your device if you 427 00:16:44,500 --> 00:16:47,470 can the private key from secure chip are 428 00:16:47,470 --> 00:16:50,200 never exposed they are generated inside 429 00:16:50,200 --> 00:16:52,360 the hardware private keys generated 430 00:16:52,360 --> 00:16:53,620 inside the hardware the public key is 431 00:16:53,620 --> 00:16:56,169 generated and then exposed so it can be 432 00:16:56,169 --> 00:16:58,120 distributed to to the backend this is 433 00:16:58,120 --> 00:16:59,350 super important we have a great 434 00:16:59,350 --> 00:17:01,149 partnership with microchip here on that 435 00:17:01,149 --> 00:17:03,309 you're talking a sub dollar and it's 436 00:17:03,309 --> 00:17:05,349 really cheap to add and it saves you a 437 00:17:05,349 --> 00:17:08,880 ton of trouble you can send that crypto 438 00:17:08,880 --> 00:17:10,929 pre-configured to your manufacturer 439 00:17:10,929 --> 00:17:13,630 anywhere in the world even if you don't 440 00:17:13,630 --> 00:17:15,459 trust them doesn't matter because they 441 00:17:15,459 --> 00:17:16,869 can't read anything from that chip 442 00:17:16,869 --> 00:17:18,459 they'll just be able to solder it to 443 00:17:18,459 --> 00:17:20,740 your PCB design and then you're good to 444 00:17:20,740 --> 00:17:22,660 go the identity has been burned onto the 445 00:17:22,660 --> 00:17:25,720 device it's super secure there's really 446 00:17:25,720 --> 00:17:28,630 no copying of keys possible there's no 447 00:17:28,630 --> 00:17:31,240 API calls that the manufacturer has to 448 00:17:31,240 --> 00:17:33,460 do there's no constraint so the cost of 449 00:17:33,460 --> 00:17:35,140 manufacturing is actually much much 450 00:17:35,140 --> 00:17:38,319 cheaper and it often time compensate for 451 00:17:38,319 --> 00:17:40,029 the price of the chip so that's super 452 00:17:40,029 --> 00:17:43,179 important I've seen customers having to 453 00:17:43,179 --> 00:17:46,170 add three or four dollars to do custom 454 00:17:46,170 --> 00:17:48,460 manufacturing for each of the devices if 455 00:17:48,460 --> 00:17:50,799 you use this there's no more custom it's 456 00:17:50,799 --> 00:17:52,329 a single thing so you'd save three or 457 00:17:52,329 --> 00:17:53,380 four dollars for it 458 00:17:53,380 --> 00:17:54,669 a chip that costs less 459 00:17:54,669 --> 00:17:56,440 and a dollar so that's that's a very 460 00:17:56,440 --> 00:17:59,470 good value prop you should really use a 461 00:17:59,470 --> 00:18:01,450 crypto chip the clip that you can also 462 00:18:01,450 --> 00:18:03,460 do secure boot by the way so you can 463 00:18:03,460 --> 00:18:06,220 have the signature of your firmware 464 00:18:06,220 --> 00:18:08,259 inside the crypto chip when the device 465 00:18:08,259 --> 00:18:11,048 boots there's a signature there's a hash 466 00:18:11,048 --> 00:18:12,730 that's calculated of your firmware it's 467 00:18:12,730 --> 00:18:14,138 passed to the crypto the critical say 468 00:18:14,138 --> 00:18:16,239 yes or no and then the device can boot 469 00:18:16,239 --> 00:18:18,999 or not so you're doing secure provision 470 00:18:18,999 --> 00:18:21,398 you have a keys cheaper manufacturing 471 00:18:21,398 --> 00:18:23,528 and more secure manufacturing you're 472 00:18:23,528 --> 00:18:26,499 doing secure boot with this and also 473 00:18:26,499 --> 00:18:27,849 we'll see you'll be able to do key 474 00:18:27,849 --> 00:18:29,558 rotation with this so this is very 475 00:18:29,558 --> 00:18:31,480 important even if you feel it's a little 476 00:18:31,480 --> 00:18:34,329 bit expensive please do it it will save 477 00:18:34,329 --> 00:18:36,579 you a ton of time will save you a lot of 478 00:18:36,579 --> 00:18:38,679 trouble down the line so use a secure 479 00:18:38,679 --> 00:18:43,028 element second be authentication I was 480 00:18:43,028 --> 00:18:46,720 talking about mutual life from TLS 481 00:18:46,720 --> 00:18:48,308 mutuality is great that there's kind of 482 00:18:48,308 --> 00:18:51,788 a lot of downside to it so we recommend 483 00:18:51,788 --> 00:18:54,128 using a jot for authentication jawed is 484 00:18:54,128 --> 00:18:55,690 something that's used by web web 485 00:18:55,690 --> 00:18:58,089 services in general and then it's a 486 00:18:58,089 --> 00:19:02,858 standard it's a JSON web token the way 487 00:19:02,858 --> 00:19:04,599 works and I have a little schema the 488 00:19:04,599 --> 00:19:06,970 schematic after that is you establish a 489 00:19:06,970 --> 00:19:08,980 TLS session with the Google front end 490 00:19:08,980 --> 00:19:10,839 and you were in the world as I said card 491 00:19:10,839 --> 00:19:12,730 IOT core is a global service so anywhere 492 00:19:12,730 --> 00:19:14,169 in the world you'll hit that Google 493 00:19:14,169 --> 00:19:15,819 Google front end with a TLS session 494 00:19:15,819 --> 00:19:17,589 you'll establish that TLS session with 495 00:19:17,589 --> 00:19:19,480 Google front end great no problem 496 00:19:19,480 --> 00:19:21,519 then you're going to establish your own 497 00:19:21,519 --> 00:19:24,759 qtd session over TLS to do that you're 498 00:19:24,759 --> 00:19:26,589 going to use username and password from 499 00:19:26,589 --> 00:19:28,659 MQTT so you're not using the mutual loss 500 00:19:28,659 --> 00:19:31,058 at this point you're just establish your 501 00:19:31,058 --> 00:19:33,579 TLS session that's it my name qtt 502 00:19:33,579 --> 00:19:35,829 session has user name and password to 503 00:19:35,829 --> 00:19:38,409 connect statement of your qtt has user 504 00:19:38,409 --> 00:19:40,329 name password username is actually not 505 00:19:40,329 --> 00:19:41,919 used we don't you can put anything you 506 00:19:41,919 --> 00:19:44,079 want in there you say ignore or empty 507 00:19:44,079 --> 00:19:44,858 doesn't matter 508 00:19:44,858 --> 00:19:47,950 the password is actually not a password 509 00:19:47,950 --> 00:19:51,220 it's a it's a jot token a JSON web token 510 00:19:51,220 --> 00:19:53,200 that has has a bunch of information 511 00:19:53,200 --> 00:19:55,538 about the device the device ID all of 512 00:19:55,538 --> 00:19:58,569 that that is signed by the private key 513 00:19:58,569 --> 00:20:00,909 so encrypted and signed by the private 514 00:20:00,909 --> 00:20:03,759 key of the device with a little crypto I 515 00:20:03,759 --> 00:20:05,230 showed you earlier that crypto is 516 00:20:05,230 --> 00:20:07,058 capable of signing that job I could 517 00:20:07,058 --> 00:20:07,960 although all the 518 00:20:07,960 --> 00:20:09,730 to do it without crypto so it's very 519 00:20:09,730 --> 00:20:12,009 easy to do you sign that jut with your 520 00:20:12,009 --> 00:20:13,990 private key and you pass it as your 521 00:20:13,990 --> 00:20:16,390 password that jut will be valid from 522 00:20:16,390 --> 00:20:19,509 whatever you want to 24 hours maximum so 523 00:20:19,509 --> 00:20:21,789 you will have to rotate every 24 hours 524 00:20:21,789 --> 00:20:25,299 at minimum so that jar is signed and 525 00:20:25,299 --> 00:20:28,720 passed to IOT core IOT core we'll look 526 00:20:28,720 --> 00:20:30,460 at the device ID we'll find the public 527 00:20:30,460 --> 00:20:32,829 key and validate that the private 528 00:20:32,829 --> 00:20:34,599 signature that the signature from the 529 00:20:34,599 --> 00:20:36,940 private key is actually valid and here 530 00:20:36,940 --> 00:20:38,589 you go you have your device ident 531 00:20:38,589 --> 00:20:41,170 occation so using that system you get 532 00:20:41,170 --> 00:20:43,750 mutual authentication from both cloud 533 00:20:43,750 --> 00:20:47,079 and device without using the TLS mutual 534 00:20:47,079 --> 00:20:51,940 of feature we support ECC and RSA on IOT 535 00:20:51,940 --> 00:20:54,250 core and that crypto that I showed you 536 00:20:54,250 --> 00:20:58,809 can do both as well little schematic to 537 00:20:58,809 --> 00:21:00,849 bring it to life we have the provisioner 538 00:21:00,849 --> 00:21:03,460 the provisioner is a person is a company 539 00:21:03,460 --> 00:21:07,930 we will buy the chips from from 540 00:21:07,930 --> 00:21:10,630 microchip microchip will configure those 541 00:21:10,630 --> 00:21:12,849 keys with your CA and your certificates 542 00:21:12,849 --> 00:21:14,799 the private key is inside the public is 543 00:21:14,799 --> 00:21:17,049 passed to you the provisioner will run 544 00:21:17,049 --> 00:21:20,019 that script to put all the public keys 545 00:21:20,019 --> 00:21:22,029 in device manager all the public keys 546 00:21:22,029 --> 00:21:23,650 are put there the device are not even 547 00:21:23,650 --> 00:21:24,940 created but all the public is already 548 00:21:24,940 --> 00:21:28,240 there the device the crypto is passed on 549 00:21:28,240 --> 00:21:30,759 the device burned on it the device wakes 550 00:21:30,759 --> 00:21:33,099 up for the first time creates the jot 551 00:21:33,099 --> 00:21:36,099 signs the drug with the crypto connects 552 00:21:36,099 --> 00:21:38,859 to the broker the jar is verified we 553 00:21:38,859 --> 00:21:41,230 already have the public keys there we're 554 00:21:41,230 --> 00:21:45,599 all good to go it works so that's 555 00:21:45,599 --> 00:21:47,650 basically doing that you've solved all 556 00:21:47,650 --> 00:21:50,619 of your problems so it's really it's 557 00:21:50,619 --> 00:21:53,619 really nice so why not TLS mutual law 558 00:21:53,619 --> 00:21:57,279 why using jar instead first thing is you 559 00:21:57,279 --> 00:21:59,289 achieve mutual authentication with dot 560 00:21:59,289 --> 00:22:02,259 and TLS both so you will achieve the 561 00:22:02,259 --> 00:22:03,990 same level authentication of 562 00:22:03,990 --> 00:22:06,279 authentication and security with both 563 00:22:06,279 --> 00:22:09,880 solution the benefit are that the TLS 564 00:22:09,880 --> 00:22:12,099 attack is much smaller all you need is 565 00:22:12,099 --> 00:22:14,049 establish the TLS session with the cloud 566 00:22:14,049 --> 00:22:16,450 that's all you don't need to use the TLS 567 00:22:16,450 --> 00:22:19,089 the mutual loss section of that stack 568 00:22:19,089 --> 00:22:21,650 which make that stack much much smaller 569 00:22:21,650 --> 00:22:25,339 for example we've gone from 150 200k 570 00:22:25,339 --> 00:22:28,400 roughly to 10 K for the entire stacks 571 00:22:28,400 --> 00:22:29,990 that's a big difference especially for 572 00:22:29,990 --> 00:22:31,940 devices that often time have 32 K of 573 00:22:31,940 --> 00:22:34,039 memory or 64 K of memory you can't put a 574 00:22:34,039 --> 00:22:35,960 full TLS stack in it you have to use a 575 00:22:35,960 --> 00:22:37,819 different solution this is what it 576 00:22:37,819 --> 00:22:40,069 brings you you can bring as much smaller 577 00:22:40,069 --> 00:22:42,559 stack the speed is faster because you 578 00:22:42,559 --> 00:22:43,849 don't have to do that whole new 579 00:22:43,849 --> 00:22:46,009 handshake and mutual off every time you 580 00:22:46,009 --> 00:22:47,750 establish the TLS session all you have 581 00:22:47,750 --> 00:22:50,450 to do is one TLS boom username password 582 00:22:50,450 --> 00:22:52,250 you're done it's much faster less 583 00:22:52,250 --> 00:22:54,410 consuming in bandwidth there's no 584 00:22:54,410 --> 00:22:56,779 dependency on the TLS stack you use you 585 00:22:56,779 --> 00:22:59,210 do not have to use a special TLS stack 586 00:22:59,210 --> 00:23:02,119 that's optimized that has mu2 alot 587 00:23:02,119 --> 00:23:04,099 optimized and all that you can use any 588 00:23:04,099 --> 00:23:05,960 TLS tack you want open source ones are 589 00:23:05,960 --> 00:23:08,089 very good because the only thing you use 590 00:23:08,089 --> 00:23:10,640 is the TLS session with your cloud so 591 00:23:10,640 --> 00:23:12,589 that's less dependent if you have to 592 00:23:12,589 --> 00:23:15,289 update the TLS stack at some point from 593 00:23:15,289 --> 00:23:16,700 one point two to one point three for 594 00:23:16,700 --> 00:23:19,220 example your code is not dependent on 595 00:23:19,220 --> 00:23:21,529 that tli stack the fact that you use a 596 00:23:21,529 --> 00:23:23,690 crypto is not dependent on that TLS tag 597 00:23:23,690 --> 00:23:26,450 so the upgrade of the TLS that gets much 598 00:23:26,450 --> 00:23:30,230 easier much less risk much less testing 599 00:23:30,230 --> 00:23:33,289 to be done supports crypto because your 600 00:23:33,289 --> 00:23:35,480 code does it not the TLS stack no 601 00:23:35,480 --> 00:23:38,299 dependency again the ease of evolution 602 00:23:38,299 --> 00:23:40,970 or the stack as I said there's no no 603 00:23:40,970 --> 00:23:42,079 validation of your code your code 604 00:23:42,079 --> 00:23:43,430 doesn't change you can change the tear 605 00:23:43,430 --> 00:23:44,809 cycle you want your car's gonna be the 606 00:23:44,809 --> 00:23:46,279 same it's gonna generate the dot sign it 607 00:23:46,279 --> 00:23:48,200 put it as a password in MQTT Connect 608 00:23:48,200 --> 00:23:51,049 very easy and then how do you support 609 00:23:51,049 --> 00:23:54,170 multiple certificate here with card IT 610 00:23:54,170 --> 00:23:57,680 core you can use up to 3 certificate so 611 00:23:57,680 --> 00:24:00,799 3 public keys per device Valley public 612 00:24:00,799 --> 00:24:02,390 keys per device so what you'll do is you 613 00:24:02,390 --> 00:24:04,789 have your public key you want to rotate 614 00:24:04,789 --> 00:24:06,380 it you'll create a second public key 615 00:24:06,380 --> 00:24:09,349 you'll put it there you will relent ik 8 616 00:24:09,349 --> 00:24:11,329 you will also enjoy with the first one 617 00:24:11,329 --> 00:24:13,490 download you know all the information 618 00:24:13,490 --> 00:24:16,309 you need for using the second key then 619 00:24:16,309 --> 00:24:18,019 rotate because both can be used at the 620 00:24:18,019 --> 00:24:20,240 same time and then you'll invalidate the 621 00:24:20,240 --> 00:24:21,980 first one so you could do those rotation 622 00:24:21,980 --> 00:24:23,990 up to 3 keys at the same time and you 623 00:24:23,990 --> 00:24:26,240 could do those rotation very easily it's 624 00:24:26,240 --> 00:24:27,890 much harder to do with the material off 625 00:24:27,890 --> 00:24:29,900 because the TLS tag has to know where 626 00:24:29,900 --> 00:24:31,460 the certificates are etc because you're 627 00:24:31,460 --> 00:24:34,759 again dependent on the TLS tag so by 628 00:24:34,759 --> 00:24:35,569 using the Judd 629 00:24:35,569 --> 00:24:39,259 touken and the signature with IOT core 630 00:24:39,259 --> 00:24:41,059 you're simplifying your life a whole 631 00:24:41,059 --> 00:24:46,940 bunch versus TLS mutual love for bigger 632 00:24:46,940 --> 00:24:49,250 devices there's an added layer security 633 00:24:49,250 --> 00:24:51,740 that you can use for MCU class devices 634 00:24:51,740 --> 00:24:53,390 you'll have to use whatever you know 635 00:24:53,390 --> 00:24:55,730 Mongoose OS or Express logic or any of 636 00:24:55,730 --> 00:24:58,430 the know zephyr from the Linux 637 00:24:58,430 --> 00:24:59,900 Foundation you should have used some of 638 00:24:59,900 --> 00:25:02,059 those but for larger devices that have 639 00:25:02,059 --> 00:25:06,920 CPU class processors you can use Android 640 00:25:06,920 --> 00:25:09,529 things Android things is the optimized 641 00:25:09,529 --> 00:25:12,829 version of Android for devices it is a 642 00:25:12,829 --> 00:25:15,019 secure OS from the ground up it is a 643 00:25:15,019 --> 00:25:18,349 full OS we will provide we as the Google 644 00:25:18,349 --> 00:25:21,730 will provide secure patches OS updates 645 00:25:21,730 --> 00:25:25,099 like we would do on your phone if you 646 00:25:25,099 --> 00:25:26,420 have an Android phone you get all those 647 00:25:26,420 --> 00:25:27,710 updates you don't have to really think 648 00:25:27,710 --> 00:25:29,720 about it versus if you have a linux 649 00:25:29,720 --> 00:25:31,190 server for example in the cloud and when 650 00:25:31,190 --> 00:25:32,539 the updates are available you have to go 651 00:25:32,539 --> 00:25:34,940 patch and update and maintain and test 652 00:25:34,940 --> 00:25:37,220 all that we do all that for you with 653 00:25:37,220 --> 00:25:39,759 Android things so you do not have to 654 00:25:39,759 --> 00:25:43,099 manage those those environments on your 655 00:25:43,099 --> 00:25:45,019 own Google will provide you the firmware 656 00:25:45,019 --> 00:25:46,940 update that the OS update the security 657 00:25:46,940 --> 00:25:49,400 patches and the infrastructure to deploy 658 00:25:49,400 --> 00:25:51,319 those though those patches to the 659 00:25:51,319 --> 00:25:53,809 devices through the same back-end that 660 00:25:53,809 --> 00:25:56,839 actually deploys updates to your Android 661 00:25:56,839 --> 00:26:00,349 phones it's a very battle tested back in 662 00:26:00,349 --> 00:26:03,440 those update processes have been used 663 00:26:03,440 --> 00:26:05,539 millions hundreds of millions of times 664 00:26:05,539 --> 00:26:08,180 already it's a very secure way to send 665 00:26:08,180 --> 00:26:10,339 those updates very secure way to have an 666 00:26:10,339 --> 00:26:11,359 OS that you don't have to worry about 667 00:26:11,359 --> 00:26:14,809 other benefits you can use Android 668 00:26:14,809 --> 00:26:16,400 developers to build apps on Android 669 00:26:16,400 --> 00:26:18,589 things it's the same IDE same language 670 00:26:18,589 --> 00:26:20,480 same same everything it's really the 671 00:26:20,480 --> 00:26:22,579 same as an Android device very easy to 672 00:26:22,579 --> 00:26:25,339 deploy an application you can run 673 00:26:25,339 --> 00:26:28,849 tensorflow models on android thing so 674 00:26:28,849 --> 00:26:31,579 run machine learning intelligence on the 675 00:26:31,579 --> 00:26:33,980 edge and you also have the cloud IOT 676 00:26:33,980 --> 00:26:36,380 connectivity as part of the u.s. so you 677 00:26:36,380 --> 00:26:38,269 can communicate with cloud IOT core in 678 00:26:38,269 --> 00:26:40,880 the cloud iot platform very easily by 679 00:26:40,880 --> 00:26:43,730 using android things so it's a good 680 00:26:43,730 --> 00:26:45,920 option the only downside of android 681 00:26:45,920 --> 00:26:47,559 things it's you have to use certified 682 00:26:47,559 --> 00:26:48,829 some 683 00:26:48,829 --> 00:26:51,710 so system on modules certified hardware 684 00:26:51,710 --> 00:26:54,950 that we have tested and validated to 685 00:26:54,950 --> 00:26:56,329 work with Android things so we have 686 00:26:56,329 --> 00:26:59,148 relationship with Qualcomm we then XP 687 00:26:59,148 --> 00:27:03,710 with arm I believe some others I can't 688 00:27:03,710 --> 00:27:06,409 remember exactly the full list but we 689 00:27:06,409 --> 00:27:08,028 have a bunch of modules like that and 690 00:27:08,028 --> 00:27:09,619 you can use and those are the only 691 00:27:09,619 --> 00:27:13,609 approved hardware or some that can be 692 00:27:13,609 --> 00:27:15,919 used by anything so the only downside so 693 00:27:15,919 --> 00:27:17,690 if it's possible for you to choose one 694 00:27:17,690 --> 00:27:18,950 of those everything is a great option 695 00:27:18,950 --> 00:27:20,390 otherwise you'd have to revert to 696 00:27:20,390 --> 00:27:23,569 something else and I believe that's 697 00:27:23,569 --> 00:27:25,069 about it if you want to know more about 698 00:27:25,069 --> 00:27:28,700 cada ot you can go in that simple URL 699 00:27:28,700 --> 00:27:32,929 cloud google.com slash IOT you'll find 700 00:27:32,929 --> 00:27:36,319 no sample code you'll find example 701 00:27:36,319 --> 00:27:38,089 documentation a little bit of an 702 00:27:38,089 --> 00:27:40,130 overview of the infrastructure I invite 703 00:27:40,130 --> 00:27:42,109 you to come to next it's in a couple 704 00:27:42,109 --> 00:27:43,429 weeks that's something you really want 705 00:27:43,429 --> 00:27:44,960 to see there's gonna be a lot of IOT 706 00:27:44,960 --> 00:27:48,500 talks over there and that's about it so 707 00:27:48,500 --> 00:27:51,230 stay tuned for the live Q&A we'll be 708 00:27:51,230 --> 00:28:00,558 back in less than a minute 709 00:28:00,558 --> 00:29:07,009 you 710 00:29:07,009 --> 00:29:10,079 hey welcome back for the Q&A around the 711 00:29:10,079 --> 00:29:12,900 security and IOT so we have a few 712 00:29:12,900 --> 00:29:14,819 questions from the audience here so I 713 00:29:14,819 --> 00:29:17,369 just look at that I like the use of a 714 00:29:17,369 --> 00:29:19,170 hardware root of trust but many of our 715 00:29:19,170 --> 00:29:21,210 customers don't have that in their 716 00:29:21,210 --> 00:29:24,359 current design what can they do that's a 717 00:29:24,359 --> 00:29:25,319 good question because I was emphasizing 718 00:29:25,319 --> 00:29:28,650 you know the use of hardware and it's 719 00:29:28,650 --> 00:29:30,089 true there's a lot of harder out there 720 00:29:30,089 --> 00:29:32,309 that don't have root of trust so how do 721 00:29:32,309 --> 00:29:34,410 we handle that so as if you're at first 722 00:29:34,410 --> 00:29:36,599 you don't have to use the root of trust 723 00:29:36,599 --> 00:29:38,130 you can still connect to IT core and 724 00:29:38,130 --> 00:29:40,410 benefit from the jaw authentication from 725 00:29:40,410 --> 00:29:42,750 the independence on the TLS stack and 726 00:29:42,750 --> 00:29:44,309 all the security of the backend so 727 00:29:44,309 --> 00:29:46,049 that's let's put it that way you can 728 00:29:46,049 --> 00:29:48,359 still use a clarity core without the 729 00:29:48,359 --> 00:29:50,849 root of trust that's totally fine if you 730 00:29:50,849 --> 00:29:52,829 don't have one but you want to add one 731 00:29:52,829 --> 00:29:54,029 to your design there's several ways to 732 00:29:54,029 --> 00:29:55,769 do that those little crypto I showed you 733 00:29:55,769 --> 00:29:57,390 that the microchip point for example use 734 00:29:57,390 --> 00:29:59,039 it I Square C as a protocol to 735 00:29:59,039 --> 00:30:02,400 communicate with node in the rest of the 736 00:30:02,400 --> 00:30:04,799 board the PCB it's on of course is very 737 00:30:04,799 --> 00:30:07,380 common on most devices and you'll find a 738 00:30:07,380 --> 00:30:09,630 lot of retrofit hardware that you can 739 00:30:09,630 --> 00:30:13,309 add to an I square C bus on the hardware 740 00:30:13,309 --> 00:30:16,200 either through a hat that you plug in 741 00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:18,569 there's a nice hat that exists on for 742 00:30:18,569 --> 00:30:20,400 PI's for example as an example put a hat 743 00:30:20,400 --> 00:30:22,920 it has the crypto on it you can use that 744 00:30:22,920 --> 00:30:25,289 to retrofit design and the cool thing 745 00:30:25,289 --> 00:30:27,539 about I square C is you can do it hot so 746 00:30:27,539 --> 00:30:28,799 you don't have to shut down the device 747 00:30:28,799 --> 00:30:30,569 that's pretty close you just add that 748 00:30:30,569 --> 00:30:33,059 crypto to existing devices other 749 00:30:33,059 --> 00:30:35,240 customers I've seen doing is they use 750 00:30:35,240 --> 00:30:37,589 communication chips so for example you 751 00:30:37,589 --> 00:30:39,029 have a device that's not connecting like 752 00:30:39,029 --> 00:30:42,029 a manufacturing you know a PLC on a 753 00:30:42,029 --> 00:30:44,430 manufacturing line that is not connected 754 00:30:44,430 --> 00:30:45,480 to the Internet they'll add a 755 00:30:45,480 --> 00:30:47,279 communication module and inside that 756 00:30:47,279 --> 00:30:49,170 communication module like a Wi-Fi or 757 00:30:49,170 --> 00:30:51,599 Ethernet you'll have a crypto already in 758 00:30:51,599 --> 00:30:53,099 there that you can start using and 759 00:30:53,099 --> 00:30:55,470 actually the encryption is all dealt by 760 00:30:55,470 --> 00:30:57,839 the communication devices itself not the 761 00:30:57,839 --> 00:31:01,529 MCU not the MCU or the CPU so that's a 762 00:31:01,529 --> 00:31:03,450 great way to also retrofit without 763 00:31:03,450 --> 00:31:05,460 touching the existing design just add 764 00:31:05,460 --> 00:31:07,079 the communication chip 765 00:31:07,079 --> 00:31:09,599 Wi-Fi internet whatever serial and then 766 00:31:09,599 --> 00:31:12,089 add the crypto that has the crypto 767 00:31:12,089 --> 00:31:13,470 embedded in it so that there are ways to 768 00:31:13,470 --> 00:31:17,700 do that it's mostly a retrofit world but 769 00:31:17,700 --> 00:31:19,170 it's easy to retrofit because of the 770 00:31:19,170 --> 00:31:20,009 ICRC Committee 771 00:31:20,009 --> 00:31:24,200 that's a very standard another question 772 00:31:24,200 --> 00:31:26,549 it still seems like the best way to 773 00:31:26,549 --> 00:31:30,000 secure devices is changing changing 774 00:31:30,000 --> 00:31:34,650 devices I assume should we wait until is 775 00:31:34,650 --> 00:31:36,539 there any reason for the customers to 776 00:31:36,539 --> 00:31:38,960 hold off any longer 777 00:31:38,960 --> 00:31:42,779 so I think the question here is more 778 00:31:42,779 --> 00:31:46,230 around we need to change everything to 779 00:31:46,230 --> 00:31:48,089 be secure but I don't think that's a 780 00:31:48,089 --> 00:31:49,319 good I think you shouldn't you shouldn't 781 00:31:49,319 --> 00:31:50,940 hold off I think you know if you're 782 00:31:50,940 --> 00:31:52,410 doing a design today if you put a 783 00:31:52,410 --> 00:31:54,240 hardware route of trust on it if you put 784 00:31:54,240 --> 00:31:56,160 a little creek though you're basically 785 00:31:56,160 --> 00:31:58,109 future proof you'll be able to update 786 00:31:58,109 --> 00:32:00,269 that hardware address if you need you'll 787 00:32:00,269 --> 00:32:01,829 be able to rely on that hardware route 788 00:32:01,829 --> 00:32:03,869 of trust to do a lot of security 789 00:32:03,869 --> 00:32:06,420 improvement like irritation new 790 00:32:06,420 --> 00:32:08,279 generation of certificates validation of 791 00:32:08,279 --> 00:32:11,430 boot firmware images and all of that so 792 00:32:11,430 --> 00:32:13,140 there's no and there's no reason to wait 793 00:32:13,140 --> 00:32:16,500 I think overall the security is there 794 00:32:16,500 --> 00:32:18,450 it's a matter of implementing it and 795 00:32:18,450 --> 00:32:20,670 we've seen that it could be complicated 796 00:32:20,670 --> 00:32:23,279 but with a solution with IOT core with 797 00:32:23,279 --> 00:32:24,359 the hardware root of trust in the 798 00:32:24,359 --> 00:32:25,859 partnership with microchip for example 799 00:32:25,859 --> 00:32:29,130 the those things are very much solved 800 00:32:29,130 --> 00:32:31,200 and there is solutions for security 801 00:32:31,200 --> 00:32:33,299 today and you shouldn't wait you 802 00:32:33,299 --> 00:32:35,250 shouldn't wait you can be secure pretty 803 00:32:35,250 --> 00:32:38,009 easily today if with the solutions we 804 00:32:38,009 --> 00:32:39,599 have out there so there's no reason to 805 00:32:39,599 --> 00:32:43,910 wait in terms of Christ you said sub $1 806 00:32:43,910 --> 00:32:46,230 this is still very expensive for small 807 00:32:46,230 --> 00:32:48,690 devices are there ways to lower this 808 00:32:48,690 --> 00:32:51,240 cost so yes about its sub dollar and it 809 00:32:51,240 --> 00:32:53,220 depends on on the volume obviously but 810 00:32:53,220 --> 00:32:56,730 it's not it's not over $1 depends on 811 00:32:56,730 --> 00:33:00,509 volume so I would say you know if you're 812 00:33:00,509 --> 00:33:03,180 looking at low-cost devices you know 813 00:33:03,180 --> 00:33:04,769 people that have bombs that are now 814 00:33:04,769 --> 00:33:09,210 maybe 20 30 bucks or even less that 815 00:33:09,210 --> 00:33:11,190 means you're already looking often time 816 00:33:11,190 --> 00:33:13,380 at fairly high volumes because otherwise 817 00:33:13,380 --> 00:33:16,049 you can't get those bombed down and that 818 00:33:16,049 --> 00:33:17,819 means that you're gonna get volume 819 00:33:17,819 --> 00:33:19,500 discounts as well on those chips so 820 00:33:19,500 --> 00:33:21,269 you'll be way lower than $1 so that's 821 00:33:21,269 --> 00:33:22,529 what this one thing to know if you have 822 00:33:22,529 --> 00:33:24,420 volume you know sub dollars as a 823 00:33:24,420 --> 00:33:26,640 guidance but you get volume discounts on 824 00:33:26,640 --> 00:33:29,339 that the other thing is you have to 825 00:33:29,339 --> 00:33:31,200 think about the cost holistically it's 826 00:33:31,200 --> 00:33:33,420 not just the cost of the bomb it's what 827 00:33:33,420 --> 00:33:34,150 it saves you 828 00:33:34,150 --> 00:33:38,799 Manufacturing cost in maintenance in no 829 00:33:38,799 --> 00:33:41,200 reputation cost a dollar amount lost 830 00:33:41,200 --> 00:33:44,170 through a hack that could happen and the 831 00:33:44,170 --> 00:33:45,880 ease of maintaining that over time 832 00:33:45,880 --> 00:33:48,339 there's a ton of costs maintaining 833 00:33:48,339 --> 00:33:49,630 things over time maintaining things 834 00:33:49,630 --> 00:33:52,150 secure over time that this little crypto 835 00:33:52,150 --> 00:33:55,539 sub dollar will solve for you and to in 836 00:33:55,539 --> 00:33:57,880 my opinion it is well worth it to spend 837 00:33:57,880 --> 00:33:59,890 that the bomb will be a little higher 838 00:33:59,890 --> 00:34:01,779 for your devices but it's so much 839 00:34:01,779 --> 00:34:05,170 cheaper overall holistically then you 840 00:34:05,170 --> 00:34:08,289 know then you can you can really see or 841 00:34:08,289 --> 00:34:11,829 get without it there are other questions 842 00:34:11,829 --> 00:34:15,219 and this coming up okay so I mean well 843 00:34:15,219 --> 00:34:17,110 stay tuned for the next session we have 844 00:34:17,110 --> 00:34:19,630 a siege at efficiently migrating data 845 00:34:19,630 --> 00:34:22,389 into the Google cloud platform which 846 00:34:22,389 --> 00:34:24,139 should be pretty interesting thank you