on I'm sparkle Wesley on the director academic outreach and research
at the National security college and it's a delight to have you all here
before we get started week knowledge
and celebrate the first Australians on whose traditional lands we made
and pay our respects to the elders of the normal people passed
and present China
is the biggest question that we face
in this region and in it and indeed the world
the choice is the China Mikes why the China develops
in the years and the decades ahead will be I believe
the single biggest influence up
up the outcome love the future for this country in our region
and so it's an enormous pleasure to invite one of this country's
my foremost China foreign policy analyst
Linda jacobsen to speak at this national security lecture tonight
to great pleasure because linda is someone whose work
and his views I admire enormously
and she's also a close personal friend she is
up the East Asia program dot director
at the low Institute before she
join the law institute in 2011 she
lived and worked in China for twenty years
she's published six books about china an East Asian societies
on on topics as diverse as Confucianism
and reform she's a Mandarin speaker
and has published extensively on China's
foreign and security policy the Taiwan Strait
China's energy security climate change
and science and technology policies prior to joining the low Institute
she served as the director of the China and global security program
and senior researcher at the Stockholm international
Peace Research Institute Sikri between 1998
in 2009 she worked for the Finnish Institute on international affairs
she was a fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in
1990
the finish edition of the book a million troops a decade in China
when the Finnish government publication award pursue pre
policy paper new follow foreign policy actors in China
the truly revolutionary piece of work which I'm
command to love you was awarded an alibi
in 2010 ladies and gentlemen please join me
in welcoming India curbs he
thank you Michael for that very generous introduction
thank you to to Michaels Michael the strange and also Michael Wesley
for the invitation to speak tonight it's really a pleasure
an honor to be here at the national security college
and it's my first public lecture in camera though
I've now been exactly two years in Australia so
a first for me a.m.
I've divided my
presentation tonight into three parts I'm hoping that it might
a little bit shed light on China's
on policy dilemma the first question I'm gonna talk about
is why is it so difficult for us outsiders to understand
China's on policy and the second question is what are the objectives
Aug china's foreign policy and 30 then
to the short term what all the near-term
biggest challenges in foreign policy for China
so first to this question why is it so difficult boss outsiders to understand
china's foreign policy I'm I think
we all recognize how important understanding the foreign policy if
China is to the world
as Michael already mentioned its someone up there
biggest questions that confront us how China
as a major economical political military power
is going to shape the region how it's going to use its power
and of course today its global outreach
stretches to just about if me corner of the PLO
a.m. we never feel
that we really get it when we think about china's foreign policy
in fact way often mostly confused I what they call
their foreign policy and I think this several reasons
and all go through them one by one
5th fleet despite all the changes that have taken place in China today
we should never forget that decision making in China
remains opaque I'm the country's
fall more open then it was just
ten years ago but still the pivotal
decisions in China I made by the police duo
Standing Committee no all-powerful Grouplove
seven men there's no public information about when they meet
and let alone what they have decided at these meetings
I like to say that here in Australia or in any country
which calls itself a democracy we are comfortable saying that China has a
great
impact on our economic well-being will go as far to say that where quite
dependent
on China's economic growth continuing but we
find it rather uncomfortable to say at all well being
our prosperity is dependent on decisions made by
7 men of the Chinese Communist Party who make decisions
without any transparency or accountability
except perhaps to them each other and
about just two had insult to injury
they and profess to believe in marxist leninism
martyrdom thought we don't like those kind
have to the second reason why where
often confused by china's foreign policy
is that today there are so many actors
who try and influence Chinese foreign policy
than they were five to 10 years ago Michael
mentioned the report that I wrote while I'm still it's a prequel the new
foreign policy actors have China in that report
I describe that the divers suffocation
of Chinese society on the one hand coupled with
the intense internationalization of China
on the other hand has led to numerous
group both within the official establishment of China
and also groups on the margins up that establishment
wanting to striving to influence foreign policy
decision-making so they are the official actors
I'm party organs government ministries
plae units there there official on policy actors in is
many more them today because of China's global outreach than there were
five to 10 years ago and then they are these actors on the margins
in that report iight identify for very important
actors on the margins they are the CEO's a
large resource companies am especially the oil and gas companies
they are the provincial leaders in provinces
which are along the coast knows that have prospered
the most from economic changes in China
they are the medicines who are increasingly
forceful in their opinions about what Chinese foreign policy should look like
and sometimes do indeed
have an impact on decision making and then the fourth group
is a group by Paul the intellectuals who have
for one reason or another some connection to the top leaders
day to today are more and more influential
in that report I identified three trends and I just briefly
with one sentence explain them first the wall
decision-making even in foreign policy formulation has become factored in China
second be don't know group questions
that China must continue to open up must continue to reform
there are certain me different interpretations
about what degree I'm internationalization
China should pursue and thirdly which is most pertinent for
this evening's discussion about china's foreign policy dilemma
there are and increasing number actors
who would like to see china be more assertive
in its foreign and security policy now I hope that
report three years ago these trends have all continued
in the last three years and based on research I've done over the past two
years at say this third factor
the fact that before it was more groups on the margins who were advocating for
China to taking
and more staunch stance when he came to dealing with the United States
or China's neighbors today that's
a growing trend it's a strengthening trend and I'll get back to that
as I move forward then thirdly
one of the reasons that we are confused and have a difficult time
understanding Chinese foreign policy is that the people who actually
run Chinese foreign policy appears on a day-to-day basis
are not powerful leaders up the Communist Party
and there's a contradiction there we think china's foreign policy
is extremely important but if you look at their
party status the men who are in charge upon
policy today in China they are merely members have the food
most powerful who I'll Chinese Communist Party members
so at the very top you have the seven Politburo Standing Committee members
and you have the twenty-plus politburo the in large politburo
and under them the third tier the power structure is the Central Committee
which has two hundred members now
the man in charge the state councilor he's called in charge a foreign affairs
he's merely
a central committee member so is the foreign minister
and they can be outweighed in any discussion
outranked in any part a call by any
up to 20 Politburo members so they are not
powerful party members and in China
the party is the place that wields power
now pivotal foreign policy decisions
I made then by the polluter you're standing committee the seven-member
small committee which is headed by Xi Jinping
certainly Xi Jinping and his six fellow colleagues
a much more experienced in foreign policy
then their fetuses were ten years ago
there's no doubt that they've been groomed also
in the alum a foreign policy she will
be the one who makes that final decisions on any
really controversial foreign policy issue on
issues the deal with the United States he'll be certainly assisted
by one sheesh on whose on the Pluto Standing Committee
a.m. the new Premio the number two now
in the party here are key leakage on will be mostly
responsible for decisions about Europe and younger John
who by the way is the only pollute bill standing committee member who has ever
lived aboard he's lived in Pyongyang for one year
am he will be I think pivotal when we come
to north korea I mention this about junk the junk
not only to am get everyone to smile a little
I see it because is certainly a disconnect
between China's leaders the very top leaders
and boss groups have a leaps in China today
one can say they have been millions and millions of Chinese
over the last thirty years who have lived abroad studied abroad
worked aboard and so its interesting
the seven men who lead China while the most powerful in China
have this gap in perception of the outside world and
of the west in particular compared to so many elite
who have spent at least a year aboard
during their lifetime and then finally
I'm the fourth reason why
Chinese foreign policy is sometimes so confusing
is because as I mentioned already in my previous point
foreign policy is not a top priority
for China's leaders its domestic problems immense challenges the China's
leaders have
which preoccupies them the simply have to concentrate
on keeping economic growth going
to stay in power this is a prerequisite for the Chinese comment
this party to stay in power so farm policy
is not what Xi Jinping things about when he wakes up every morning
it's much more questions of how to keep the economy growing
or how to be crease to be a air and water pollution
how to increase social welfare how to create jobs
how to decrease the social injustices in society which
cause so much dissatisfaction
she has about five years
the first term that he will be general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
to make progress on these domestic reforms
Chinese people themselves are extremely worried
about the future of their country this is something that often
doesn't come out in a lot of analysis of China today
Chinese elite during the last
12 to 18 months and I go back to china very regularly
are fixated with the question of how are we going to move forward how are we
going to deal with these immense challenges how is she doing being going
to muster
the political will to deal with financial restructurings
creating jobs and so on so the end quite worried
about the future while we from the outside see this rising giant
and worry about how China is going to use its power
but from the inside China actually or Chinese people perceive China
at the moment to being quite weak and of course this disconnect
between how we perceive China and how they
themselves to see themselves is one of the reasons why it's so difficult to
to always understand China's foreign policy
then to the next parks have my talk tonight and that was the question ok
what off to all are the objectives
of china's foreign policy officially these objectives have been stated
in several official documents and
the Communist Party sees as the goals
on foreign policy 21 insure
at the party stays in power they say
the job is to ensure political stability
but when asked to explain that it is very explicitly said
that the aim of China's diplomacy and foreign policy is to keep
the chinese communist power party in power secondly
it should defend sovereignty and territorial integrity
as well as seek to reunify the motherland which is a reference to
taiwan
and the reunification up the mainland and Taiwan
and thirdly to ensure economic development
I'm I think the second objective to defend
sovereignty and territorial integrity
is what we have seen china pursue much more assertively
during the last three to four years we will continue to see
China assertively defend sovereignty or what
least China perceives as its someone territory
and hopefully if time allows at the end of my talk
I could go into the question a core interests which has been
a focus at least the international media over the last few weeks
what of tall is a core interest that China
how does china itself did find it
and is for example the South China Sea or the East China Sea
a quart interest for China obviously these three
officially stated objectives a somewhat
ambiguous I think they're intended to be and of course obviously this sometimes
in conflict with each other and hence
the confusion over what China is actually hoping to achieve
with its foreign policy actions and
unstated but very important
underlying objective of china's foreign policy
is to ensure the China returns
to its rightful place at the center of the world
as a great nation which is respected and bestowed
dignity by Others I'm
one has to remember that off to all the communist party came to power
in 1949 vowing China will never again
be subjugated and humiliated by foreigners
and today it's not only schoolchildren who what what this
citizens adult I'm reminded of this
just about every month by a new book biannual article by a new museum
exhibition
a theme park a theater play and so on
all these describe the suffering up the Chinese people
at the hands of the Japanese and Westerners doing that
eighteen hundreds in the first half of nineteen hundreds
soap china continues to crave respected a
many Chinese officials who are spoken to over the lost
five to eight years continuously
say that they're disappointed that China's contribute shins
over the last thirty years the reform period contributions to global
prosperity
and also stability on never acknowledged
sufficiently by outsiders yet again
another disconnect Chinese officials often feel
we the outsiders don't showing up
acknowledgment they mean gratitude I'm for what china has done
to keep the economy going and to keep the region
stable this brings me very briefly to the
concept of China dream I'm
Xi Jinping has now point this notion
and he's repeatedly used the China dream in many of his speeches
it's this aspiration are restoring
national dignity of to this entry
of national humiliation and he's put it into these two words
China green basically I think one can say the concept signifies
the need to continue to modernize china the need
for China to continue to regain its national
comprehensive strength which is a very Chinese concept but that's what they say
about their own power
its national Comprehensive string this concept of
rejuvenation is of course by known means new
but it's come alive again and because she has
spoken about it so many times it's a very colloquial
I'm expression obviously much easier for
a lot of people to comprehend and understand
than for example the three represents of James a min
and he made it very clear that this would be
his slogan because already on the very first day
a of the he had become general secretary am
after the closing of the 18th Nash national
party congress in november he took his fellow
Politburo Standing Committee members to the National Museum in Beijing
and they visited the exhibition road to revival
and he spoke today a about the China green
hopefully in the Q&A with and have some more time to discuss
this China dream because it's an intricate part up at the moment what one
would say
the Chinese psyche and then lastly
to the question of the short term challenges the
China today faces at China's short term foreign policy challenges
I name for them relations with the United States
relations with Japan relations with Southeast Asian countries especially
those which
China today has sovereignty disputes over in the east
no South China Sea and then north korea not only of course
Beijing's relations with Pyongyang but the whole
North Korean I'm nuclear
program and the Korean Peninsula dilemma which
has been troubling Beijing
tokyo seoul and Washington i'm for at least the last
two decades a.m. first to the question of China's relations with the United
States
the media likes to always tell us how much strategic distrust there is between
these two giants
certainly davis' an ample amount of that
but bombing a blow-up over the Senkaku
the OU islands which are come to in the East China Sea
I think that she will do his utmost to
pursue constructive relations with Washington
these two countries are highly into the pendant
it's in both have the interest it's in the interest of both countries
certainly also Obama for this relationship
to continue in a constructive manner
I'm the relationship is also today much more
mature and it was just five to 10 years ago
I'll give you two examples a year ago
I'm we had to crisis is the first one was born she lies police chief
a.m. escaping to the console
consulate at the United States asking for political asylum
when he had fallen out with more she lie and
now we know the disgraced Chongqing party chief
a.m. this happened on the eve a vice president then-vice President Xi
Jinping's
very important trip to the United States
the fact that this was somehow dealt with
and didn't cause any interruption to xi Jinping's visit to the United States
but also didn't really cause any tensions between China and the United
States
am is a sign in my opinion %uh the maturity
of the relations on how father to countries have come
to dealing with these sudden
incidents which could turn into a crisis in a flash
the second example is the flight
although yes the flight up the blind activist
a.m. Chen who went to the US Embassy in Beijing
this was on the eve of the strategic dialogue between the United States and
China
Hillary Clinton was just about to arrive in Beijing a very important
moment in the relationship again the two countries were able to deal
with this incident in a way that didn't in any way
damage the relationship so there is a maturity
which I'm cautiously optimistic about
and I do think the indeed dependence between the two countries
is often overlooked when we talk about the strategic
distrust now what's going to happen twenty to thirty years down the line
is not something that I'm not referring to I don't think any of us
should even try and predict what's going to happen twenty to thirty years down
the line because it's impossible to predict
what kind a power China is going to develop into
and how China will deal with these
domestic challenges which I briefly mentioned early on
then coming to the relationship between China and Japan
I'm as we know lost September
a.m. the so-called sank a call now you island
dispute flared up again why because the japanese
central government decided to by of
a.m. the private owner 3 up the disputed islands
and this caused widespread protests all over
China Japanese citizens were beaten up
Japanese businesses were attacked a.m. it was really
quite an ugly scene there was a real outburst of nationalism
obviously with the quiet blessing up the leadership because
one doesn't demonstrate in China well that many weeks without the blessing
up the Communist Party now
we simply I've been reading analysis
by Westerners who put the entire blame
of tensions increasing escalating
on china this is a dispute where they are to
guilty parties both parties are
guilty to escalation of tension
I'm Japan chose to
purchase the japanese government chose to
purchase the island at a very
sensitive time for China if they had only
of the private owner given him a bit more money
a.m. to put of the official announcement of the deal to March of this year
it would have still caused an eruption up tensions but it wouldn't ab
I think at least & Poor's the crisis that we
see as a ongoing crisis at the moment between China and Japan
everyone knows the better months leading up to a leadership transition
in China a very sensitive and it was a very
inappropriate time to and purchase the islands now the japanese government for
its part
was actually just trying to stop ultra
nationalistic Tokyo governor from purchasing those islands and thinking it
was doing a good deed
a.m. but the timing was most unfortunate
and very interestingly the Prime Minister of Japan at the time
nada has acknowledged that the timing could have been better
well we have escalated tensions we have law enforcement agency bezels
and aircraft nearly on a daily basis
today I'm patrolling these disputed islands why
Japan does not acknowledge that these islands are
disputed put end of story
be do not acknowledge that their is any dispute
China again sees them as disputed territory
and seized the central government all Japan
change the status quo the status quo which was really
agreed-upon 30 two years ago
a when China and Japan establish diplomatic relations
that let this issue be we won't touch it
will leave it to future generations and that's how we're going to manage
the disputed islands so this change in status quo in the eyes of Beijing
was very serious and now they feel that they need to
assert sovereignty and that's why they send a lot of course meant
vessels out to their area that's white Japan of course
understandably also responds by sending its own
that risk of an incident is extremely high
I'm an incident could easily spiral
out of control causing a real crisis
for my part I am cautiously optimistic
that both she and Prime Minister Arbor want to avoid at any cost
I'm this crisis because it is an ongoing crisis one can say as long as these
two countries send their patrol boats out an aircraft that
out to today the island they really want to see this crisis
managed in a way that would not escalate to
for example up armed conflict I think
the interdependence also between China and Japan is a huge factor here
not only for Japan but also for China and Japanese companies employ hundreds
of thousands of Chinese workers
I think the both leaders are well aware of the risks involved in this
crisis getting out of hand how it's going to be resolved
I cannot say but certainly this is a real test pushy Jinping
he cannot look weak he cannot give in to Japan
nor can opt are they cannot look weak either and
and pushy Jinping now is the new communist party leader
any move that would be seen as a concession
to Japan means that he is not standing up
and as a dignified the communist party leader
so that certainly going to be a tightrope
which is probably one of the most crucial love you have to walk in the
next
18 to 24 months the same pertains of course to the South China Sea
am they as I have written in a recent lowey Institute
analysis I see the weaker countries are Philippines and Vietnam
being in a very difficult position to fend off China's assertiveness
here we're really talking about Giants against smaller
weaker parties and the economic damage
that to confined military conflict would
inflict upon China if there was a military conflict between
the Philippines and China or Vietnam and China would be much smaller to china
than for example
a conflict with Japan and that's why I am worried
added Xi Jinping is put against the wall to show his nationalist
credentials it would be in the South China Sea that he would
show force I'm
Xi Jinping could also a surprise us all
and agreed to multi lateral negotiations even if he dragged them on
forever and ever but at least to agree to the principal
of binding a way to manage
the disputes over the South China Sea their sovereignty disputes they
concern these islands around which they are known
am both oil gas another minimal resources
he hasn't given any indication that he would
do this it would be a game changer in the South China Sea
but I do think the China is very away
up the damage it has done to itself over the last three to four years
in Southeast Asia after all over 15 years
with very skillful diplomacy they bill Kopp I'm
good relations with just about every Southeast Asian country
and this goodwill has all but vanished
because of the assertive behavior mostly above the law enforcement agencies
in China so I think we're going to see Xi Jinping putting effort
into Southeast Asia and restarting
so to speak a diplomatic charm offensive
and then lost the North Korea I'm
I like to begin any thing I say about North Korea with the statement that no
one
knows what's going on in north korea and anyone who tells you that they do
is lying we don't no what's going on in north korea
the Chinese are extremely exasperated and baby
if anyone have had am a lot of dealings
over the decades with the north koreans I think for China
the principal I love no war
no instability and no nukes this has been a mantra for
a number of years now will hold I
belong to the camp if you've been following this issue
a that does not see a fundamental change in china's policies towards north korea
what does this mean no war no instability no nukes it means that yes
they don't want
nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula but it's only number three
in priority the second one no instability
still overrides the concern
about nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula
I'm China has a lot to lose at least in the eyes of Beijing
if they would be and serious instability
in north korea if they were tens of millions of people
and dislocated because of a collapse of the North Korean regime
China rightfully asks why shouldn't South Korea
turn off the taps now South Korea doesn't
and supply fuel to north korea like the Chinese do which is the pivotal
am card in beijing's hand but
they do provide aid they do provide money and Dave
until last week had a very I'm
for the north koreans lucrative joint venture going on
occasional so I don't see
though in the last couple of months we've seen some analysis to that extent
real change in not by china's position towards north korea they will continue
to somehow balance between
the expectations all their neighbors and the United States
to put pressure on Pyongyang they will continue to put pressure
but I don't see them coming off for example fuel and causing
a collapse of the north korean regime I think
that fear instability is ingrained
in Chinese leaders am quite a few
are the standing committee members at present
have sued a in northeast China
and they've been part of that consistency planned making
if north korea regime collapses and they are millions have
refugees coming over the border I don't think they're going to
and easily be swayed by Xi Jinping even if he
was about opinion that China is going to get seriously tough
with north korea I think we I'm going to have this problem
around for a long long time to come
now in conclusion am
China's foreign policy as I view it will not
become proactive it will continue
to be reactive as it has been already
for some years now I think a genuine
concern that I have is that inattention
to foreign policy by the top leaders
good lead to a crisis occurring you
to the actions of numerous
foreign policy actors and this case of course I mean
official foreign policy actors I'm
they are as I already mentioned numerous groupings within the establishment and
certainly outside the establishment
who would like to see china take a much more forceful stance
who are the opinion that for thirty years now during the whole reform period
China has always swallowed and agreed to the terms
that have been given to them by the United States and others
and now China has shown it's irresponsible
power doing that global financial crisis especially
and China should be setting the Thames
up in gage mint China should be setting the agenda
I think this is a China we're going to see in the short term
balancing tween its desperate need
to have a benign peaceful environment but at the same time
managing the expectations of the elites
the pushing Xi Jinping and his fellow leaders
to a much more forceful a Chinese foreign policy
thank you he
thank you you'd
just my life hip
or them net up
I might stop
you you might mention 19 effect
you about and thank you for reminding me I
was looking at the clock and I knew I had to stop but I did promise to get
back to this question up or interests
and of course it's been in that papers and
recently because the fun ministry spokesman
person I'm blurted out
that of course this this is not a direct quote but I'm paraphrasing
of course there the Al you Islands are bought
of China's core interests and every China watcher
from every part of the globe went ballistic into ok so now it's official
that's how you ought part of China's core interests
it is too she said so you can go and look at the YouTube
but the official transcription Aug
the press conference had omitted
this sentence so let me state that
they are you have not been declared a core interest
of China I think it was a human ever as I've said to a few other people who have
lost me this
I mean how many times has the white house pressed
spokesman had to retract something that he or she said
I mean human beings on to questions am
perhaps a little on unofficially and she blurted this out meaning that
I'm the DL you is sovereign territory of China
and protecting sovereignty is of course a poor interest
so I mean I don't think china has changed it's going to strum
the ones I mentioned keeping the pot party in power protecting sovereignty
and ensuring economic development but as I said
they're very ambiguous and of course sometimes intention with each other
but having said that because up the divers suffocation of Chinese society
not only have the numbers ok
actors increased immensely but also what you're allowed to write about
discuss debate even in the open source domain
so there are lots o elites who have them own
spokespeople in be searches in
media representatives sometimes even in public
intellectuals who are pressing the government to define
I'm some into issues in South China Sea and in the East China Sea that they are
using Google
dispute as a core interests and some other quite influential in fact plae
uniformed officers have said that they should be a core interests
so eat it confuses us when his one-party state
I'm which supposedly is run by one-party
the communist and party I'm family allows all this discussion
influential authoritative people saying things that are not
in the pocket doctrine but the work reported the party congress in november
makes it very clear
that those all the three going to stand out add to that one Dusun
Beijing University why hold very
high in my Portman I think about strategic
thinkers who I influential who have access to the top leadership
he wrote in foreign affairs is in
March able and 2011
that besides the tie one question China has never defined
any foreign policy issue as a core interest and you very much
in an interesting way specifies how keeping the party in power
is be call interest seems to have
going out of its way to a normally virtually
every actor has a relationship we've you know
Philippines viet name my life Asia
Japan India
truly tactically few the walleyes
you might have missed im stuck to the same thing
but take them one at a time your
gang up on them with other people why is it so tired am
what happened
starting at the end of 2009
and could be summed up call Oakley by what you said am
China went out of its way to annoy one country after
the other and I'm just gonna frost
reverse us back to November 2009 am
from the China's from China's porn Tube You the Obama first visit to China as
president of the united states was
extremely successful they managed to get the United States to sign a document
where
it said United States should respect China's
call interest so we come back to this question of coal interest
this was a real diplomatic
big tree for China I might add the United States has
certainly regretted am that statement
since a.m. but it was also at the time just remember where we were with her
global financial crisis China
its its it it came to the realization that mike got
the world really does need us and we should show
our power but at the same time it's not bad lean your
here I think there was a lot up inattention
by the senior leadership which is now slightly shown
signs of changing under Xi Jinping with the restructuring of the government
which took place
at the National People's Congress in March and I can come back to that but
he i think is very aware of the inattention by the senior leadership
and there was a lot of actions by
these foreign policy actors especially in that we all know
maritime security in which they didn't break any rules and they didn't
certainly defy
any orders but Chinese language per se is very
inaccurate and directives that come from the central to the provinces
and will lower a very be
to say the least so one can nearly justified
any action am under the
for example banner of protecting national sovereignty these
actors at the local level did a lot of harm to china's
international reputation diplomatic efforts in southeast asia like I
mentioned
by being party to many of these Matt I'm incidence
saudis Pato China kicking itself in the shins
can be explained in my opinion in those days
by degree in attention from a senior leadership
now as I mentioned I'm Xi Jinping
by blessing the restructuring up the government
three months ago and putting all these maritime law enforcement agencies on the
one
come on we don't yet know is under one come on
we know that and they have been put under the
administration a1 agency but it remains to be seen other fleets actually under
one command
I think there is a acknowledgement by the top leadership
that inattention is a recipe for disaster
and and they do need to pay more attention but winding themselves out of
this without looking weak
without in any way showing that others are putting pressure on China to change
their policies
is a real balancing act like I said and if I may I'll just give one example
which hasn't been written about
am last year suddenly those outcry from the Philippines and Vietnam
that new passports that work being carried by Chinese PRC citizens
am had a map with the disputed territory
as China's territory and while for understandable reasons
this course the great outcry throughout Southeast Asian
well I've started looking into this and it so happens
it's there public security ministry which issues possible what
they had not not only consulted they had not even informed
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about this am I have
three sources who said that the pot farm Minister Yang Jiechi at the time was
furious when he heard about it official
passports are issued by the Foreign Ministry so
officials traveling do not have that controversial map
in there possible but normal citizens continue to
have that how what could she Jinping do in that situation say that this was a
mistake
that it's not all sovereign territory while China has always said that
everything in
side the nine dashed line is this woman territory sows
to revoke a decision by a ministry or
a provincial government or municipal government is much more tricky
than of course trying to get it never
to happen in the first place but thats the inefficiency
are the chinese bureaucracy that the have very little communication
and they are different actors pursuing
their own interest they have competing agendas many of these
ministries
thank you China's obviously critical
happen in Erica nomic relationships and if we go back a couple have used to the
case
student who it seems that Australia and China were talking past each other
well what constitutes national security and what constitutes other elements have
business intelligence collection and so on
what lessons do you draw read at the Stern Hu case unrelated cases
which might have an impact on your future economic relations with china
that's a very good question I'm all
immediately say the numb don't think I'm qualified to go into
every detail of the Stern Hu cases I wasn't yet living
in Australian didn't work for an Australian think tank
but wanna the lessons I think am
but both shot sides should have taken away and in part to have taken away
is that if you don't have dialogue
you don't have communication at the very senior levels
if his not that much familiarity
between the CEOs of companies or the political leaders of countries
when something like that happens that they can pick up the phone
and discussed so flight to meet each other and discuss
and it is really downward spiral
I think a.m. at least that the company level
bizarre had many many discussions with Rio Tinto sense
and this has been acknowledged that there has to be
a lot of communication and I'd like to at the word trust
in dealings between to counterparts but also at the government level
someone has to get to know once counterpart
I'm not saying you have to agreed with what the Chinese
say or do but one has to know them well enough but one can have those
I'm discussions when problems arise and problems inevitably will
allies even in the economic relationship as Australia has
seen
law professor and thank you for a very clear and concise presentation
and Kenny from the supply commission I'm just wondering are
in 2009 when Austria releases defence white paper
I does some concern from China that the people as a
antagonistic to its China do you think that
reason might be with us release his con- some way to alleviate
consent thank you
certainly I think the wording into
most recent defence white paper Australia
am is different in tone than the one of 2009
I'm I think the Chinese quite understandably and if i've understood
correctly
rightfully thought that they were the target in 2009
am I've always advocated that one should say out loud
that there is uncertainty how China will use its power
and uncertainty evokes anxiety and sometimes a good night the invokes
appears
and its normal but we don't know how China will use its power in the future
because China doesn't know it sell
I think it would be much better to openly discuss
a.m. this fundamental issue so I think they're
recent defence white paper did take a few steps
at least I haven't read it word for word I have to admit I've been ill and
my boys is going but I have read a lot of commentary
around in some the government official statement since Friday
and I think there has been a step taken to
acknowledging that the these are questions that need to be
discussed and so it should be and so yes I think
the tone obvious recent
defence white paper has certainly probably I'm
been a positive I'm for
Beijing
in hi profession
thing thank you for your good pigmentation how unquestioned
and now you can use it happy mmm
people become dictated to us consume you any
especially luxury goose am can you
is using ok cocaine yeah thank you
yeah especially luxury goods and doesn't mean I think
their use some heat in secrecy and these phenomena
is it also a part of high Chinese administration's policy
which reacts to a globalization so
consumerism in China especially learned
Lux luxury goods I think it's a very natural
phenomenon as China has opened up to the world
I like to say that no one
in China can possibly and not know how people
in the city's live even problem villages they are one million villages by the way
in China
is a television many villages people surf the internet
they see how people in the city's live and the people in the city certainly
know how people in Singapore Taiwan Hong Kong
Sydney anywhere in the world live and everywhere in the world
people like to buy luxury goods I don't think there's a hidden agenda
China has become a part of the world and globalization
a has led to a awareness
of luxury goods I don't think and the Chinese government is promoting
the sales luxury goods I think people want to buy them
delivery thank you for this impressive toward a force around
Chinese foreign policy a morning how you characterize
China's behavior decisions in the security council in relation to you
his basement Syria that's a tough time
I'm China
as a Beato wielding
permanent member the security council never wants to be left alone
we've seen this time and again I'm
it foods to kinda take a bit of shield
behind Russia's back a.m. and
it's not going to be a spoil breaker I mean we even saw this on Libya
that it wouldn't stand alone in
opposition to what so called the rest want
Ord are striving toward and I think
that Syria poses an immense problem for the Chinese
of course he opposes an immense problem for every single member
I'll permanent member and any other member
above the security council at the moment so by pushy gym playing now is a new
leader
to be faced with am even
slightly the to hearing from this non-intervention
policy which is one other and principles of china's foreign policy has been
throughout the People's Republic of China
and is going to be a really tough call a.m.
China is always worried that if the approved all
am intervening in the sovereign state
and somewhere then that could be used against them
that that's a fundamental anxiety that China has
and of course we've seen many variations of China
going around this I'm not saying that but it's going to be a real
am dilemma and I probably
at this point in time should have mentioned it as a fifth
on my short term challenges for a China
and it's very difficult to predict up
thank you
um I was wondering if you could give your views on
China's current relationship with Russia and if you think
their relationship is going to change in the foreseeable a predictable future
that's ok
very important question I just want to add one thing to the previous
a.m. question and and this is a typical this Syria dilemma
that she Jinping its facing really reflects
his desire not to have to think about foreign policy issues i mean this is
really
at typical issue which he hasn't probably
been trained for I mean when I said that they have so much more foreign policy
experience than their predecessors this new
7 Politburo Standing Committee members am
their experienced in Africa
of course the pivotal US neighboring countries and so on but
Syria is not something he's probably sat down and really
put himself into now he's going to have to and that's
detract distracting him from what he really should be doing wants to be doing
and that's making sure the economy grows so this is another
dilemma that Syria poses I'm China Russia
I haven't really studied China Russia in the last two
two years that I've been in Australia my last report possibly was about
security and energy relations between China and Russia
and at the time I Bay much was above you
that despite I'm officially the two countries having the best relations ever
as we hear
every time the vid leader's visit each other am
they are immense tensions under the surface
between russia and China starting from
the fact that the little brother has now become the Big Brother
and vice versa am sentries I love
antagonism distrust I'm
at the grassroots level it's very difficult to get
cultural educational cooperation going because there seems to be an inherent
dislike for each other among the peoples and so on and so forth
I'm but having said that I think in the last two years
China and Russia both realized
even more so than before that they really can be of some use to each other
so it is as mobile or has said and I think keeps poking at the new
and some weeks if not months ago it is an axis of convenience
it's not real trust it's not real
I'm desire to have genuine cooperation but they need each other and I think
we're going to see more
that in the near future but in the long term
I really do not see them as partners I really don't see them
certainly is allies a.m. they they have conflicting interests at the end of the
day
aka very brief
up
Jim
with think you are mostly talk I want to ask you
up your opinion on the future the
sino-indian relations particularly with regards to written so for those
and that such in and those border disputes
thank you my name is make you more from Japanese embassy
and I first like to appreciate very fair and comprehensive description about the
situation
surrounding single on I it is
to allow our interests to maintain status quo
but I don't I don't want to argue right here
I like to yeah I'd like to ask a a question about that to a role
I'm eatery particularly pela a and I
foreign policy decision making %uh we
a recently have had that this incident where I'll
Chinese in a bubble I'll directed
to our 8am directly targeting radar
up to a Japanese unable award
all and that we on up quite sure
all which level all such a decision has been made
and up what label horse Xi Jinping himself has a control
military cell all of course they its
he's a supremely the to open to all Dmitry but
up %uh nowadays we've been hearing more more
on quite assertive opinions up from within
email in thank you
thank you and thank you for both questions I'm sorry did this disappoint
on the question of China India
I said that no one knows anything about North Korea man out stand by that
but china india is a very which topic and it's something that I haven't
I'm studied throughout my career properly
the only thing I would like to comment about the recent tensions is that it is
surprising to me
a.m. that as many observers before me have
noted that why is now china when it's
said me I think we're seeing signs of a trying to calm down
its activities b2b the Southeast Asian Nations why then
the new renewed tensions with
India that's a mystery for me but the deeper
china-india relations is not something that I've
follow and thank you also for the comments on
Japan night I agree with you China japan's intention is to keep the status
quo it's just the perception
which is the problem am
the role of the military in foreign policy
decision-making this is of course
the real crux understanding China's foreign policy
formulation am its something that we know
far too little about but what I have discovered
stunning these foreign policy actors and certainly the plae I consider them a new
foreign policy act I mean they've always been an active but they're really trying
to assert themselves into the
role now of course they are they want influence and
and I think that's natural but how much influence do they have is what we don't
really know this certainly poor communication
between the Foreign Affairs units
up the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
now it's a open secret am
in Beijing that the two absolutely don't get on with each other and they hardly
even communicate with each other I'm generally speaking
the role in power the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has declined
tremendously am over the last five to eight years
am though one Australian foreign policy official said
that's the case in all countries am
so the communication in this very stovepipe society is notoriously bad
specifically between the military and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who at least officially is supposed to
coordinate
foreign policy up civilian agencies
but there's also a disconnect if i understood Michael Swain who I
look upon as the world's leading expert on the plae and decision-making within
the plat
within the PL a between this foreign affairs
division on calling it it's it has a much more complicated name
and the ones who actually make strategy to also within the PL a
there's not the best have communication I've intention and then
action which could explain some other
miscommunications we have see as for this
one specific incident about locking in the radar
I mean no one knows who gave the command on that but to your question is she
Jinping income on the plat
yes definitely the plae is
the party's army this is something that's very
never had some good discussions in camber about this today with some
Australian senior officials it's very difficult to comprehend that is not
a national army it's something that many in China by the way
advocate for the pple would be China's National Army and not the party's
on but the fact of the matter is it is and
will remain as law mister party is in power
the party's army and Xi Jinping couldn't be
in power if you didn't and control the army
and any reports that say anything to the contrary I think
a very exaggerated Xi Jinping does have one
assets compared to his predecessors and that's because he was brought up as
everyone knows
I'm by a military
family he feels at home when he deals
with generals I mean morgenthau in his first year will number one wouldn't I
wasn't even
head of the Central Military Commission during the first two years of being in
power but
even despite that when he went to visit army units when he had discussions
when he had meetings he couldn't have possibly felt as comfortable as she
Jinping
who it's just very natural to have these generals around him
he has another childhood friends among to
civic senior ranks of the PL a so I would say definitely he is in power
how much the influence him we don't know I mean it
I would be lying if I said I even including how much they do influence him
but interaction he does have with the PL a much more
and wouldn't outdid during his first year right now at present if you just
look at his official
am program he certainly has a lot of interaction with the feeling
下载YouTube(cc)字幕请访问http://zhuwei.me/youtube