hi my name is Marc Torres me and this is
phenomenology we're looking at a man who
strolls text ideas pertaining to the
pure phenomenology into a pure
phenomenological philosophy book one
welcome back careful I hope you guys are
doing well in this video we're gonna
sort of jump in and we're gonna start by
taking a look at part two chapter one of
who strolls text ideas one so part two
the title for this next sort of section
we're opening up here it's called the
considerations fundamental to
phenomenology we called it up to this
point in the videos what we've seen is
we've seen who Cyril make pretty strong
objections against the philosophical
position of naturalism if you will and I
won't sort of go through that now and
he's talked about phenomenology and we
looked at his his texts the
phenomenology or philosophy is rigorous
science we saw that who Cyril wants to
articulate an eidetic science that is a
science of essences that's thorough and
certain and so first he's dislodged
naturalism and we're gonna see in this
second part he's going to start to lay
the groundwork for a phenomenology
proper especially in these first two
chapters we're taking a look at it so
chapter one here is the poppy is the
title is the positing which belongs to
the natural attitude and it's exclusion
so this is a very very important chapter
for this role although it's fairly brief
actually now he continues on with the
section numeration right so section 27
begins with the world of the natural
attitude I in my surrounding world okay
and we're gonna see at this point who
thrillin served what to say well when we
talk about our experience of the world
and the phenomena were experiencing
because remember the essences that were
after in philosophy like think about the
essence of justice I eat play-doh for
instance or you think about the essence
of numbers for the mathematician right
all of these essence
is occur as explorers experience to our
sin our subjective field of cognition
and so but we have to sort of begin our
analysis of cognition and and not just
cognition but consciousness by looking
at well what does it mean to have an
experience and whose trouble wants say
well let's just start with our sort of
basic worldview that is the way in which
we actually approach the arcs the way in
which most of our experiences are
actually characterized and they're
characterized by what he calls the
natural attitude now the natural
attitude of course you can see here he's
obviously thinking of naturalism in the
background and part of the reason here
is because he thinks that naturalism
confuses the rigorous scientific
evaluation of certain eidetic concepts
with the the the sense of attitude we
have in our natural sort of sense and
we're gonna see that he's talks about
and we've mentioned it the philosophical
attitude and how that's different than
the nationality but what is the natural
ID you know in doing this investigation
right we can do this investigation that
first person singular I'm sort of fond
to telling students students have been
trained to give up the first person
saying the word I and really what we see
with whose nose methodologies because we
ultimately its cognition that you're
exponents your cognition the exploit so
the first person singular is not just
convenient it is in fact maintains a
fidelity to what you're actually
describing right he says I am conscious
of a world that's endlessly spread out
in space endlessly be coming and having
endlessly become in time right I'm
conscious of it and that signifies above
all that intuitively I find it
immediately that I experience it right
and he's describing the sense that when
I look here I think the can of seltzer
water is what I'm drinking here when I
look at the can of seltzer water I grasp
it intuitively as being in the
world and being within a sort of field
of that's that's both in space but also
in tongue endlessly spread out before me
so it's sort of it's very beautiful
passage and I think in many ways we
really start to see the who Cyril the
logical investigations start to shine so
we go back to this first-person sailor
and think about the nav side you know
for instance you can take your own
experience describe your own experience
and we've done this in the class where
for instance you are we I've asked you
to give a description of what your daily
life is like right and when you take
that experience what are some of the the
characteristics essential to that
average everyday experience in which I
experienced the world is endlessly
before me right and it's there for me
immediately and intuitively as an object
right he says well never look it's
simply there right it's on hand it's on
hit him this is a sort of good mode cuz
you're gonna see what we get to hide
occurrence in a couple weeks here
Heidegger is going to also use the
language of the hand right maybe you can
sort of see you grab the thing you
grabbed the seltzer water bottle or can
I'm sorry and this is an example where
the world is at hand that is it's
something there for me to use it's
something that I can manipulate and
relate myself to it but it's just simply
there as it were and in this world this
experience presents actualities and in
the field of intuition now remember
think about intuition for who's early
earth as really being something like the
receiving capacity we have for the world
but sort of actual which what I say it
our intuition is what Prime's us to
understand and Cognos an experience of
the world is simply there right but
these are all presented is actualized
that is as things endowed with reality
and things are found directly in the
field of perception here right so
my perception of course not just my eyes
though the eyes are generally privileged
by philosophers because right many
philosophers have talked about this that
the eye is for instance seemed to give
us so much with so little effort on our
part right my knowledge of these objects
that experience in the world involves no
conceptual thinking as it were which
changes in to sort of clear intuitive
right and this is sort of an important
thing and the for instance earlier today
I was actually having a discussion with
some of my students in another class
about Plato and Plato's conception of
the soul and intellect and all these
sorts of things but there's something
that's probably missing in Plato's
conception because Plato describes the
soul as this rational element that
captures and grasp intellectual ideal
transcendent entities but there's
something fundamentally not right about
that in terms of trying to describe the
actual experience I have on the
day-to-day world right I don't what I
see actions playing because that this
has been sitting here I was from earlier
today but for here's my cup of water
right when I look at my cup of water
right there's no conceptual thinking
that's required either right I just
grasp it in a clear and Tooting right
and that which is clearly intended is
surrounded by what he calls us obscurely
intended to the horizon of an
intermediate actuality right that is
there's there's these other actualities
that are not yet quite there which are
also within my intuitive field so for
instance what I see let's say I have ice
in my glass of water
and when I look at the ice right it's
typical that the cup is cold like I'm
not perceiving at this moment that the
cup is cold but i intuited as one of
these actualities just on the other just
on the other side of the horizon of what
I am intending and of course I can
actualize that right and so there's this
so in the natural antigen you can see
your what justo doing is he's describing
the positing right remember he talked
about the positing that we have in the
bachelor chair he will in here a minute
but there's this sense in which we are
our experience of phenomena brings with
it and already given sense of actuality
and so and this is what its gonna refer
to as a posit no the obscurity of the in
turn of the indeterminate gets populated
with intuitive possibilities right so
here's another example of some magic
resist you're seen on the horizon and
you're looking out at the horizon the
further you go out even though it's
spread out before you in endless space
and time as it were in your experience
right what's what's indeterminate you
start to populate you start to fill in
the gaps with possibilities that you
recognize through not just your
transcendental capacities but in terms
of your actual life of of becoming
accustomed and expecting things there's
expectations and so for instance when I
look out into the horizon and I see
little things moving I start doing to it
the possibilities that these are other
persons like myself even though they are
completely vague and ambiguous within my
sense perception so this is important
because this means that in consciousness
our experience is not just limited to
this sort of sensation quality but
there's this if you will this activity
of intuition that we seem to have in
which we Intuit possibilities along the
horizon of our experience now also I
recognize that everything is in time
within this natural attitude right
everything has a way who's protocol is a
two-sided infinite temporal horizon this
is the known and the unknown right so
everything's in time now you can
honestly think normally time we we were
using the language of the past and the
present but but take a look at it right
and if I want to describe what I
actually know that what I can say is
that the further something is into the
past of the action the well no I don't
think that's what it means here right
they when I
into the past I have an experience of
what happened and in that sense
something is in time and then of course
in the future it's still unknown right
so we can trace these inner relations of
actualities that are immediately
surrounded us right and now here
something's very important number nine
that justo suggests and by the way
there's no he doesn't give numbers here
I just sort of laid out what I think are
some of the key points whose rule
recognizes that our standpoint in the
natural attitude is not fixed it can
change and it can not only change in
terms of time and space or as I can move
around the room and get different a
different concatenation of perspectives
but my standpoints also not fixed in the
sense that I'm I'm able even from the
same vantage point from the same sitting
position as it were to recognize in and
have a different perspective on the
world so consciousness is rich enough
and fantastically accommodating to allow
us this one looks like this really free
play in our day-to-day lives right so it
might a to the experience I was seeing
the world that I'm seeing in terms of
this horizon of possibilities in space
and in time some things are known some
things are unknown there's an inner
relations of actualities right but my
standpoint is one in which it seems to
be descriptively free phenomenally right
but my I can move about as it were so
the natural attitude is something that's
also continually available to us right
we're gonna see of course he's going to
differentiate or compare the natural
attitude to other types of attitudes
such as the philosophical idea or the he
calls it the arithmetical attitude and I
think that's funny to say so I called
the mathematical attitude and and
there's perhaps even the natural
scientific attitude right there's these
different types of attitudes that we can
take on in the way in which we see and
engage with the world but the natural
attitude is the one that always comes
back right it's the one that's always
available to me that is I'm always sort
of
the world in terms of these inner
relations of exercise that are that are
not just outside me but with me in an
important sense they're they're a part
of the horizon of things that I I
perceive and into it as immediately
actual and available right so physical
objects though for instance are abuse
physical objects of use are not only
available but I recognize certain value
characteristics now this is important
because what it means is that art our
sense of the world our natural everyday
experience of the world begins and
includes a layer of value description'
where we make value judgments and we
recognize certain things as having value
so value is very important here and of
course one of the questions in
contemporary philosophy concerns moral
realism and whether or not it's possible
to make moral judgments that actually
reflect reality now we're not going to
say that that's the case here or even
the who strolls say that because that's
certainly not what he's talking about
but it is relevant to consider here from
whose Earl's perspective that we do in
fact experience the world always if we
if you will with the layer of value
that's organizing our perception of what
we're perceiving what we're seeing right
so for instance right now I'll show you
what I'm looking at I'm looking at a
little bucket of pins then there's an
eraser and I can see here and there for
instance when I see the eraser right and
I see the pen and you can imagine if I'm
writing the pen and I need to I need
something to write with the pen has more
value in that circumstance right I
perceive it as having that value and so
there's sort of value characteristics in
the natural attitude and also there's a
social world of course of course right
we live in a world with others and this
world is also highly value Laden ok so
moving to section 28 the sort of phrase
that who Searle can capture out of the
Cartesian discourse here is this
conception of the cogito now the title
of this section is the cogito my natural
surrounding world and the ideal
surrounding worlds right so here's the
cogito right now all the mental acts are
going to be captured by this term so any
of these Matt these mental acts we have
whether it's judgments whether is a sort
of perception right you can see that
when we describe the naturalizer we
describe a whole bunch of different
experiences and types or modes of
experiences in the word coquito who can
stand for all of that right I mean here
it's really important I think whose role
reminds us and would recommend that I
remember remind you that the term cogito
here we need to strip it of its
philosophical heritage here and really
see it as a variable to talk about what
we're describing in these
phenomenological meditations and
contemplations right now for instance
one field of the cognition of course
that's included is mathematics it's
mathematics now on the one hand when
when if you want to compare the
experience I have in the National
attitude of looking at the water cup
here and if I want to compare that to
the sort of cognition that takes place
when I do mathematics say for instance
I'm looking at a diagram of geometric
proof of some sort right and I'm in and
I compare these now one feel the
cognition includes this stuff this map
these mathematical objects they're not
real in the same sense that the cup is
real I don't treat it as real now of
course who Stroh is not denying the
reality of mathematics here and that's
why I put it in scare quotes it's not a
real actuality but I just I know treat
isn't actually in the same sense right
and that's why for instance that's why
kids that's why people can say well
mathematics doesn't help you in the real
world why because the real world is
populated with things that are actually
available to me you know my immediate
field of cognition whereas these
mathematical objects
something as where I can attend to
mentally but they don't fill out the
world in the same way right no but he
does say but it but these all these
mathematical things do have an actuality
in a sense that for instance if I'm
looking at a geometric proof right
remember the proofs perhaps you did when
you took trigonometry or lhr in high
school right that when you do these
proofs they are actual they never change
they seem to be consistent and they're
always available to me so long as I'm in
this arithmetical attitude in it and so
and so that's sort of the first thing so
the term cogito spans the range here now
one of the things we recognize is that
we have sort of a world of there's
worlds of intention
there's worlds of intention right and
these worlds of intentions signify these
different types of attitudes so one of
the questions you may be asking though
what exactly is the difference between
the natural attitude and the
arithmetical attitude and the
philosophical attitude and whatever
other attitude we postulate what is the
difference well the difference is we're
talking about different worlds of
intention now he's going to talk about
intentionality quite a bit so I don't
wanna go into too much depth on it now
but we have talked about the notion of
intentionality intentionally refers to
the directedness of our cognition or I
know what is it regards the directedness
of consciousness right and when you when
you see the world and you direct your
consciousness in your average everyday
sense where you assume there's nature
and there's these different actual extra
bodies that are immediately given to you
and non-voluntary says right that that
signifies one type of world of attention
but when I turn it turn my intention in
my consciousness inwards as a word I
don't know if that's the right term in
words here but if not but when I turn it
inwards and do in it intend the sorts of
mathematical objects you think about
what pie is what radiuses and diameters
and parallelograms and how all of those
features can function within geometric
proof right there I do have
I do have consciousness directionality
but it's towards a particular type of
things different sort of worlds right
and that's what these attitudes refer to
is they refer to different worlds of
intentionality right so moving here in a
section 29 the other ego subjects and
the interests objective natural
surrounding world one of the really
important things one of the things that
I'm most interested in personally my own
research concerns the question of others
and it concerns the question of our
experience of other people the world we
experience every we experience others
all the time now but the here's the
thing is that in the natural attitude we
treat others as egos subjects which are
like ourselves alright let me even scoot
in there so you can see it right so for
instance if I am let's say I was just at
a restaurant I just had sushi and for
instance the wit the waitress was there
and she was very nice he had for a since
I treated her and I not just treat her
but I I assume and I expect and I have
no other way of imagining her is anyone
different than someone that's similar to
me that is in terms of being an ego
subject who has consciousness and who
has similar phenomenal experiences right
I I treat her as being someone like
myself as a subject of the world and the
natural attitude and I recognize that we
are in the same objective world right
then we're both in the same world it's
not this that she has consciousness and
I have it but that we have a common
world and that we built with that we
intuitive within different modes if you
will right so for instance she's
experienced in the world the same world
that I am and we share the world but
she's experiencing it in a different
mode than I am right I don't know what
her attitude is for instance and I also
don't know
for instance the her or even her
physical perspective her physical
perceptions and sensations are different
right she's
seeing the world over there and I'm
sitting here and she's over there so
it's a difference but there is a way in
which in the natural attitude we just
treat it we treat others as being just
like us but just occupying a different
position right that is we come to an
understanding with our fellow human
being and in common with them posit and
objective spatio-temporal actuality as
our factually existent surrounding world
to which we ourselves nonetheless belong
couple spelling errors there so my
apologies you know it's hard to always
prove this stuff so you can see here
this is with that we just treat it as a
sort of fact right and so this is sort
of important so it's realist I know is
you sort of characterize this and one
thing I mention is he's gonna use this
term inter subjective why because since
I treat the other person as a subject
and other subject right and there is
subject like me that means that our
social relationship can be referred to
as intersubjective that is the place in
which we as distinct subjects come
together right that's all inter
subjective means here now in section 30
we see who stroke began to discuss the
general positing which characterizes the
natural attitude and I've mentioned this
at the beginning now the National
attitude is a description and it's prior
to any theory so we thought we haven't
been doing and what whose role has not
been doing in the second chapter is
trying to give us a theoretical you know
model for how to understand cognition
and experience he's is describing the
way in which we actually do experience
the world and one of the things that's
interesting is even though people
especially in certain analytic
philosophers are highly critical of
phenomenology you can see here that he
is describing really the way in which we
do in fact treat others in the world
right um he's not making this up I don't
think it describes my experience
perfectly right but what he wants to say
here is that within this natural
attitude we have this conception of
positing right and what does it mean to
posit something in the most simple way
you can say that deposit means to put
forward right to say that some
it's not anything to say something
because he doesn't mean it in that sense
but deposit is to put something out into
the world so to to think that something
is the case and to act as it is and to
bring it into reality so deposit is to
bring something into the world I think
so what is the positing of the National
attitude well he says a quote I
continually find the one spatiotemporal
actuality to which I belong like all the
other human beings who are to be found
in it and who are related to it as I am
now I find this actuality now the word
already says it here right as if
actually exists in actuality and also
accepted I accept it as it presents
itself to me as factually existent so
what is the next what is the positing
that comes with the nationalize you well
the positing is that we treat everything
is factually existent right and we
accept it and then it's also presenting
itself to us in an immediate intuitive
way and it's also non voluntary right
and when I say non vult or that is when
I look at the cup of water right I even
if I close my eyes and open them it
seems to come in again right and so but
the positing here is that I posit this
thing we've been calling actuality of
ultimately but when I posit it's not
that I'm saying the water is actual
people don't live their lives saying
this is actual this is not right people
live their lives treating it as if it's
actual so this is an operative condition
right of the natural attitude he says no
he continues to read no doubt about or a
rejection of data belonging to the
natural world alters in any respect the
general positing which characterizes the
natural attitude that is what he wants
to say is that even when I discover that
my knowledge is wrong I don't stop the
natural positing or the positing that
comes with the nationality right so even
for instance let's say it's very common
for instance that a person who's seen a
crime in
a witness will eventually start to
misremember rather quickly actually what
they have experienced you've probably
heard of this in other psychology or
maybe philosophy classes where it's
where human beings are actually really
really poor eyewitnesses we tend to
remember what we want to remember right
but imagine for instance your eye
witness and imagine for instance you see
a sort of crime right and you report it
and then suddenly someone shows you a
video of what happened and you were
wrong you were wrong that is your memory
maybe even your perception of the events
was incorrect
right so improves it - for instance I'm
sure this happens occasionally for
instance this is the job of police right
but notice that even when I discover
that I'm wrong about what I think I know
about the world I don't then stop
believing that the world is real right
or that the perceptions I'm having of
all these objects in the world are real
so so even if I reject the data that
belongs to natural world this doesn't
change the general positing which
characterizes the natural attitude so
let's take a look at number 31 this next
section and here's where things get
interesting and we start to see where
who Cyril starts to sort of turn the
screwdriver and starts to move us into a
more solid phenomenological claim right
section 131 here's the radical
alteration of the natural positing and
he calls this excluding or parent that
of parenthesizes now what he's kind of
let's say are you here is that
phenomenology we ultimately going to do
in phenomenology is we're going to
evaluate the descriptions of our
experience in terms of the identic
relations that structurally must be in a
transcendental sense in order for me to
have the experience I'm having so but we
need a way in order to actually isolate
and if you will yeah I would say in
order to isolate and identify specific
features of our experience that are
relevant but the first thing we have to
recognize is that one of the things we
can do is we can alter the general
positing right so here's sort of what he
argues right well
and positive we treat the surrounding
world is factually existent right we
treat it as an actuality but the
positing does does not change any
features of the experience right
the positing is actually a sort of
judgment right why does the posi not
change a features because right you know
in a philosophy 101 class right the
professor will frequently say how do you
know that this isn't a dream right
what's happening there well essentially
the what the professor does is they say
everything you're experiencing right
maybe doesn't have actuality right
they're actually forcing you to exclude
than the general positing that comes
with the natural attitude right because
if you because even if it's true that
this isn't real right that doesn't
change that what I'm experiencing is
what I'm experiencing right so that
means that the the general positive if
we ignore it right is actually a change
in judgment which this means that we can
actually treat everything as being on
hand right and this results in treating
everything is on hand right because now
I can actually now begin even if I have
unclear ideas I can begin to to
understand them in their own on their
own terms
right so in fact the general positing is
what he calls a predicate to judgment
about the surrounding world never called
it if you've taken a logic course you
should if you have it you should maybe
have good right you'll learn about
predicate propositions right but in
every proposition there's a subject and
there's a predicate right the subject is
what you're talking about and the
predicate is what you're saying about
whatever it is you're talking about
really right and so it's a predicate of
judgment and the idea here is that when
we talk about the surrounding world the
subject of the world doesn't change
right but we alter the predicate our
predicate of judgment about the world
that's probably not the best description
or explanation but I'm hoping that I'll
help you understand what he means here
when he talks about predicate of
judgment okay so
but how does this sort of work how does
this exclusion and of course he's well
aware that we were talking about here
sounds a lot like Descartes remember
take cards doubt all things that can be
doubted that was in its own way it's
more than just the suspension or the
exclusion of the National attitude but
it did result in the exclusion of all
things actual right so what was
Descartes doing well Descartes was
attempting to doubt universally he's
trying to doubt all things in all ways
in all cases right that's the most
radical form of doubt which even
Descartes discovers it is not possible
in the end it doesn't withstand its own
reflection
hence the I think therefore I am okay so
that's the first sort of thing now what
did Descartes do well this is just a
methodological expedient that is
Descartes was just trying to speed up
his method right he's trying to use a
method in this sort of device in order
to clear away all the false knowledge
that had been built up in his previous
his previous conceptions right now what
whose role that says is that this
reveals what we might call our perfect
freedom in positing that is nothing in
the world forces me to posit anything
about the world right in terms of
actuallity now notice here we're talking
about actuality and we're talking about
the predicate of judgments we make when
we say that something exists or
something has an ontological actuality
or something like this right but what we
realize that here is that since we can
exclude things like it while it's true
that I don't have perfect freedom in
terms of controlling what I'm perceiving
I can't look at the cup and then
suddenly click my eyes and see something
different I can't have perfect freedom
in terms of whether or not I posit
things as having actuality or not right
I can't in fact while looking here at my
desk and recording this video I can in
fact you know begin to sort of treat the
idea that all of my perceptions do not
actually have an actuality on the other
side right and I'm perfectly free to do
it so this is really quite interesting
especially when we talk when people want
to talk about
conceptions of freedom because it looks
like here is that we do have freedom and
the freedom can be demonstrative Lee
shown simply by its the the the freedom
to doubt things universally right and so
that we have a sort of phenomenological
four you might say and we can put doubt
something despite its being available to
us in the National Action that was the
example I was giving you right even
though in the National attitude the
computer is right here before me right
I can doubt it and so what does that
mean it means that it's not so much that
I'm taking away my experience I'm not
modifying my experience what I'm doing
is I'm modifying my general positing
remember since the Gienapp time she was
always available to me I can always stop
modification as it were and then treat
the world as really what it is right and
this is what he means by the term
excluding right or parent the sizing
right and so what he's gonna then say is
that we can start to use this suspension
of our general pausing suspension babies
that threat term modification of the
general positive and we can start to
realize that we can exclude certain
things within our investigation for
instance we can exclude for instance
whether or not these things really are
here right now here's is a great sort of
quote here that I like to include he
says with regard to any positing we can
quite freely exercise this peculiar
epoch a certain reframing from judgment
which is compatible with the unshakable
conviction of truth even with the
unshakable conviction of evident truth
right now he's gonna use this term epoch
here and I'm gonna show it to you in
just a minute to refer to this sort of
exclusion and what we can do when we
sort of I don't wanna say pretend but
where we ignore the we suspend this
general positing that characterizes the
naturalizing we can not necessarily
believe that really is actual right he's
gonna call this the epoch and we can
just even with things that we really are
absolutely certain it's like all
triangles have three
sides believe it or not philosophers
have asked the question do all triangles
have to have three sides that sounds
insane
and it also is not sort of joking a
little bit but we there's a sort of
unshakable conviction that it's
evidently true that a triangle has three
sides but even we can pause it we can
suspend this general positing here with
a natural attitude and this is what the
paralyzing judgment is where every
positing related to this objectivity is
to be excluded and is converted into a
parenthetical modification so I sort of
think about like this is how you have
parentheses in a sentence essentially
saying is the natural idea is we sort of
have the long sentence of our experience
and what we're doing is that we in
phenomenology we can parenthesize
certain things we can bracket them out
as a word in fact we'll see later he
actually begins to use that very
language now thirty Section 32 is very
important is the phenomenological
okay epoch came so this is the Greek
term epoch or here's the English
equivalent epoch this really I think is
pronounced something like beep okay
right
and what does beep okay mean or epoch a
in he said epoch a refers to this idea
that quote I am NOT negating the world
as though I'm a sophist when I ignore
the actual of things I'm not doubting
its factual being as though I were a
skeptic rather I'm experiencing the
phenomenological a pumpkin which also
completely shuts me off from any
judgment about Spacey Oh temporal
factual being right so this is really
quite interesting and important so
what's happening here the in this
problem we can parenthesize and bracket
things out when we can ignore the
actuality of something this is the
phenomenological epoch this is a
phenomenological movement here and it's
so important he gives it a Greek term
right and an important term with that
right and so he's not a sophist he's an
ensign and so this he's not a solipsist
right and he's not a skeptic right he
just recognizes descriptively this is
something we can do we can exercise this
phenomenological
suspension of the general positing and
he says we accept a proposition only as
a form of modified consciousness right
so that means that what so if we suspend
all of like take your experience you're
sitting here watching the video right
now now suspend the general positing
that is may now now analyze and describe
your experiences without the assumption
that there's actuality here and what you
see is that now all the things we can do
only things we can talk about our forms
of modified consciousness because after
all that's all I'm left with right ok so
we're going to stop right there here for
the next video which is chapter 2
consciousness and natural action body
you're gonna really enjoy it because
we're going to see that this this is
gonna really build up into a really
fabulous set of arguments on this show
so thanks for watching and I'll see you
guys online